LESTER
CROWN CENTER
ON US FOREIGN POLICY
By Dina Smeltz,
Ivo Daalder,
Karl Friedho,
Craig Kafura, and
Emily Sullivan
A Foreign Policy
for the Middle
Class—What
Americans Think
RESULTS OF THE 2021 CHICAGO
COUNCIL SURVEY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC
OPINION AND US FOREIGN POLICY
2021 Chicago Council
Survey Team
Meghan Bradley
Intern, Chicago Council on
Global Aairs
Karl Friedho
Marshall M. Bouton Fellow, Public
Opinion and Asia Policy, Chicago
Council on Global Aairs
Craig Kafura
Assistant Director, Public Opinion
and Foreign Policy, Chicago
Council on Global Aairs
Fosca Majnoni d’Intignano
Intern, Chicago Council on
Global Aairs
Dina Smeltz
Senior Fellow, Public Opinion and
Foreign Policy, Chicago Council
on Global Aairs
Katherine Stiplosek
Intern, Chicago Council on
Global Aairs
Emily Sullivan
Research Assistant, Chicago
Council on Global Aairs
Colin Wol
Intern, Chicago Council on
Global Aairs
Foreign Policy Advisory Board
Joshua Busby
Associate Professor of Public
Aairs, Lyndon B. Johnson School
of Public Aairs, University of
Texas at Austin
Ivo Daalder
President, Chicago Council on
Global Aairs
Michael Desch
Packey J. Dee Professor
of International Relations,
Department of Political Science,
University of Notre Dame
Daniel Drezner
Professor of International Politics,
Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University
Peter Feaver
Professor of Political Science and
Public Policy, Duke University
Richard Fontaine
CEO, Center for a New American
Security
Brian Hanson
Vice President of Studies,
Chicago Council on Global Aairs
Bruce Jentleson
William Preston Few Professor
of Public Policy and Political
Science, Sanford School of Public
Policy, Duke University
Ellen Laipson
Distinguished Fellow and
President Emeritus, Stimson
Center
Tod Lindberg
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
James Lindsay
Senior Vice President, Director
of Studies, Chair, Council on
Foreign Relations
Diana Mutz
Samuel A. Stouer Professor
of Political Science and
Communication, Director
of the Institute for the Study of
Citizens and Politics, University
of Pennsylvania
Robert Pape
Professor of Political Science,
University of Chicago
Kori Schake
Senior Fellow and Director of
Foreign and Defense Policy
Studies, American Enterprise
Institute
James Steinberg
Incoming Dean, John Hopkins
School of Advanced International
Studies
The Chicago Council on Global
Aairs is an independent,
nonpartisan organization.
All statements of fact and
expressions of opinion contained
in this report are the sole
responsibility of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Chicago Council on
Global Aairs or of the project
funders.
Copyright © 2021 by the Chicago
Council on Global Aairs. All
rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of
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copying permitted by sections
107 and 108 of the US Copyright
Law and excerpts by reviewers
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about the Chicago Council or
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Photography:
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
2
CONCLUSION METHODOLOGY APPENDIX
34
36
38
DEFINING THE
MIDDLE CLASS
INTRODUCTION
1311
LINKAGES BETWEEN
US DOMESTIC AND
FOREIGN POLICIES
13
US MILITARY
SUPERIORITY
AND PRESENCE
ABROAD
29
BUILDING AT HOME
TO COMPETE WITH
CHINA ABROAD
18
EFFORTS TO
RESTORE US
LEADERSHIP
26
REVITALIZING
ALLIES AND
PARTNERS
31
ENDNOTES
42
2
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In his inaugural speech, US President Joe Biden ticked o a range of challenges confronting the country.
“We face an attack on democracy and on truth. A raging virus. Growing inequity. The sting of systemic
racism. A climate in crisis. America’s role in the world. Any one of these would be enough to challenge
us in profound ways. But the fact is we face them all at once, presenting this nation with the gravest of
responsibilities.”
1
To meet this responsibility, President Biden and his administration propose a “Foreign Policy for the
Middle Class,” which aims to simultaneously meet America's challenges at home and abroad.
2
At its core, the Foreign Policy for the Middle Class is about recognizing the linkages between American
domestic strength and US ability to maintain international competitiveness. It emphasizes investing
at home—in recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, infrastructure, green technology, and a range
of other social and domestic programs. With these investments, the administration aims to equip
American workers, companies, and the government to compete with—and outperform—international
competitors. That means investing in American businesses that operate in strategic sectors, research and
development, and American jobs and wages rather than focusing on expansive trade deals.
By “building back better” at home, the administration seeks to revitalize the US strength and dynamism
needed for the growing political, economic, and security competition with China. To prevail in that
competition, the Biden team is intent on restoring US alliances and working with allies to confront
adversaries and to address the most pressing global problems. US ocials also consider this competition
a challenge between democracies and autocracies, and which system can better deliver concrete results
for everyday citizens. They call for not only restoring democracy at home but also elevating the centrality
of human rights. And most of all, the Biden team argues that American leadership and engagement
matter. “We must demonstrate clearly to the American people that leading the world isn’t an investment
we make to feel good about ourselves,” Biden has argued.
3
“It’s how we ensure the American people are
able to live in peace, security, and prosperity. It’s in our undeniable self-interest.”
The idea of a Foreign Policy for the Middle Class has not been without its critics. There is confusion and
debate about how this policy would be formulated—with some arguing it is little more than a slogan.
Some point to the populist tinge inherent in these ideas,
4
with similarities to the last administration's
America First policies. Others think of it as “Trumpism with a human face,”
5
focusing on the well-being of
Americans first but without the divisive nationalism that alienated some Americans and denigrated US
allies.
6
Another commentator points out that the economic well-being of the middle class is determined
less by foreign policy and more by domestic policy—“where the politics are fiercer, congressional
influence is stronger, and presidents enjoy less freedom of action.”
7
Other skeptics fault the Biden
strategy for incorporating “bad economics and class warfare” into US foreign policy.
8
And even those
columnists who acknowledge some of the merits of the policy assert that “proposing a middle class
litmus test for every major decision” risks setting impossible standards.
9
3
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
The controversial decision to remove US troops from Afghanistan has been the most high-profile example
of the Biden strategy, demonstrating the administration’s commitment to refocusing American eorts
and resources on initiatives with more tangible payos for the American people. Critics say that the way
the withdrawal was executed has hurt US credibility with our allies and has risked deflating confidence in
traditional political leadership,
10
perhaps giving energy to authoritarian politicians such as Trump.
11
A solid
majority of Americans have consistently supported the withdrawal. But beyond Afghanistan, a Foreign
Policy for the Middle Class could have potential ramifications across all facets of US foreign policy,
including US trade policy, US alliances, US leadership on global issues, and relations with China.
The 2021 Chicago Council Survey finds that Americans welcome several of the major ideas underpinning
a Foreign Policy for the Middle Class. The public sees large businesses (59%) and the wealthy (50%) as
benefiting a great deal from US foreign policy, rather than the American middle class (11%). Americans see
China as a rising economic and military power, one that seeks to replace the United States as the leading
power in the world. And Americans think that by making concrete progress at home—by improving
education, strengthening democracy, and maintaining US economic power—the United States can
enhance its global influence.
While many of the administration’s foreign policy priorities are also priorities for the US public, that is
not universally true. The public is less interested in promoting human rights and democracy abroad
than the administration proclaims to be. And the data also seem to disprove some of the assumptions
undergirding the administration’s approach to foreign policy—namely, that Americans are skeptical about
trade and wary of US global engagement and leadership.
Americans Support Focusing on Domestic Improvement
A key feature of the Foreign Policy for the Middle Class is the link between domestic investments and
international influence. In fact, the factors seen by most Americans as very important for maintaining
US international influence are domestically focused. Majorities of Americans consider improving public
education (73%), strengthening democracy at home (70%), and reducing both racial (53%) and economic
inequality (50%) as very important to maintaining America’s global influence (Figure A). But those are not
the only factors important to the public; Americans also see maintaining US economic power (66%) and
American military superiority (57%) as key elements to US global influence. It is these latter elements that
Americans also see as being directly challenged by a rising China.
While Americans have been supportive of public spending on infrastructure for decades, according
to Chicago Council Surveys, they do not appear to make a connection between infrastructure
improvements at home and benefits to US influence overseas. The public rates the importance of
improving infrastructure relatively low (10th out of 12 items that are very important to retaining US global
influence). Promoting democracy and human rights around the world, taking leadership on international
issues, and participating in international organizations are similarly low on this list.
4
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Americans Sense China Is Catching Up to the United States
A major aim of the administration’s policies, Biden has argued, is to prepare the United States to face the
challenges to US prosperity, security, and democratic values presented by “our most serious competitor,
China.”
12
Americans are broadly concerned about competition from China, and they are notably less
confident in US economic and military strength compared with China now than they were two years
ago. A plurality of Americans (40%) say China is economically stronger than the United States, up from
31 percent who said the same in 2019 (Figure B); only a quarter (27%) see the United States as stronger
(down from 38% in 2019). And for the first time in Council polling, fewer than half of Americans (46%) say
the United States is stronger than China in terms of military power, down from 58 percent who said the
same in 2019 (Figure C).
Please indicate how important the following factors are to the United States remaining influential on the
global stage: (%)
n = 1,045
Figure A: Remaining Influential on the Global Stage
2021 Chicago Council Survey
Somewhat important
Very important
Not very important
Promoting democracy and human
rights around the world
Maintaining US economic power
Reducing racial inequality at home
Maintaining US military superiority
Improving public education
Encouraging legal immigration
Reducing economic inequality at home
Increasing public spending on
infrastructure
Preventing political violence such as
the January 6 insurrection
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Strengthening democracy at home
Not important at all
Taking leadership on international
issues
Participating in international
organizations
73 22 3
70 23 4
66 28 4
57 28 9
54 25 9
53 25 11
50 30 11
46 36 10
44 42 9
43 40 12
41 45 10
37 44 13
2
2
4
10
10
8
7
4
5
3
5
1
5
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Figure B: US-China Economic Power Comparison
At the present time, which nation do you feel is stronger in terms ofeconomicpower, the United States or
China—or do you think they are about equal economically?(%)
n = 2,086
China
The United States
About equal
26
27
45
2014 2016 2019
2021
28
31
38
29
38
31
31
27
40
2021 Chicago Council Survey
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Figure C: US-China Military Comparison
At the present time, which nation do you feel is stronger in terms ofmilitarypower, the United States or
China—or do you think they are about equal militarily? (%)
n = 2,086
China
The United States
About equal
32
54
14
2014 2016 2019
2021
32
50
15
30
58
11
35
46
18
2021 Chicago Council Survey
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
6
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Widespread Support for Trade Restrictions against China and
Industrial Policies to Bolster US Businesses
There is a strong economic dimension to the administration’s foreign policy approach, designed, in part,
to increase American competitiveness against China. Many Americans agree, with two-thirds (66%) saying
that maintaining US economic power is one of the most important factors in the United States retaining
global influence. And Americans see China’s rise as a challenge to that economic power.
Americans currently think trade with China has more negatives than positives for the United States.
In a dramatic shift from 2019, a majority of Americans now says trade between the two nations does more
to weaken US national security (58%, up from 33% in 2019). By contrast, two years ago—amid the
US-China trade war—two-thirds of Americans believed that US-China trade strengthened US national
security. And in a separate question, majorities favor increasing taris on products imported from China
(62%) and significantly reducing trade between the two countries, even if this leads to greater costs for
American consumers (57%). A Council poll in March 2021 found that majorities of Americans also favored
prohibiting US companies from selling sensitive high-tech products to China (71%) and prohibiting Chinese
technology companies from building communications networks in the United States (66%).
To compete with China in the development of emerging technologies, US ocials propose direct public
investment into strategically important industries. Americans are broadly supportive of this approach;
eight in 10 say the government should fund research and development of emerging technologies to
give US companies an edge over foreign businesses (79%). Seven in 10 favor financial support for US
companies that are competing against foreign businesses receiving support from their respective
governments (72%).
Slightly fewer Americans—but still majorities—support imposing taris on foreign products in industries
that compete with US businesses (60%), banning or limiting imports from foreign companies that compete
with US businesses (57%), and identifying businesses most likely to succeed and giving them financial
support (55%).
Administration Underestimates Public Support for Trade
Some of the administration’s assumptions about everyday Americans’ inclinations are not borne out by
the data. Administration ocials concede that Americans have not benefited as much from globalization
and US trade policies as much as policymakers had hoped. But the 2021 Chicago Council Survey
suggests these ocials undervalue US public support for globalization and trade.
MORE AMERICANS NOW SAY TRADE BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA DOES MORE TO
WEAKEN US NATIONAL SECURITY
58%( )
.
7
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
A record number of Americans (68%) now say globalization is mostly good for the United States,
and nearly three-quarters or more consider international trade to be beneficial to consumers, their own
standard of living, US technology companies, the US economy, and US agriculture (Figure D). Smaller
majorities say international trade is good for US manufacturing companies and creating jobs in the United
States. This support for international trade spans the political spectrum.
Overall, do you think international trade is good or bad for: (%)
n = 2,086
Figure D: Beneficiaries of Trade
2021 Chicago Council Survey
Bad
Good
US tech companies
US manufacturing companies
The US economy
Consumers like you
Creating jobs in the United States
US agriculture
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Your own standard of living
82
79
78
75
73
63
60
17
20
21
24
25
37
40
(
8
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Solid Support for Continued US Global Leadership
With the recent withdrawal from Afghanistan as a backdrop, there is an enduring assumption among
senior Biden administration ocials that the American public has become disillusioned with the US-led
international order and is ready for a more restrained US foreign policy. As Secretary Blinken said in his
March 2021 speech, “for some time now Americans have been asking tough but fair questions about
what we’re doing, how we’re leading – indeed whether we should be leading at all.”
13
Some of those concerns may be overstated: nearly two-thirds of Americans (64%) say it is better for the
United States to play an active part in world aairs than to stay out of world aairs (35%)—a finding that is
consistent with past surveys (Figure E). And a majority of the public believes the benefits of maintaining
the US role in the world outweigh the costs (56%).
Figure E: US Role in World Aairs
Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world aairs or if we stay
out of world aairs? (%)
n = 2,086
Active part
Stay out
1978 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002
2004
2006
2008
1974 1982 2010
2012
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
29
23
35
27
28
29
28
25
30
28
36
31
38
41
35
35
35
29
30
30
35
67
59
54
64
62
65
61
71
67
69
63
67
61
58
64
64
64
70
69
68
64
2021 Chicago Council Survey
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
9
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
The public also wants the United States to play a leading role in preventing nuclear proliferation (76%),
combating terrorism (67%), sending COVID-19 vaccines to other countries in need (62%), and limiting
climate change (58%). But Americans do not want to manage this responsibility on their own: a large
majority supports a policy of shared leadership (69%) rather than seeking a dominant role for the country
(23%). The public also supports international cooperation in resolving critical global issues, with majorities
of Americans backing US participation in the Paris Agreement on climate change (64%) and the Iran
nuclear agreement (59%).
While Supporting Afghanistan Withdrawal, Americans Still
Want to Rely on US Military
The withdrawal from Afghanistan has prompted fierce criticism of the Biden administration and its
foreign policy approach. But a broad majority of Americans continues to support the decision. Even so,
Americans show little interest in pulling the US military back from other commitments around the world. A
majority of Americans (57%) says maintaining US military superiority is a very important factor to US global
influence, and most think US military bases around the world enhance US military strength. Majorities of
Americans want to either maintain or increase the US military presence in Asia-Pacific (78%), Africa (73%),
Latin America (73%), Europe (71%), and the Middle East (68%).
In addition, Americans are as willing as ever—or even more willing—to send US troops to defend allies
and partners across a range of scenarios. For example, if North Korea invaded South Korea, 63 percent
would support using US troops to defend South Korea. A record-high 59 percent of Americans support
using US troops if Russia invades a NATO ally such as Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia. Perhaps the most
striking shift is that, for the first time, a bare majority of Americans (52%) supports using US troops if China
were to invade Taiwan; in 2020, only 41 percent supported US involvement.
10
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Conclusion
In a March 2021 speech, Secretary of State Antony Blinken argued that the administration’s priorities
would respond to three questions: “What will our foreign policy mean for American workers and their
families? What do we need to do around the world to make us stronger here at home? And what do we
need to do at home to make us stronger in the world?”
14
As the 2021 Chicago Council Survey shows, this
idea of a Foreign Policy for the Middle Class has some resonance with the American public.
The public believes that reforms to education, democracy, and economic competitiveness will bear
fruit for America’s international role. And, like Biden and many in his administration, Americans are
concerned about the rise of China as an economic and military competitor to the United States. However,
while Americans back reduced trade with China and providing government support for businesses
developing emerging technologies, they are also far more positive about the benefits of trade than the
administration assumes.
Internationally, Americans seek to share leadership with other nations and to establish a leading US role
in addressing many of the world's most pressing challenges, including climate change and the COVID-19
pandemic. They also want the United States to participate in international agreements that address
critical threats, such as the Paris Agreement and the Iran nuclear deal. And though the public backs the
withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, Americans favor maintaining the existing US military presence
around the world and are more likely now than in past years to support using force to defend US allies
and partners.
The Biden administration’s push to restore American leadership abroad while dramatically renewing
domestic programs contains an internal tension.
15
That tension arises from two key areas. First, senior
administration ocials have only so much time and attention. Focusing on one area, such as global
leadership, will necessarily detract from others, including domestic renewal. More importantly, every
administration has limited fiscal resources and political capital for its initiatives. While the American public
supports revitalization on both domestic and international fronts, the Biden team will inevitably face
trade-os. Ultimately, however, the question will be whether the Foreign Policy for the Middle Class is
able to deliver on both fronts—domestic and international alike—to realize its promised benefits for the
American people.
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Do Americans Think? 2021 Chicago Council Survey
11
DEFINING THE MIDDLE CLASS
A “Foreign Policy for the Middle Class” raises a question: which Americans, exactly, consider themselves
as belonging to the middle class? As other researchers have shown, there are many ways to define the
“middle class.” For this report, we opted to interpret the administration’s use of the term to discuss the
views of Americans overall, rather than focus on Americans who specifically describe themselves as
members of the middle class. This fits with the general rhetorical approach of political figures who often
use “middle class” to mean everyday Americans or the American general public. At any rate, the vast
majority of Americans identifies as some variant of the middle class. When asked what socioeconomic
class they belong in, half of Americans (48%) self-identify as belonging to the middle class; another
quarter (25%) say they are in the lower-middle class, and 18 percent say they are upper-middle class.
Relatively few Americans identify outright as a member of the lower class (8%) or upper class (2%).
That said, the views of those who identify themselves as middle-class Americans do dier from those
of other Americans in some ways, including from both upper-middle-class and lower-middle-class
counterparts.
Some dierences are political. The 48 percent who describe themselves as part of the middle class are
more likely to identify as Republican than lower-class Americans, and less likely to identify as Democrats
compared with upper-class Americans. Middle-class Americans are also more likely than lower-class
Americans to say they are ideologically conservative, and less likely than upper-class Americans to
identify as ideological liberals.
There are also demographic dierences. With an average age of 49, middle-class Americans are
older than the average lower-class American (45) but younger than upper-class Americans (51). They
are also more likely to identify racially as white, non-Hispanic than lower-class Americans. And there
are notable dierences in educational attainment. Lower-class Americans are far less likely to have a
college education, while upper-class Americans are far more likely to say the same. The middle class
sits between these two extremes, with a third holding a college degree, another third with some college
education, and another third with a high school diploma or less.
Some of these dierences also translate into policy preferences. The middle class is more likely than
other Americans to see the United States as the greatest country in the world, and more likely to see US
military superiority as very important to maintaining US influence around the world. They are also more
likely to see controlling and reducing illegal immigration, and limiting China’s influence around the world,
as very important policy goals for the United States. But in many ways, middle-class Americans hold
very middle-of-the-road views. Like other Americans, they favor an active role in the world for the United
States, shared leadership with other countries, and see trade and globalization as largely positive for
the country.
12
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
INTRODUCTION
Not long after US President Joe Biden took oce, his administration announced its overarching foreign
policy strategy—a Foreign Policy for the Middle Class. For President Biden, strengthening the middle
class is an important way to win the “fundamental debate” over whether democracies or autocracies
are the superior system. “We must demonstrate that democracies can still deliver for our people in
this changed world,” he said at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference. “That, in my view, is our
galvanizing mission.”
16
The need to increase American competitiveness in the face of a rising China is a motivating force for this
foreign policy approach. The idea that domestic renewal can revive international influence rests on the
United States simultaneously rebuilding its economy, democracy, and alliances to work “from a position
of strength” worldwide.
The results of the 2021 Chicago Council Survey show that most Americans are receptive to these ideas.
Americans see a need to prioritize domestic revitalization and US competitiveness. There is broad
backing for more restrictive policies toward China, and support for US alliances remains strong. However,
the data also show that the Biden administration—like others before it—underestimates support among
the American public for international trade, US international involvement, and US global leadership. At
the same time, the administration may overestimate the American public’s concern for human rights
and democracy abroad. Despite some critics’ views that the Foreign Policy for the Middle Class is too
expansive with both domestic and international activism, these results show that Americans do not think
US foreign policy should be laid aside while domestic issues are addressed. On the contrary, Americans
expect that domestic improvements will benefit US influence and leadership abroad.
13
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
LINKAGES BETWEEN US DOMESTIC
AND FOREIGN POLICIES
In his inaugural speech, President Biden ticked o a range of challenges aecting the country. “We
face an attack on democracy and on truth. A raging virus. Growing inequity. The sting of systemic racism.
A climate in crisis. America’s role in the world. Any one of these would be enough to challenge us in
profound ways. But the fact is we face them all at once, presenting this nation with the gravest
of responsibilities.”
17
While many of these issues can be viewed from a domestic angle, they also have international
consequences. During his first major foreign policy speech, which he notably directed at the American
people, Secretary of State Antony Blinken made this connection clear, saying “distinctions between
domestic and foreign policy have simply fallen away. Our domestic renewal and our strength in the world
are completely entwined. And how we work will reflect that reality.”
18
Domestic Priorities Rate Highly for Maintaining US Influence
The preference for putting one’s own house in order before—or at the same time as—tackling global
concerns comes through loud and clear in the 2021 Chicago Council Survey.
The public rates improving public education, strengthening democracy at home, and maintaining US
economic power as the top three factors in the United States remaining globally influential (Figure 1).
In addition, maintaining US military superiority, preventing violent attacks such as the January 6
insurrection, and reducing racial and economic inequality all rank higher than taking leadership on
international issues, promoting democracy and human rights around the world, and participating
in international organizations. While some skeptics have criticized the Biden strategy for being too
expansive in its attempts to incorporate domestic issues into its foreign policy, the American public
seems to agree that these issues that have long been considered domestic do, in fact, have a place in
foreign policy conversations.
Greater Concern for Internal Than External Threats
Americans say they are personally more concerned about threats within the United States (81%) than
threats outside the country (19%). This partially reflects a March 2021 survey finding that many Americans
see political polarization (65%), domestic violent extremism (61%), and the COVID-19 pandemic (57%) as
critical threats facing the country. And in a January 2021 Chicago Council poll, more Americans named
violent white nationalist groups in the United States (29%) and China (26%) as the greatest threats to the
country than named terrorist group outside the United States (11%), North Korea (8%), or Iran (2%).
19
14
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
This domestic focus also extends to Americans’ top foreign policy goals, as Figure 2 shows. A large
majority of Americans (79%) say that protecting the jobs of American workers is a very important goal,
in line with the importance they attach to preventing cyberattacks (83%) and nuclear proliferation (75%).
Protecting US jobs, in fact, is seen as more urgent than combating international terrorism (66% very
important), preventing and combating global pandemics (66%), and limiting climate change (54%).
Please indicate how important the following factors are to the United States remaining influential on the
global stage: (%)
n = 1,045
Figure 1: Remaining Influential on the Global Stage
2021 Chicago Council Survey
Somewhat important
Very important
Not very important
Promoting democracy and human
rights around the world
Maintaining US economic power
Reducing racial inequality at home
Maintaining US military superiority
Improving public education
Encouraging legal immigration
Reducing economic inequality at home
Increasing public spending on
infrastructure
Preventing political violence such as
the January 6 insurrection
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Strengthening democracy at home
Not important at all
Taking leadership on international
issues
Participating in international
organizations
73 22 3
70 23 4
66 28 4
57 28 9
54 25 9
53 25 11
50 30 11
46 36 10
44 42 9
43 40 12
41 45 10
37 44 13
2
2
4
10
10
8
7
4
5
3
5
1
15
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one, please
select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a
somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all: (%)
n = bases vary
Figure 2: Foreign Policy Goals
2021 Chicago Council Survey
Somewhat important
Very important
Not important at all
Combating world hunger
Preventing the spread of
nuclear weapons
Limiting climate change
Combating international terrorism
Preventing cyberattacks
Controlling and reducing illegal
immigration
Improving the United States' standing
in the world
Limiting China’s influence around
the world
Preventing and combating global
pandemics
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Protecting the jobs of US workers
Maintaining superior military
power worldwide
Promoting and defending human
rights in other countries
Protecting weaker nations against
foreign aggression
Helping to bring a democratic form
of government to other nations
83
79
75
66
66
54
53
50
50
50
49
41
32
18
15
1
19 2
23 2
31 3
29 4
27 19
38 9
39 11
43 7
41 9
40 10
50 9
58 9
55 27
16
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Democracy and Human Rights: Focus on Home, Not Abroad
Democracy and human rights have been consistent frames for the Biden administration’s foreign policy
priorities. As Secretary Blinken stated in February 2021, “President Biden is committed to a foreign
policy . . . that is centered on the defense of democracy and the protection of human rights.”
20
Biden himself often frames the challenge of the 21st century as a contest between democracy
and authoritarianism.
However, neither human rights nor promoting democracy abroad is a top foreign policy priority for the
American public. Only four in 10 Americans (41%) see promoting and defending human rights in other
countries as a very important goal for US foreign policy. Even fewer (18%) say that helping to bring a
democratic form of government to other nations is a very important goal for the United States; in fact,
more (27%) say it is not important at all. Furthermore, only a minority of Americans (44%) see promoting
democracy and human rights abroad as a very important factor in maintaining US global influence.
Americans are more concerned about democracy at home. Seven in 10 (70%) say strengthening US
democracy is a very important factor in maintaining US global influence, and 54 percent say the same
about preventing political violence such as the January 6 insurrection. One of the causes of this domestic
focus is that half of Americans (52%) believe American democracy has been temporarily weakened but is
still functioning, while another quarter (25%) see it as permanently weakened. Americans who see their
own democracy as being temporarily or permanently weakened are more likely to focus on strengthening
democracy at home, and they are less likely to see promoting democracy and human rights abroad as a
very important factor in US global influence.
Domestic Spending Priorities
This domestic focus is also amplified in Americans’ views on the federal budget. If forced to make
trade-os between domestic and international priorities, Americans would put most of their money into
domestic spending (Figure 3). When told they have $100 to spend on a hypothetical federal budget,
survey respondents allocate greater average amounts to education ($15.61), healthcare ($15.21), social
security ($14.92), and infrastructure ($13.85) than they do to defense spending ($11.90). Average amounts
are smaller for environmental protection ($9.36), welfare and unemployment programs ($8.07), military
aid ($3.79) and economic assistance ($3.71) abroad, and diplomatic programs to promote US policies
abroad ($3.58).
OF AMERICANS SAY STRENGTHENING US DEMOCRACY IS
VERY IMPORTANT FOR MAINTAINING US INTERNATIONAL
INFLUENCE.
70%
17
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
But these results do not mean that Americans think US foreign policy should be placed on the back
burner while domestic issues are addressed. On the contrary, Americans expect that improvements
on the home front will have knock-on benefits for US influence abroad. In addition, the broad majority
supports continued US involvement in world aairs, continued membership in international organizations,
and continued partnerships with allies and friends—and this is also true for those who prioritize spending
on domestic concerns.
Next, I’d like you to please imagine that you get to choose how to spend $100 of your tax money to make
up the following areas of the US government budget. For each item, please let us know how many dollars
you’d prefer to spend. You must spend all $100: ($)
n = 1,030
Figure 3: US Budget Allocation
2021 Chicago Council Survey
15.61
15.21
14.92
13.85
11.90
9.36
8.07
3.79
3.71
Education
Healthcare
Social security
Improving public infrastructure such
as highways, bridges, and airports
Defense spending
Environmental protection
Welfare and unemployment programs
at home
Military aid to other countries
Economic aid to other countries
Diplomatic programs to promote US
policies abroad
3.58
18
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Figure 4: Influence of the United States and China
I would like to know how much influence you think each of the following countries has in the world. Please
answer on a 0 to 10 scale, with 0 meaning they are not at all influential and 10 meaning they are extremely
influential. (mean)
n = 1,015
2021 Chicago Council Survey
China
The United States
2002 2006 2016
2021
9.1
8.5 8.5
8.6
8.5
8.6
8.5
8.3 8.3
8.5 8.5
6.8
6.4
6.9
7.5
7.4 7.4
7.1
6.8
7.3 7.3
7.5
2008 2010 2012 2014 2017 2018 2019
BUILDING AT HOME TO COMPETE
WITH CHINA ABROAD
Both on the campaign trail and as president, Biden has been clear that he views China as a competitor
to the United States. As he said in March 2021, “they have an overall goal to become the leading country
in the world, the wealthiest country in the world, and the most powerful country in the world. That’s not
going to happen on my watch.”
21
The 2021 Chicago Council Survey finds that Americans, too, see Chinese
influence growing—and support policies aimed at keeping the United States in the lead.
Americans continue to view the United States as the country with the most influence in the world today,
but their views of China’s influence have shifted over the past 15 years, particularly in 2010 following the
global financial crisis. Today, the gap has closed to one of its narrowest points, with the United States
maintaining a one-point lead in perceived influence over China (Figure 4).
While Americans’ perceptions of US influence have been broadly stable since 2006, more Americans
now (54%) than in 2018 (45%) say the United States is less economically competitive than it was 10 years
ago (27% say it is equally competitive; 19% say it is more competitive). Americans are also notably less
confident now than they were two years ago in both US economic and military strength compared with
China. As Figure 5 shows, a plurality of Americans (40%) say that China is stronger than the United States
economically, up from 31 percent who said the same in 2019; only a quarter (27%) now see the United
States as stronger. And for the first time in Council polling, fewer than half of Americans (46%) see the
United States as stronger than China in terms of military power, down from 58 percent who said the same
in 2019 (Figure 6).
19
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Figure 5: US-China Economic Power Comparison
At the present time, which nation do you feel is stronger in terms ofeconomicpower, the United States or
China—or do you think they are about equal economically?(%)
n = 2,086
China
The United States
About equal
26
27
45
2014 2016 2019
2021
28
31
38
29
38
31
31
27
40
2021 Chicago Council Survey
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Figure 6: US-China Military Comparison
At the present time, which nation do you feel is stronger in terms ofmilitarypower, the United States or
China—or do you think they are about equal militarily? (%)
n = 2,086
China
The United States
About equal
32
54
14
2014 2016 2019
2021
32
50
15
30
58
11
35
46
18
2021 Chicago Council Survey
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
20
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Support Is Growing for US-China Trade Restrictions
The public’s concern about declining US economic power relative to China is helping to drive support
for policies aimed at reversing that transition. In a dramatic shift from 2019, a majority of Americans now
says trade between the United States and China does more to weaken US national security (58%, up from
33% in 2019), as Figure 7 shows. By contrast, two years ago—amid the US-China trade war—two-thirds of
Americans believed that US-China trade strengthened US national security (64%, now down to 38%).
Does trade between the United States and China do more to strengthen US national security or to weaken
US national security? (%)
n = 2,086
Figure 7: Trade between the United States and China
2021 Chicago Council Survey
More to weaken
More to strengthen
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
64
33
2019
2021
38
58
21
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
There is also growing support for restrictions on trade between the United States and China. A majority
of Americans (62%, up from 55% in 2020) favors increasing taris on products imported from China. Many
(57%, up from 54% in 2020) favor significant reductions in trade between the two countries, even if this
leads to greater costs.
Trade is not the only area of concern in relation to China: technology has been a major area of focus for
the Biden administration. The 2021 Interim National Security Strategy states that the United States must
also “confront unfair and illegal trade practices, cyber theft, and coercive economic practices that hurt
American workers, undercut our advanced and emerging technologies, and seek to erode our strategic
advantage and national competitiveness.”
22
Many Americans, too, are concerned about the technological angle of US-China competition. Half (52%)
favor restricting the exchange of scientific research between the United States and China, and a March
2021 Council poll found that majorities of Americans favored prohibiting US companies from selling
sensitive high-tech products to China (71%) and prohibiting Chinese technology companies from building
communications networks in the United States (66%).
SEE THE UNITED STATES AS STRONGER THAN
CHINA IN TERMS OF MILITARY POWER, DOWN
FROM 58 PERCENT WHO SAID THE SAME IN 2019.
46%
FEWER THAN HALF OF AMERICANS
( )
22
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
79 18
72 24
60 36
57 39
55 41
Which of the following actions, if any, do you think the US government should take to promote investment
in strategically important industries?(%)
n = 1,071
Figure 8: Promoting Investment in Industry
2021 Chicago Council Survey
Should not take action
Should take action
The US government should impose
taris on foreign products in those
industries that compete with US
businesses
The US government should ban
or limit imports from foreign
companies in those industries that
compete with key US businesses
The US government should fund
research and development of emerging
technologies to give US companies an
edge over foreign businesses in these
new industries
The US government should identify
businesses most likely to succeed in
those industries and oer those
companies financial support
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
The US government should
financially support US companies in key
industries competing against foreign
businesses that receive support from
their own governments
Promoting Strategic Industries
To compete with China in the development of emerging technologies, US ocials propose direct public
investment into strategically important industries. According to a speech delivered on August 9, 2021, by
Secretary Blinken, “there are some things that even the most vibrant private sector can’t do on its own.
Public investment is still vital. Moreover, America’s entrepreneurs are able to do their pathbreaking work
in part because of the foundation provided by public investment.”
23
Majorities of Americans favor the US government investing in strategically important industries. This
support covers a variety of ways in which the federal government could act, though it should be noted
that the question itself did not mention any budget trade-os that would have to be considered before
implementing these policies.
23
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
To what extent do the following groups benefit from US foreign policy? (%)
n = 1,053
Figure 9: Beneficiaries of US Foreign Policy
2021 Chicago Council Survey
A fair amount
A great deal
Not very much
Wealthy Americans
Middle-class Americans
The US military
Large companies
Small companies
Working-class Americans
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
The US government
59
58
50
42
13
11
10
34 2
32 7
37 9
38 15
29 44
33 44
29 47
Not at all
5
4
2
4
13
13
12
As Figure 8 shows, eight in 10 Americans say the government should fund research and development of
emerging technologies to give US companies an edge over foreign businesses (79%). Seven in 10 favor
financial support for US companies that are competing against foreign businesses supported by their
respective governments (72%).
Slightly smaller majorities support imposing taris on foreign products in industries that compete with US
businesses (60%), banning or limiting imports from foreign companies that compete with US businesses
(57%), and identifying businesses most likely to succeed and giving them financial support (55%).
Americans Embrace Globalization but Don’t Feel Like Winners
One assumption of the Biden administration that is not borne out by the data is the idea that Americans
have become disillusioned with globalization and trade. This assumption is evident in Secretary Blinken’s
March 3, 2021, speech, “A Foreign Policy for the American People,” in which he noted, “Some of us
previously argued for free trade agreements because we believed Americans would broadly share in
the economic gains that those—and that those deals would shape the global economy in ways that we
wanted. . . . But we didn’t do enough to understand who would be negatively aected and what would
be needed to adequately oset their pain, or to enforce agreements that were already on the books and
help more workers and small businesses fully benefit from them.”
24
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Overall, do you think trade is good or bad for: (%)
n = 2,086
Figure 10: Beneficiaries of Trade
2021 Chicago Council Survey
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Your own standards of living
Creating jobs in the US
The US economy
Consumers like you
US agriculture
US technology companies
US manufacturing
companies
2004 2006 202120172016 2018 2019 2020
38
37
40
56
67
59
60
63
73
57
54
59
72
82
87
74
75
78
65
64 64
79
73
70 70
78
85
82
82
The data, reflected in Figure 9, show that the administration is correct that everyday Americans feel
that large companies (92%), the US government (90%), and the wealthy (87%) benefit disproportionately
from US foreign policy decisions. But even those who think the US economic system is unfair to them
personally do not necessarily blame trade policy for this inequality. By nearly a six-to-four margin,
more Americans say the US economic system is personally fair (56%, with 42% saying it is unfair), similar
to 2018 results. When those who think it is unfair are asked which specific factors are to blame, only
27 percent name US trade policy as contributing a great deal. Instead, majorities say that the power of
big business (69%) and the influence of special interests (52%) contribute a great deal to this unfairness,
followed by institutional inequality (41%).
Rather than seeing trade and globalization as sources of unfairness in American life, a record number
of Americans (68%) now say that globalization is mostly good for the United States. As Figure 10 shows,
three-quarters or more consider international trade to be beneficial to consumers like them (82%), their
own standard of living (79%), US technology companies (78%), the US economy (75%), and US agriculture
(73%). Smaller majorities say the international trade has been good for US manufacturing companies (63%)
and creating jobs in the United States (60%).
25
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
International trade agreements have not been a priority for the Biden administration so far, with the
administration and Congress having allowed Trade Promotion Authority to expire in July 2021. The
administration has received ample criticism for refusing to negotiate trade agreements under the rubric of
protecting the middle class, particularly from those in Washington who see automation and innovation as
greater contributors to middle-class job loss than trade.
But the administration’s belief that ordinary Americans oppose trade agreements belies a high level
of public support for both specific and hypothetical trade agreements. Support for the United States–
Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), the renegotiated and renamed North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), is now at an all-time high (80%). Majorities also support joining the Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) (62%) and a free-trade agreement with
Taiwan (57%).
Build Back Better? Public Doesn't Equate Infrastructure
Rebuild with US Global Influence
The August 2021 passage of the Biden administration’s infrastructure bill in the Senate is a key
component of the Foreign Policy for the Middle Class agenda. It includes the largest federal investment
in infrastructure projects in more than a decade, aecting nearly all aspects of the US economy, including
eorts to limit climate change.
24
Administration ocials have positioned infrastructure investment as a guarantee for future global
economic power and influence, emphasizing that building a strong and modern infrastructure at home
is essential for the United States to push back on Chinese and Russian claims that their economic and
governing systems represent the best path to prosperity.
Americans have been supportive of infrastructure improvement for decades, according to Chicago
Council Surveys. As Figure 3 on page 17 shows, infrastructure rates relatively high on the list of
Americans’ spending priorities. When asked to vote with their hypothetical dollars (given a budget of
$100 total to spend), the public places infrastructure as the fourth most important priority and seems to
favor significant investment ($13.85). This amount is similarly high across all political aliations.
But the data suggest that Americans do not see a link between infrastructure investments and US foreign
policy. As Figure 1 on page 14 demonstrates, the public rates increasing public spending on infrastructure
10th out of 12 factors that would contribute to the US remaining influential on the global stage (ranking
by very important). While larger percentages of respondents see other factors as very important, eight in
10 overall say that infrastructure is at least somewhat important to maintaining US influence (83% very or
somewhat important).
26
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
EFFORTS TO RESTORE US
LEADERSHIP
While key elements of a Foreign Policy for the Middle Class focus on rebuilding at home to project US
influence abroad, returning to the global stage is one of the Biden administration’s top priorities. The
current administration has been careful to temper its language when discussing US leadership. Biden’s
team has emphasized cooperation over unilateral leadership on the world stage.
25
In his September
2021 speech at the UN General Assembly, Biden remarked, "as the United States turns our focus to
the priorities and the regions of the world, like the Indo-Pacific, that are most consequential today and
tomorrow, we’ll do so with our allies and partners, through cooperation at multilateral institutions like
the United Nations, to amplify our collective strength and speed, our progress toward dealing with
these global challenges."
26
This caution is rooted in the belief held by many administration ocials that
Americans outside Washington are no longer supportive of US global leadership and the costs associated
with it.
27
In a 2018 piece for Foreign Aairs, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan attributed this
supposed preference for a restrained foreign policy to the fact that ordinary Americans have not felt the
promised benefit from globalization and the current international order.
28
Despite this, a majority of Americans (64%) continues to say that the United States should take an active
role in world aairs, as they have every year since the Chicago Council first asked this question in 1974
(Figure 11). This is down slightly from 68 percent in 2020 but is in line with the historical average.
Figure 11: US Role in World Aairs
Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world aairs or if we stay
out of world aairs? (%)
n = 2,086
Active part
Stay out
1978 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002
2004
2006
2008
1974 1982 2010
2012
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
29
23
35
27
28
29
28
25
30
28
36
31
38
41
35
35
35
29
30
30
35
67
59
54
64
62
65
61
71
67
69
63
67
61
58
64
64
64
70
69
68
64
2021 Chicago Council Survey
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
27
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Figure 12: US Leadership Role in the World
What kind of leadership role should the United States play in the world? Should it be the dominant leader,
should it play a shared leadership role, or should it not play any leadership role? (% shared leadership role)
n = 2,086
2021 Chicago Council Survey
Democrat
Republican
Overall
Independent
63
62 62
66
68
69
57
53
50
51
54
53
72
70 70
75
78
77
59
63
64
69 69
73
2015 2016 2017 2019 2020 2021
Moreover, 56 percent say the benefits outweigh the costs of maintaining the US role in the world, down
slightly from 61 percent in 2019.
The data, reflected in Figure 12, also show that a majority of Americans (69%) wants the United States
to play a shared leadership role in the world, as they have since the question was first asked in 2015
(63%). That support crosses partisan lines, with majorities of Democrats (77%), Independents (73%), and
Republicans (53%) all in favor of the United States playing a shared leadership role in the world. Just
23 percent want the United States to be the dominant world leader, and 8 percent want the United States
to play no leadership role at all.
One aspect of support for this shared leadership role is American participation in international
agreements. And the 2021 Chicago Council Survey finds that Americans want the US at the table.
Two-thirds (64%) support US participation in the Paris Agreement on climate change, and 71 percent say
the United States should participate in the International Criminal Court. Six in 10 (59%) Americans think
the United States should participate in the Iran nuclear agreement that lifts some economic sanctions
against Iran in exchange for strict limits on its nuclear program. And on trade, 62 percent think the United
States should sign on to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.
28
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Should the United States play a leading role, a minor role, or no role in the following
international eorts?(%)
n = 1,037
Figure 13: US Leadership in International Eorts
2021 Chicago Council Survey
A minor role
A leading role
No role
Sending COVID-19 vaccines to other
countries in need
Limiting climate change
Preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons
Combating world hunger
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Combating international terrorism
76
67
62
58
54
20 3
29 5
29 9
27 14
39 6
The administration has made it clear that it will pursue both American leadership and international
cooperation. In a March 2021 speech, Secretary Blinken noted that, “while the times have changed,
some principles are enduring. . . . One is that American leadership and engagement matter. . . . Another
enduring principle is that we need countries to cooperate, now more than ever.”
29
On specific international eorts, there is majority support for the United States playing a leading role
on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (76%), combating international terrorism (67%), sending
COVID-19 vaccines to other countries in need (62%), limiting climate change (58%), and combating world
hunger (54%), as Figure 13 shows.
If the United States does not take the lead on these pressing challenges, the American public is skeptical
that other countries will step up. If the United States does not take a leading role on these issues,
few Americans say it is very likely that another country will spearhead eorts on COVID-19 vaccine
distribution (15%), combating world hunger (10%), and limiting climate change (19%).
29
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Asia-Pacific
6316 20
Increased
Do you think that the US military presence in the following regions should be increased, maintained at its
present level, or decreased? (%)
n = 2,086
Figure 14: US Global Military Presence
2021 Chicago Council Survey
Maintained
Decreased
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Europe
648 27
Latin America
6310 25
Africa
6112 25
Middle East
5216 30
US MILITARY SUPERIORITY AND
PRESENCE ABROAD
After two decades at war in Afghanistan and 18 years at war in Iraq, there is an enduring assumption that
Americans are weary of “forever wars” and are ready for a more restrained US foreign policy. Secretary
Blinken, who has previously come up for criticism for being too supportive of past military interventions,
30
claimed in January 2019 that whoever won the presidency in 2020 would have to contend with broad
support for retrenchment and an “America First” foreign policy among the American public.
31
But the public-opinion data do not reflect an American public that is ready to withdraw from the
world or that prefers a more restrained foreign policy. A more recent Chicago Council–Ipsos survey
conducted August 23–26 found that two-thirds (64%) of Americans continue to support the US withdrawal
of troops from Afghanistan.
When it comes to the US military, few Americans (15%) want to decrease its size. More than twice as many
want to increase the size of the US military, and a bare majority (52%) wants to keep it about the same
size. In addition, the American public is broadly supportive of the US military presence around the world.
As Figure 14 shows, majorities of Americans want to either maintain or increase the US military presence
in the Asia-Pacific (78%), Latin America (73%), Africa (73%), Europe (71%), and the Middle East (68%).
30
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Do you think the United States uses the following sets of foreign policy tools too much, not enough, or the
right amount?(%)
n = 2,086
Figure 15: US Foreign Policy Tools
2021 Chicago Council Survey
The right amount
Not enough
Too much
Military tools such as drone strikes and
military interventions
Diplomatic tools such as international
agreements, alliances, and participating
in international organizations
Security tools such as defense treaties
and basing US troops abroad
Economic tools such as sanctions and
taris
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Humanitarian tools such as sharing
vaccines, combating hunger, and
providing disaster relief
42
40
40
38
33
28
28
1545
3128
1645
1749
Not only do Americans support the US military presence around the world but a combined majority of
the public also thinks that defense treaties and basing US troops abroad are used about the right amount
(42%) or not enough (28%), as Figure 15 shows. Just 28 percent say these types of security tools are used
too much in the US foreign policy mix. The data also suggest that a combined majority of the American
public is fairly comfortable using military force. Forty percent say that military tools such as drone strikes
and military interventions are used the right amount, and an additional 28 percent say they are not used
enough. That does not mean that Americans want to rely solely on these tools, however. Pluralities also
say humanitarian tools (45%) and diplomatic tools (45%) are not used enough, and 49 percent say the
same about economic tools such as sanctions and taris.
Of course, maintaining the US military size and presence around the world is not cheap, but the American
public seems largely ready to fund it. When asked to allocate $100 of their tax money to specific areas of
the US budget, respondents apportioned an overall mean of $11.90 for defense spending.
31
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
REVITALIZING ALLIES AND
PARTNERS
Along with domestic renewal of the United States, revitalizing relationships with US allies and partners
has thus far been a core focus of the Biden administration’s foreign policy. “The only way we’re going to
meet these global threats,” President Biden remarked after a G7 meeting, “is by working together, and
with our partners and our allies.”
32
In a March 2021 speech, Secretary Blinken called allies a “unique asset”
and said the administration is “making a big push right now to reconnect with our friends and allies, and to
reinvent partnerships that were built years ago so they’re suited to today’s and tomorrow’s challenges.”
33
The idea that alliances benefit the United States was called into question under the Trump administration.
But the American public did not see US allies as free riders. Instead, the 2020 Chicago Council Survey
found that majorities of Americans said alliances benefited both the United States and its allies in East
Asia (59%), Europe (67%), and the Middle East (61%). And in 2020, seven in 10 Americans (71%) said the
United States should be more willing to make decisions with its allies even if this means the United States
may not get its preferred policy choice.
Figure 16: Use of US Troops Abroad
There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other parts of
the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would youfavoror oppose the use of US troops:
(% favor)
n varies
2021 Chicago Council Survey
If China invadedTaiwan
If Israel were attacked by its neighborsIf North Korea invaded South Korea
If Russia invades a NATO ally like Latvia,
Lithuania, or Estonia
1990 1994 1998 2008
2015
20212002 2004 2006 2010 2012 2014
2018
2017 2019
2020
44
47
44
27
63
53
59
52
19861982
19
24
19
22
39
30
31
36
33
43
32
45
32
41
25
40
49
28
41
45
26
47
45
53
28
47
62
64
5858
52
54
54
52
53
35
38
41
32
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Of course, a core element of US alliances is the security guarantee to use the US military in the case
an ally is attacked by a foreign power. Across a range of scenarios, American public support to use US
military force to defend allies or partners either remains stable or has increased (Figure 16). For example,
if North Korea invaded South Korea, 63 percent would support using US troops to defend South Korea.
That is up from 58 percent in 2020 and only one percentage point lower than the all-time high of 64
percent in 2018. A record-high 59 percent of Americans support using US troops if Russia invades a
NATO ally such as Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia. That is up from 52 percent in 2020 and the previous high
of 54 percent in 2019. Just over half of Americans (53%) continue to say that they would favor using US
troops to defend Israel if it is attacked by its neighbors. Perhaps the most striking shift is that, for the
first time, a majority of Americans (52%) supports using US troops if China invaded Taiwan. In 2020, that
number was 41 percent.
THE MISSING LINK: MANY AMERICANS NOT YET
CONVINCED IMMIGRATION ADDS TO US GLOBAL
INFLUENCE
SIDEBAR
Secretary Blinken frequently emphasizes the edge
immigrants provide to the United States in the global
economy and the importance of incentivizing the
“best and brightest” people to come live, study, and
work in the United States when speaking about
domestic renewal.
The 2021 Chicago Council Survey data show the
anti-immigrant rhetoric amplified by former
President Trump, other public figures, and certain
media outlets in recent years is not widely shared
among the American public. Majorities of Americans
express net favorable views of Korean (77%),
Chinese (70%), and Mexican immigrants (69%).
Despite these generally favorable views of
immigrants, however, Americans overall are less
convinced than the current administration that
encouraging legal immigration should be a priority
when it comes to ensuring our continued global
influence. When asked how important several
dierent factors are for the United States to remain
influential on the global stage, only 46 percent of
Americans classify encouraging legal immigration as
a very important factor (see Figure 1 on page 14).
Immigration is one of the issues over which
Americans remain most divided in terms of overall
results and especially across partisan aliation. Half
of Americans see controlling and reducing illegal
immigration as a very important foreign policy goal.
The gap between Republicans’ and Democrats’
views on this issue have widened tremendously
since 1998, when they were separated by only four
percentage points as opposed to the 54 percentage
points that separate them today (Figure 17).
33
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Figure 17: Foreign Policy Goals: Controlling Illegal Immigration
Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one, please select
whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat
important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all:Controlling and reducing illegal immigration
(% very important)
n = 1,492
2021 Chicago Council Survey
Democrat
Republican
Overall
Independent
72
1994 1998 2002 2010
2015
20212004 2006 2008 2012 2014 2016 2018
55
57
53
54
50
81
27
45
70
73
67
71
59
71
57
56
58
70
53
53
61
75
52
56 59
73
46
61
53
70
43
48
61
66
68
71
47
52
45
42
50
55
40
43
35
36
31
20
THE MISSING LINK: MANY AMERICANS NOT YET
CONVINCED IMMIGRATION ADDS TO US GLOBAL
INFLUENCE (CONTINUED)
SIDEBAR
The Biden administration’s proposed immigration
reform legislation, known as the US Citizenship
Act, lays out an eight-year path to citizenship for
many of the 11 million undocumented immigrants in
the United States today. A majority of Americans
thinks illegal immigrants should be allowed to stay
in their jobs and apply for US citizenship either
with conditions (24%) or without (41%). But there is a
stark partisan divide on this question, likely making
major immigration reform a tough sell for the Biden
administration at this time.
34
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
CONCLUSION
As the president wrote in the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, “America is back.
Diplomacy is back. Alliances are back.” Do the American people believe that America is back? And do
they support the policies laid out in the Biden administration’s Foreign Policy for the Middle Class? The
results of the 2021 Chicago Council Survey show that the US public still believes the United States is
the most influential country in the world but feels China nipping at its heels. Public support has been
remarkably stable in supporting many of the traditional foreign policy elements included in the Biden
doctrine—international engagement, alliances, and US global leadership.
The American public, like the administration, wants greater investments at home and believes that
increased focus on domestic priorities such as improving public education and strengthening American
democracy are important for maintaining American influence abroad. And like Biden and many in his
administration, Americans are increasingly concerned about China's rising economic and military strength.
In response, they favor policies aimed at both restraining Beijing’s rise and bolstering America’s own
strength, including taris on foreign competitors, greater investments in research and development, and
financial support for American firms.
Internationally, Americans back both diplomacy and alliances. The public wants the United States to share
leadership with other nations and take a leading role in addressing global challenges such as climate
change and the COVID-19 pandemic. Americans support US participation in international agreements that
address critical threats, such as the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Iran nuclear deal. And
though the public supports the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Americans favor maintaining the existing
US military presence around the world and are more likely now than in past years to support using force
to defend US allies around the world.
Where the public and the administration dier most clearly is on trade. The Biden administration has
highlighted that not all Americans benefited from past trade agreements. Yet the 2021 Chicago Council
Survey finds that a record number of Americans see globalization as mostly good for the country,
and eight in 10 see it as good for US consumers and for their own standard of living. Majorities also
support both existing trade agreements, such as the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, and
new agreements for the United States, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership.
35
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Americans are also less enthusiastic than the administration about promoting a values-based foreign
policy. While the administration has endorsed a foreign policy centered on human rights and democracy
promotion abroad, the American public does not consider those issues to be top foreign policy priorities.
Moreover, the public doesn’t make the same links between the health of American democracy and
democracy around the world. While everyday Americans believe that bolstering democracy at home is
very important for US global influence, they do not feel the same about promoting democracy and human
rights overseas.
Some critics argue that the Foreign Policy for the Middle Class is too expansive in its linkage of domestic
and international priorities. The results of the 2021 Chicago Council Survey show that Americans disagree.
The public does not think US foreign policy should be set aside in favor of addressing domestic issues—
but rather that that these domestic improvements will benefit US influence and leadership abroad. The
challenge for the administration will be to deliver on both the domestic and international dimensions of its
policies. After all, if its fundamental diagnosis is correct and the two are inextricably linked, failure on one
front will endanger the other.
36
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
METHODOLOGY
The 2021 Chicago Council Survey, a project of the Lester Crown Center on US Foreign Policy, is
the latest eort in a series of wide-ranging surveys on American attitudes toward US foreign policy.
The 2021 Chicago Council Survey is made possible by the generous support of the Crown family and the
Korea Foundation.
The survey was conducted from July 7 to 26, 2021, among a representative national sample of 2,086 adults.
The margin of sampling error for the full sample is +/- 2.33 percentage points, including a design eect of
1.1817. The margin of error is higher for partisan subgroups or for partial-sample items. Partisan identification
is based on respondents’ answers to a standard partisan self-identification question: “Generally speaking,
do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?”
The survey was conducted by Ipsos Public Aairs, a polling, social science, and market research firm in
Palo Alto, California, using a randomly selected sample of Ipsos’s large-scale nationwide research panel,
KnowledgePanel® (KP). KP is the first and largest online research panel that is representative of the entire
US population. Ipsos recruits panel members using address-based sampling (ABS) methods to ensure full
coverage of all households in the nation.
The survey was fielded to a total of 3,899 panel members, yielding a total of 2,200 completed surveys (a
completion rate of 56.4%). The median survey length was 25 minutes. Of the 2,200 total completed surveys,
114 cases were excluded for quality-control reasons, leaving a final sample size of 2,086 respondents.
Cases were excluded if they met one of the following three criteria:
1. Speedsters: Respondents who completed the survey in eight minutes or less
• Total cases removed: n = 45
2. Refused 50 percent or more of questions: Respondents who refused to answer 50 percent or more of
the eligible survey questions
• Total cases removed: n = 88; n = 67 unique to criteria group
3. Data check score of three out of four: Respondents who failed three or four of the quality checks
implemented (see criteria below)
• Total cases removed: n = 29; n = 2 unique to criteria group
1. Completed survey faster than eight minutes
2. Did not accurately input a “4,” refused, or skipped Q3_1 in the survey, which was designed to make sure
respondents were paying attention (“In order to make sure that your browser is working correctly, please
select number 4 from the below list”)
3. Refused one or more full survey batteries of five attributes or more (Q7, Q808, Q810, Q811, Q812, Q814,
Q26, Q30, Q490, Q44, Q50, Q851, Q190, Q818, QFAIR2, Q240A, Q353, QTW, Q819)
4. Respondents who gave the same exact answer (“straight lined”) to a battery of grid questions (Q7, Q811,
Q812, Q44)
For more information about the Chicago Council Survey, please contact Dina Smeltz, senior fellow for public
opinion and foreign policy (dsmeltz@thechicagocouncil.org), or Craig Kafura, assistant director of public
opinion and foreign policy (ckafura@thechicagocouncil.org).
37
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
Sampling and Weighting
In general, the specific survey samples represent an equal probability selection method (EPSEM) sample
from the panel for general population surveys. The raw distribution of KP mirrors that of US adults fairly
closely, barring occasional disparities that may emerge for certain subgroups due to dierential attrition.
To ensure selection of general population samples from KP behave as EPSEM, additional measures
are undertaken, starting by weighting the pool of active members to the geodemographic benchmarks
secured from a combination of the US Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS) and the latest
March supplement of the US Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS) along several dimensions.
Using the resulting weights as measure of size, in the next step a PPS (probability proportional to size)
procedure is used to select study-specific samples. It is the application of this PPS methodology with
the imposed size measures that produces fully self-weighting samples from KP, for which each sample
member can carry a design weight of unity. Moreover, in instances for which a study design requires any
form of oversampling of certain subgroups, such departures from an EPSEM design are accounted for by
adjusting the design weights in reference to the CPS benchmarks for the population of interest.
Typically, the geodemographic dimensions used to weight the entire KnowledgePanel include the
following dimensions, with additional nesting of dimensions as well:
• Gender (male, female)
• Age (18–29, 30–44, 45–59, 60+ years)
• Race/Hispanic ethnicity (white, non-Hispanic; Black, non-Hispanic; other, non-Hispanic; two or more
races, non-Hispanic; Hispanic)
• Education (less than high school, high school, some college, bachelor’s degree or higher)
• Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West)
• Household income (less than $10,000, $10,000 to <$25,000, $25,000 to <$50,000, $50,000 to
<$75,000, $75,000 to <$100,000, $100,000 to <$150,000, $150,000 or more)
• Homeownership status (own, rent, or other)
• Household size (1, 2, 3, 4+ members)
• Metropolitan area (yes, no)
• Hispanic origin (Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba, other, non-Hispanic)
• Language dominance (non-Hispanic and English dominant, bilingual, Hispanic and Spanish dominant)
when survey is administered in both English and Spanish
Once the study sample has been selected, the survey administered, and all the survey data are edited
and made final, design weights are adjusted to account for any dierential nonresponse that may
have resulted during the field period. Depending on the specific target population for a given study,
geodemographic distributions for the corresponding population are obtained from the CPS, the American
Community Survey (ACS), or, in certain instances, the weighted KP profile data. For this purpose, an
iterative proportional fitting (raking) procedure is used to produce the final weights. In the final step,
calculated weights are examined to identify and, if necessary, trim outliers at the extreme upper and
lower tails of the weight distribution. The resulting weights are then scaled to aggregate to the total
sample size of all eligible respondents. Detailed information on the demographic distributions of the
benchmarks can be found in the appendix.
38
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
APPENDIX
Ideology (%)
2021 Chicago Council Survey
Appendix Figure 1: Defining The Middle Class
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Upper class,
upper-middle class
Lower class,
lower-middle class Middle classOverall
Partisan Aliation (%)
2021 sample size
Republican
Democrat
Independent
27 22 30 28
577 1,032 456
32 34 29 38
39 42 40 33
Presidents (% net favorable)
Joe Biden
Donald Trump
56 57 54 59
40 41 42 33
Extremely liberal
Liberal
4 5 4 4
14 13 12 20
Slightly liberal
10 11 9 12
Moderate, middle of the road
36 41 36 26
Slightly conservative
12 9 13 13
Conservative
18 13 20 19
Extremely conservative
5 4 5 6
2020 recalled vote (%)
Joe Biden
Donald Trump
45 41 44 55
34 28 38 32
Another candidate (specify)
3 3 3 2
Didn’t vote
14 23 11 6
Don’t remember
3 3 3 3
Education (%)
No high school diploma or GED
High school graduate (high
school diploma or the
equivalent GED)
11 20 9 3
27 35 28 12
Some college or associate’s
degree
30 32 31 26
Bachelor’s degree
17 9 19 28
Master’s degree or higher
14 4 14 31
2,086
Unweighted
Weighted
672 994 3962,086
39
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
2021 Chicago Council Survey
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Household Income (%)
Less than $10,000
$10,000–$24,999
3 8 1 1
9 19 5 1
$25,000–$49,999
18 28 14 6
$50,000–$74,999
17 21 19 7
$75,000–$99,999
14 11 19 7
$100,000–$149,999
19 8 24 24
$150,000 or more
20 4 18 53
Age (%)
18–29
30–44
20 24 19 15
26 30 23 25
45–59
25 22 26 26
60+
30 23 32 34
How are you paid? (%)
Paid an hourly rate
Paid a salary
48 61 47 28
39 22 43 59
Paid by the job
9 11 8 11
Race/Ethnicity (%)
White, non-Hispanic
Black, non-Hispanic
63 56 66 70
12 17 10 6
Other, non-Hispanic
7 5 7 10
Hispanic
16 20 15 13
2+ races, non-Hispanic
2 2 2 1
Appendix Figure 1 (continued): Defining The Middle Class
Upper class,
upper-middle class
Lower class,
lower-middle class Middle classOverall
40
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
2021 Chicago Council Survey
% of 2021
sample
n = 2,086
Average
age
White,
non-Hispanic
Black,
non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Other,
non-Hispanic
Racial
composition
(%)
18–29
30–44
45–59
60+
Age (%)
High school or
less
Some college/
associate's
degree
College
graduates
Education (%)
Female
27
50
79
2
14
5
17
21
29
32
46
30
25
53
47
32
48
47
22
22
9
21
27
22
30
37
28
35
58
42
39
47
65
10
14
11
22
27
24
27
35
32
33
46
54
Male
Gender (%)
Democrat Independent Republican
Democrat Independent Republican
Conservative
Moderate
Liberal
Ideology (%)
79
18
3
7
33
58
26
51
22
ABOUT THE SURVEY SAMPLE
Weighted
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
ABOUT THE SURVEY SAMPLE
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
41
ABOUT THE CHICAGO COUNCIL
SURVEY
The Chicago Council Survey, conducted every four years since 1974, biennially since
2002, and now annually, is a trusted and widely cited source of longitudinal data on
American public opinion about a broad range of US foreign policy and international
issues. With its combination of time series and comprehensive coverage, the
Chicago Council Survey is a valuable resource to policymakers, academics, media,
and the general public because of its unique ability to capture the sense of particular
eras—post–Vietnam War, post–Cold War, post-9/11—and to define critical shifts
in American public thinking. The Chicago Council Surveys are highly respected
and widely used in policy circles and academic research both in the United States
and abroad. Several scholarly works have drawn on Chicago Council Survey data,
including The Foreign Policy Gap (Page and Bouton), Public Opinion and American
Foreign Policy (Holsti), Faces of Internationalism (Wittkopf), and The Rational Public
(Page and Shapiro). All of the past Chicago Council Survey data sets are available to
the public via the Roper Center and ICPSR, and the 2021 data will soon be available
at www.thechicagocouncil.org.
In addition to the annual Chicago Council Survey of American public opinion and
US foreign policy, the Chicago Council’s polling has often expanded to international
polling in East Asia, Iran, Mexico, and Russia. Besides these comprehensive reports,
the Chicago Council Survey team publishes and disseminates short opinion briefs on
topical issues such as international trade, immigration, Russia, North Korea’s nuclear
program, China, and Iran. These short reports can be found on the Council’s website
and on the Chicago Council Survey blog Running Numbers.
42
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
ENDNOTES
1
Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Inaugural Address by Joseph
R. Biden, Jr.,” The White House, January 20, 2021,
whitehouse.gov.
2
Jen Psaki and Jake Sullivan, “Press Briefing by Press
Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Advisor Jake
Sullivan, February 4, 2021,” The White House, February 4,
2021, whitehouse.gov.
3
Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance,” The White House, March 2021, whitehouse.gov.
4
Edward Alden, “Report Sheds Light on How Biden’s
Future NSC Chief Wants to Reshape U.S. Foreign Policy,”
Foreign Policy, December 7, 2020, foreignpolicy.com.
5
Edward Luce, “The Puzzle of Joe Biden’s ‘Middle Class
Foreign Policy,’” Financial Times, March 28, 2021, ft.com.
6
Deirdre Shesgreen and Kim Hjelmgaard, “Biden Puts
a Twist on ‘America First’ Even as He Moves to Unravel
Trump’s Foreign Policy,” USA Today, February 25, 2021,
usatoday.com.
7
Hal Brands, “What Is Biden’s ‘Foreign Policy for the Middle
Class’?,” Bloomberg, March 7, 2021, bloomberg.com.
8
Kori Schake, “Biden Brings More Class Warfare to Foreign
Policy,” Defense One, June 1, 2021, defenseone.com.
9
Brands, “What Is Biden’s ‘Foreign Policy for the
Middle Class’?”
10
Bing West, “Who Will Trust Us after Afghanistan?,”
National Review, August 26, 2021, nationalreview.com.
11
Yascha Mounk, “So Much for a ‘Foreign Policy for the
Middle Class,’” Atlantic, August 17, 2021, theatlantic.com.
12
Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Remarks by President Biden on
America’s Place in the World,” The White House, February
4, 2021, whitehouse.gov.
13
Antony J. Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American
People,” US Department of State, March 3, 2021, state.gov.
14
Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People.”
15
Jeremy Shapiro, “Biden’s Everything Doctrine,” Foreign
Aairs, April 22, 2021, foreignaairs.com.
16
Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Remarks by President Biden at the
2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,” The White
House, February 19, 2021, whitehouse.gov.
17
Biden, “Inaugural Address.”
18
Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People.”
19
Dina Smeltz and Brendan Helm, “Greatest Threat:
Democrats Say White Nationalism, Republicans Say
China,” Chicago Council on Global Aairs, February 18,
2021, thechicagocouncil.org.
43
A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think 2021 Chicago Council Survey
20
Antony J. Blinken, “Putting Human Rights at the Center of
U.S. Foreign Policy,” US Department of State, February
24, 2021, state.gov.
21
Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Remarks by President Biden in
Press Conference,” The White House, March 25, 2021,
whitehouse.gov.
22
Biden, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.”
23
Antony J. Blinken, “Domestic Renewal as a Foreign Policy
Priority,” US Department of State, August 9, 2021, state.gov.
24
Aatish Bhatia and Quoctrung Bui, “The Infrastructure
Plan: What’s in and What’s out,” New York Times, August
10, 2021, nytimes.com.
25
Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People.”
26
Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Remarks by President Biden
before the 76th Session of the United Nations General
Assembly,” The White House, September 21, 2021,
whitehouse.gov.
27
Blinken and Kagan, “‘America First’ Is Only Making the
World Worse.”
28
Jake Sullivan, “The World after Trump,” Foreign Aairs,
April 2018, foreignaairs.com.
29
Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People.”
30
Lara Jakes and Michael Crowley, “Blinken Proposes a
Foreign Policy Not ‘Disconnected from our Daily Lives,’”
New York Times, March 3, 2021, nytimes.com.
31
Blinken and Kagan, “‘America First’ Is Only Making the
World Worse.”
32
Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Remarks by President Biden in
Press Conference,” The White House, June 13, 2021,
whitehouse.gov.
33
Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People.”
Additional reports based on surveys conducted by the Chicago Council are
available at www.thechicagocouncil.org:
“Republicans and Democrats Support
Evacuating, Relocating Afghans to
the United States,” Craig Kafura.
September 3, 2021.
“20 Years Later: 9/11 in the Public
Memory,” Emily Sullivan and
Dina Smeltz. September 9, 2021.
“Americans Say North Korea Is an
Adversary, Still Prefer Diplomacy,”
Karl Friedho, September 13, 2021.
“Half of Americans Support Use of US
Troops in Defense of Ukraine,” Fosca
Majnoni d’Intignano and Craig Kafura.
September 14, 2021.
“Americans Remain Committed to
South Korea, View North Korea
as an Adversary,” Karl Friedho.
October 4, 2021.
“US Public Supports Withdrawal from
Afghanistan,” Dina Smeltz and Emily
Sullivan. August 9, 2021.
“Americans, Japanese, and South
Koreans Wary of China’s Intentions,”
Karl Friedho, Craig Kafura, and Dina
Smeltz. August 25, 2021.
“Americans Split on Military Aid to
Israel, Say Political Status Quo
Unacceptable,” Dina Smeltz and Emily
Sullivan. August 25, 2021.
“For First Time, Half of Americans
Favor Defending Taiwan If China
Invades,” Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura.
August 26, 2021.
“Majority of Americans Support
Withdrawal from Afghanistan, but
Criticize Its Implementation,”
Dina Smeltz and Emily Sullivan.
September 2, 2021.
Chicago Council on Global Aairs
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Suite 1400
Chicago, Illinois 60601
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independent, nonpartisan organization that
provides insight on critical global issues, advances
policy solutions, and fosters dialogue on what
is happening in the world and why it matters to
people in Chicago, the United States, and around
the globe. As the premier, nonpartisan global aairs
organization in America’s heartland, we believe an
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and balanced views on global issues helps to ensure
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Learn more at thechicagocouncil.org and follow
@ChicagoCouncil.