By Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, Karl Friedho,
Craig Kafura, and Lily Wojtowicz
LESTER
CROWN CENTER
ON US FOREIGN POLICY
America
Engaged
2018 CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEY
American Public Opinion and
US Foreign Policy
2018 Chicago Council
Survey Team
Dina Smeltz
Senior Fellow, Public Opinion
and Foreign Policy, Chicago
Council on Global Aairs
Karl Friedho
Fellow, Public Opinion and
Asia Policy, Chicago Council
on Global Aairs
Craig Kafura
Research Associate, Chicago
Council on Global Aairs
Lily Wojtowicz
Research Associate, Chicago
Council on Global Aairs
Allison Von Borstel
Intern, Chicago Council on
Global Aairs
Cory Breaux
Intern, Chicago Council on
Global Aairs
James Drimalla
Intern, Chicago Council on
Global Aairs
Joohyun Kwon
Intern, Chicago Council on
Global Aairs
Jose Maria Lalama
Intern, Chicago Council on
Global Aairs
Foreign Policy Advisory Board
Joshua Busby
Associate Professor of Public
Aairs, The University of Texas
Ivo Daalder
President, Chicago Council on
Global Aairs
Michael Desch
Professor and Director of the
International Security Center,
University of Notre Dame
Daniel Drezner
Professor of International Politics,
Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University
Peter Feaver
Professor of Political Science and
Public Policy, Duke University
Brian Hanson
Vice President, Studies, Chicago
Council on Global Aairs
Bruce Jentleson
Professor of Political Science and
Public Policy, Duke University
Ellen Laipson
Distinguished Fellow and
President Emeritus, Stimson
Center
Tod Lindberg
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
James Lindsay
Senior Vice President, Director
of Studies, Council on Foreign
Relations
Diana Mutz
Samuel A. Stouer Professor
of Political Science and
Communication, University of
Pennsylvania
Kori Schake
Deputy Director-General,
International Institute for
Strategic Studies
James Steinberg
University Professor, Maxwell
School of Citizenship and Public
Aairs, Syracuse University
The Chicago Council on Global
Aairs is an independent,
nonpartisan organization.
All statements of fact and
expressions of opinion contained
in this report are the sole
responsibility of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Chicago Council on
Global Aairs or of the project
funders.
Copyright © 2018 by the Chicago
Council on Global Aairs. All
rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of
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This report may not be
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copying permitted by sections
107 and 108 of the US Copyright
Law and excerpts by reviewers
for the public press), without
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publisher. For further information
about the Chicago Council or
this study, please write to the
Chicago Council on Global Aairs,
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Photography:
REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque
REUTERS/Brian Snyder
REUTERS/Aaron Bernstein
Carterdayne/iStock
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
2
7
MORE ENGAGED IN
THE WORLD
ADMIRATION OVER
FEAR
8
9
MULTILATERALISM,
NOT UNILATERALISM
COMMITTED TO
ALLIANCES
CONCLUSION APPENDIX
INCREASED SUPPORT
FOR IRAN AND PARIS
AGREEMENTS
11
HIGH ON TRADE
METHODOLOGY
12
16
21
23
24
28
ENDNOTES
33
2
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the wake of the 2016 US presidential election, political analysts warned of a dark era ahead. Newly
elected President Donald Trump had long expressed opposition to US security alliances, skepticism
of free trade, and support for authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin.
1
Since the American public
generally relies on their political leaders for foreign policy decisions, many policy watchers cautioned
that the country was headed for a populist, unilateralist, and protectionist retreat from global leadership.
While the Trump administration has taken action along this path—unilaterally withdrawing from the
Paris and Iran agreements, pulling the United States out from the Trans-Pacic Partnership (TPP) trade
agreement, and questioning the value of long-time alliances like NATO—the majority of the American
public has not followed this lead.
To the contrary, most Americans have moved in the opposite direction. The largest majority since 1974—
except for just after the September 11 attacks—now support active US engagement in world aairs. A
solid majority supports multilateral diplomacy, underscored by public willingness to accept international
decisions that are not the rst choice for the United States. A record number of Americans now
acknowledge the benets of international trade. Even though the United States withdrew from both the
Paris Agreement and the Iran nuclear deal, public support for these agreements has actually increased.
And as the ultimate indicator of commitment to allies, increased majorities express support for sending
US troops to defend both NATO and Asian allies if they are attacked.
Americans Want the United States to Remain Engaged
Despite attempts by the White House to pull the United States back from global engagement,
seven in 10 Americans (Figure A) favor the United States taking an active part in world aairs (70%). This
reading is a 7 percentage point increase from the 2017 Chicago Council Survey and is the highest
recorded level of support since 1974 except for 2002, the rst Chicago Council Survey conducted after
the September 11 attacks.
Stay out
Active part
Figure A: US Role in World Aairs
Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world aairs or if we stay
out of world aairs? (%)
n = 2,046
2018 Chicago Council Survey
1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
24
66
59
54
64
65
62
61
71
67
69
67
63
61
58
64
64
63
70
29
35
27
28
29
28
25
30
28
36
31
38
41
35
35
35
29
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
3
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
A Majority Wants Shared Action on Global Issues
The American public does not envision the United States working alone when playing an active role on
the world stage. Rather, a striking majority (91%) say that it is more eective for the United States to
work with allies and other countries to achieve its foreign policy goals. Just 8 percent say that it is more
eective for the United States to tackle world problems on its own.
Sharing leadership on global issues may mean that the United States does not always achieve its
preferred policy outcomes. Yet a majority support the United States making decisions with its allies even
if it means the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its rst choice
(66% agree, 32% disagree). Similarly, two-thirds of Americans believe that the United States should
be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations even if it means that the United States
will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its rst choice (64% agree, 34% disagree)—the
highest level of support on this question since it was rst asked in 2004, when 66 percent agreed.
Support Is Up for the Iran Deal and the Paris Agreement
President Trump has broken away from several international agreements since taking oce, including
the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Iran nuclear deal. But the American public has not
followed the president’s cues. Majorities of the public say that the United States should participate in the
Iran deal (66%) and the Paris Agreement (68%). In fact, support for US participation in both of these
high-prole international agreements has risen 6 percentage points over the past year (Figure B).
2
Figure B: International Agreements
2018 Chicago Council Survey
Based on what you know, do you think the United States should or should not participate in the following
international agreements? (% should participate)
2018
2017
2016
The Paris Agreement
that calls for countries
to collectively reduce
their emissions of
greenhouse gases
n = 999
71
68
62
The agreement that lifts
some international
economic sanctions
against Iran in exchange
for strict limits on its
nuclear program for at
least the next decade
n = 1,045
60
66
60
It’s More Important to be Admired than Feared
The administration has attempted to change the nature of US inuence around the world by using
coercive rhetoric toward both allies and hostile actors. Perhaps reective of this approach, more
Americans think that the United States is now more feared (39%) than admired (20%) around the world
today, though many volunteer an alternative response, ranging from “a joke” to “weak” to “falling
apart.”
3
But almost three times as many Americans think admiration (73%) of the United States is more
important than fear (26%) of the United States to achieve US foreign policy goals.
4
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
As interactions with US allies have strained over the course of the past year, majorities of Americans
say that relations with other countries are worsening (56%) and that the United States is losing
allies (57%). Just 12 percent of the public says that the United States is gaining allies and 31 percent
state there has been no change.
US Public Wants to Maintain or Increase Commitment to NATO
While some administration ocials have praised NATO, the president has repeatedly criticized
European allies for not spending enough on defense.
4
Yet his attacks do not seem to have dented public
support for the transatlantic alliance. A majority of Americans continue to favor maintaining (57%) or
increasing (18%) US commitment to NATO; in fact, a higher percentage of Americans now favor increasing
the US commitment to NATO than ever before (Figure C).
Figure C: NATO Commitment
2018 Chicago Council Survey
Do you feel we should increase our commitment to NATO, keep our commitment what it is now,
decrease our commitment to NATO, or withdraw from NATO entirely? (%)
n = 2,046
Keep commitment the same
Increase commitment
9
4
1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2004 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
9
8
4
5
9
11
14
10
7
12 12
18
50
58 58
62
56
56
59
65
58 66
68
66
63
57
54
67 67
70
60
61
68
76
72
76
75
78
75 75
AS INTERACTIONS WITH US ALLIES HAVE STRAINED OVER THE COURSE OF
THE PAST YEAR, MAJORITIES OF AMERICANS SAY THAT RELATIONS
WITH OTHER COUNTRIES ARE WORSENING (56%) AND THAT THE UNITED
STATES IS LOSING ALLIES (57%).
5
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
Support for Using US Troops to Defend Key Allies Has Grown
Americans continue to favor contributing to allies’ security through bases and security commitments,
and their willingness to do so has increased since last year. Majorities of Americans support maintaining
long-term military bases in South Korea (74%) and Japan (65%); both responses are at record levels since
the question was rst asked in the 2002 Chicago Council Survey. As in past surveys, a majority continue
to support maintaining US bases in Germany (60%). Further, two-thirds of Americans support sending
US troops to defend South Korea (64%) and Japan (64%) if attacked by North Korea, and 54 percent
support defending Baltic NATO allies with US troops if Russia invades. Each of these measures is at a
peak since the Council began asking these questions.
Americans Are High on Trade
The White House is waging trade battles on multiple fronts, but the American public is more positive
about the benets of trade than ever before, surpassing even the previous record ratings of 2017
(Figure D). Large majorities of Americans now say that trade is good for consumers like you (85%), the
US economy (82%), and creating jobs in the United States (67%).
Consumers like you
The US economy
Figure D: International Trade
Overall, do you think international trade is good or bad for: (% good)
n = 2,046
2018 Chicago Council Survey
Creating jobs in the United States
73
70 70
78
2004 2006 2016 2017 2018
85
57
54
59
72
82
38
37
40
57
67
While the president has criticized the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and withdrawn
from the TPP trade agreement, 63 percent of Americans now say NAFTA is good for the US economy,
up from 53 percent in 2017, and another record level in Chicago Council surveys. A majority of
Americans (61%) also believe the United States should participate in the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacic Partnership, or the CPTPP, a trade agreement formed by the 11 signatories
to the original TPP after US withdrawal.
6
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
Americans face the possibility of serious trade disruptions, as the United States and China are currently
exchanging several rounds of taris. While only four in 10 Americans consider a possible trade war
with China a critical threat (42%), a combined seven in 10 Americans are very (31%) or somewhat (41%)
concerned that a trade war with China will hurt their local economy.
5
Trade disputes with Mexico,
America’s third-largest trading partner, are somewhat less concerning to the US public: just over half of
the public are very (19%) or somewhat (33%) concerned about the impact of a trade war with Mexico on
their local economy.
6
Conclusion
The Trump administration’s bold attempts to reshape US foreign policy have not convinced many
Americans to join the bandwagon. The past two years have given the American public a glimpse
of President Trump’s alternative vision for the role of the United States in the world. And while Trump’s
base continues to share his vision, the majority of Americans do not.
Instead, most Americans are more convinced about the benets of active US engagement and the
need to work with allies. They see US soft power as more eective than muscular intimidation in
accomplishing US foreign policy goals and believe the United States is losing allies and world respect.
On those specic issues where the White House has taken action—withdrawing from the Iran nuclear
deal, the Paris Agreement, and the TPP agreement—Americans are less likely to see them as “wins”
and more likely to endorse participating in these agreements. On traditional approaches to US foreign
policy, including maintaining military bases abroad, defending key allies if attacked, and supporting
trade, Americans have doubled down. The bottom line is that two years into the Trump administration,
solid majorities of the American public have rejected the “America First” platform.
7
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
INTRODUCTION
Donald Trump entered the White House intent on reshaping US foreign policy.
While some of his cabinet ocials adhered to a traditional, rules-based approach
to foreign policy, he has argued loudly and frequently that the United States must
stop underwriting the security and prosperity of other countries at its own expense.
7
Further, he has called for the United States to withdraw from key international
agreements or renegotiate existing deals and said that any new deals struck under
his administration would deliver the lion’s share of the benets to the United States.
These views are the essence of his “America First” platform.
President Trump coupled this rhetoric with bold action. He unilaterally withdrew
the United States from the Iran agreement that lifted sanctions in exchange
for constraints on and inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities. By most accounts,
this agreement was working just as it should, but Trump labeled it a “horrible,
one-sided deal” in his speech announcing US withdrawal.
8
He also withdrew the
United States from the Paris Agreement on climate change, a nonbinding treaty
signed by every other nation on earth, calling it an agreement that “disadvantaged
the United States.”
9
Trump pulled the United States out of the Trans-Pacic
Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, having said the structure of the deal was
“terrible.”
10
He threatened to pull the United States out of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—”the worst trade deal maybe ever signed anywhere,
but certainly ever signed in this country”—before settling on renegotiating its key
terms.
11
He chastised NATO allies at the NATO summit in Brussels in July 2018
for not spending enough money on defense. Four days later, he met one-on-one
with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki. There he seemed to accept
Putin’s denial of Russian interference in the 2016 US elections, against the
unanimous conclusion of the US intelligence community.
12
On President Trump’s
scorecard, each of these moves was a “win” for the United States.
Trump’s foreign policy actions over the past two years have given the American
public an opportunity to consider a dierent vision of US foreign policy and the
US role in the world. But most Americans do not like what they have seen. While
Trump’s base has remained supportive of the president’s policies, the bulk of
the American public rejects the America First platform and opposes many of the
specic actions undertaken by the Trump administration.
13
Instead, the majority
of Americans remain committed to the traditional tools of US foreign policy—
American global leadership, security alliances, free trade, and multilateralism.
8
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
MORE ENGAGED IN THE WORLD
Despite the Trump administration’s attempts to pull the United States back from global engagement,
70 percent of Americans favor the United States continuing to take an active part in world aairs. Just
29 percent prefer that the United States stay out of world aairs (Figure 1). Support for global
engagement has jumped 7 percentage points since the 2017 Chicago Council Survey and is at the
highest recorded level since 1974 except for 2002, the rst Council Survey conducted after the
September 11 attacks.
Stay out
Active part
Figure 1: US Role in World Aairs
Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world aairs or if we stay
out of world aairs? (%)
n = 2,046
2018 Chicago Council Survey
1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
24
66
59
54
64
65
62
61
71
67
69
67
63
61
58
64
64
63
70
29
35
27
28
29
28
25
30
28
36
31
38
41
35
35
35
29
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
The most common rationale for those respondents endorsing an active US role in world aairs is that the
United States cannot avoid international engagement when the world is so interconnected. “The United
States cannot exist in a vacuum. We trade globally. We breathe the air of the entire world, we share
oceans with the entire world, we are aected by the climate of the globe,” explains one respondent.
Another survey participant comments, “We need to be seen as involved in other nations. We need to
know what is going on with them in terms of concerns, troubles, wars, diseases, etc.; ultimately it aects
us too.” Many respondents directly reject an isolationist approach, contending that “we cannot expect
to be isolated and yet a part of the world if we do not actively participate” and “isolationism is a fool’s
gambit…whenever America turns away from the world, the world bites America on the ass.”
9
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
Others focus on the need to remain internationally active so that the United States can inuence world
events and politics. “Participation means that we are helping shape the events,” remarked one
respondent. Another participant comments, by “turning our [America’s] back on our world, we cede our
place at the table.”
Many respondents diverge sharply from the president’s transactional approach toward US allies and
trading partners. Some argue that “We are dependent for our safety and security on the safety and
security of our allies,” and “If we do not know and understand our neighbors, we may stand alone when
we might need help.” Others point to US economic security, stating that “strong economic relationships
are the backbone of global peace,” and that “being involved with other countries ensures America’s
ability to trade eectively.”
Still others emphasize a moral obligation: “As the superpower in the world we are obligated and
forced into this position;” and “If we claim to be an exceptional country, we have a moral obligation to
help make the world a better place. This cannot be done by isolating ourselves.” And as another
respondent remarks, “The United States should be using its resources and capabilities to help other
countries when possible.” This viewpoint, too, runs counter to Trump’s America First philosophy. As
he stated in his rst speech at the UN General Assembly, “As long as I hold oce, I will defend America’s
interests above all else.”
14
The minority of respondents who think that the United States should stay out of world aairs mirror
President Trump’s views that there are downsides to American international engagement. While noting
that “America is the world leader,” some disagree with America’s nancial involvement in world aairs,
stating that “America needs to stop sending everyone else money until we can take care of [Americans].”
Others express a desire to avoid interfering in other countries, asserting that “there are issues that don’t
concern America” and suggest the United States “stops arming the world.”
15
ADMIRATION OVER FEAR
While the White House has sought to refashion the role of the United States in the world, it has also
attempted to change the nature of US global inuence to a more coercive style. For example, President
Trump threatened North Korea with “re and fury” and Iran with “CONSEQUENCES THE LIKES
OF WHICH FEW THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAVE EVER SUFFERED.”
16
With allies, he has resorted to
intimidating rhetoric in trying to compel NATO allies into spending more on defense and has imposed
History has taught us that isolationism doesn’t work.
We are part of the world.
—59-year-old woman from Ohio
10
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
taris against longtime US partners, including Canada, the European Union, Japan, and Mexico. These
actions have created concern among both adversaries and allies about US intentions. While Americans
acknowledge that maintaining US military superiority around the world is a very eective foreign policy
tool, a majority believe it is more important for the United States to be admired (73%) than feared (26%)
to achieve US foreign policy goals (Figure 2a).
17
In order to achieve US foreign policy goals internationally, do you think it is more important for
the United States to be feared or admired around the world? (%)
n = 1,011
Figure 2a: Is It Better to Be Feared or Admired for US Foreign Policy?
Figure 2b: And Is the United States Feared or Admired?
2018 Chicago Council Survey
Admired
Feared
73
26
n = 1,011
And today, do you think the United States is more feared or more admired around the world? (%)
Other
Admired
Feared
Laughed at
20
39
40
Other
Neither
Disliked
Both
Don’t know
Disrespected
Refused
Confused
Not trusted
Weak
13
7
5
4
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
11
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
But when asked whether the United States is more admired or feared around the world today, just
20 percent of Americans say that that the country is admired, compared with 39 percent who state
the country is more feared (Figure 2b). Moreover, this question elicits a striking number of volunteered
responses. Forty percent choose “other,” and when asked to specify, the most common responses
are along the lines that the United States is laughed at, a joke, or ridiculed (13%). Others volunteer that
the United States is neither feared nor admired (5%), is disliked and hated (4%), is both feared and
admired (3%), or is weak and falling apart (2%). For this state of aairs, some respondents blame the
president, saying that “we’re becoming a joke thanks to Trump.” But others place the blame on the
previous administration, arguing that “our image is still recovering from the damage done by Obama.”
And some lay blame on both sides: “Obama made his ‘red line’ over and over and Trump hasn’t
really been tested but people think he’s a joke.”
Shared Action on Global Issues
The American public does not envision the United States acting alone when participating in world aairs.
Instead, a striking majority (91%) say that it is more eective for the United States to work with allies
and other countries to achieve its foreign policy goals. In contrast, just 8 percent of respondents say it
is more eective for the United States to tackle world problems on its own. Similarly, the 2017 Chicago
Council Survey found that a majority of Americans prefer that the United States play a shared leadership
role in the world (61%), with only a minority saying the United States should be the dominant world
leader (32%).
Although Americans clearly want to be involved in world aairs, some nd appeal in President Trump’s
ideas that the United States should pull back so that allies will step up and do more. Fifty percent of the
US public believes that other countries will be forced to do more if the United States does less. But the
other half of respondents (49%) say that other countries will take action against world problems only if
the United States takes the lead.
INCREASED SUPPORT FOR IRAN
AND PARIS AGREEMENTS
As a candidate, Donald Trump promised that he would extricate the United States from a range of deals
that he considered disadvantageous to the country.
18
True to his word, in August 2017 his administration
withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement—an agreement that Trump called “unfair at the
highest level to the United States.”
19
And in May 2018 the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear
agreement, which the president described as “a horrible one-sided deal that should have never, ever
been made.”
20
These decisions were made unilaterally, despite partners and allies—and even some top
administration ocials—urging the White House to stick with these multilateral arrangements.
21
As
commentators noted, both withdrawals reversed major accomplishments of the Obama administration
and fullled Trump campaign pledges.
22
12
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
But most Americans disagree with these moves. A strong majority (68%) of the American public says
that the United States should participate in the Paris Agreement that calls for countries to collectively
reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases. And two-thirds (66%) also support US participation in the
agreement that lifts some international economic sanctions against Iran in exchange for strict limits on
its nuclear program for at least the next decade (Figure 3).
23
In fact, support for participating in both
of these high-prole international agreements has risen 6 percentage points over the past year.
Figure 3: International Agreements
2018 Chicago Council Survey
Based on what you know, do you think the United States should or should not participate in the following
international agreements? (% should participate)
2018
2017
2016
The Paris Agreement
that calls for countries
to collectively reduce
their emissions of
greenhouse gases
n = 999
71
68
62
The agreement that lifts
some international
economic sanctions
against Iran in exchange
for strict limits on its
nuclear program for at
least the next decade
n = 1,045
60
66
60
MULTILATERALISM, NOT
UNILATERALISM
President Trump has shown little inclination to work with allies or the United Nations, as evidenced by
his withdrawal of the United States from internationally negotiated agreements and his attempts to cut
funding for UN programs.
24
In contrast, most Americans favor cooperating with other countries, even if
the United States does not always achieve its preferred policy outcomes. A majority (66%) agree that the
United States should be more willing to make decisions with its allies even if it means the United States
will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its rst choice (32% disagree). Similarly, two-thirds
of Americans (64%) agree that the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the
United Nations even if it means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that
is not its rst choice (Figure 4).
25
13
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
Disagree
Agree
Figure 4: Working Through the United Nations
When dealing with international problems, the United States should be more willing to make decisions
within the United Nations even if this means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with
a policy that is not its first choice. (%)
n = 1,008
2018 Chicago Council Survey
66
29
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2018
36
46
48
43
40
34
60
52
50
56
59
64
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Allies and Global Influence Matter
Over the past year, President Trump has publicly chastised allies and partners, often with hostile
rhetoric. Trump claimed “the people of Germany are turning against their leadership” in response to
Angela Merkel’s refugee policy; called Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau “very dishonest
and weak”; and while visiting the United Kingdom in July 2018 criticized Prime Minister Theresa May’s
handling of Brexit, telling The Sun that he had told the prime minister how to handle it and that
she had gone “the opposite way.”
26
He accused South Korean President Moon Jae-in of appeasement
for seeking to improve relations with North Korea.
27
And he called the European Union a “foe” in the
lead-up to his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
28
These slights have not gone unnoticed. As interactions with allies have strained over the past year,
majorities of Americans say that relations with other countries are worsening (56%) and that the
United States is losing allies (57%).
29
In addition, 59 percent of Americans say that the United States is
less respected now than it was 10 years ago, with 21 percent saying it is more respected now.
30
I think the world is laughing at us.
—70-year-old woman from Florida
14
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
Americans believe that the international image of the United States matters. For example, six in
10 Americans (57%) say that respect for the United States matters a great deal for American leaders in
trying to achieve US foreign policy goals, and an additional three in 10 (31%) say it matters a fair amount.
The public’s perception that the United States is losing allies is tied to the view that the United States is
losing global inuence.
31
While American views of US inuence have remained steady over the past
year (8.3 average overall on a scale from 0 to 10), there is a large dierence between those who say the
United States is losing allies (8.2 inuence on average) compared with gaining allies (8.9 on average).
Americans are still more condent in their own country than in any other nation: a February/March 2018
survey by the Chicago Council found 68 percent of the public have a great deal or a fair amount of
condence in the United States to deal with world problems responsibly.
32
AMERICANS DON’T SHARE TRUMP’S PRAISE
OF AUTOCRATS
SID EBAR
President Trump has insulted leaders from allied
nations, but he has been complimentary and
respectful of Russian President Vladimir Putin,
Chinese President Xi Jinping, North Korean leader
Kim Jong Un, and other authoritarian leaders.
33
While the US government has imposed punitive
measures against Russia, including several rounds
of sanctions, President Trump has repeatedly
praised Putin and said he wants to have good
relations with Russia.
34
But Americans have not
warmed up to Russia, despite President Trump’s
outreach to Putin. Fewer than one-quarter of
respondents are condent in Russia’s ability to
deal responsibly with world problems (24% a great
deal or fair amount).
35
And Putin himself is very
unpopular among the US public (14% favorable,
83% unfavorable). Further, Americans were not
particularly impressed with the recent tête-a-tête
in Helsinki: a Quinnipiac poll shows that more
Americans thought that the Helsinki summit was a
success for Russia than for the United States.
36
Despite the ongoing trade disputes between
China and the United States, President Trump has
remained optimistic about his relationship with
President Xi Jinping. In early April 2018, Trump
tweeted that he and Xi would always be friends.
37
But attitudes toward Xi among the American
public have remained largely negative. Just one-
third have a favorable view of Xi (34% compared
with 61% unfavorable), unchanged since 2017. Even
so, public attitudes toward China do not seem
to be closely tied to perceptions of its leader. In
a February/March 2018 survey, Americans rated
China an average of 45 degrees on a feeling
thermometer scale, where 0 represents a very
cold, unfavorable feeling and 100 represents
a very warm, favorable feeling.
38
Similarly, despite Trump’s praise for North
Korean leader Kim Jong Un after the Singapore
summit, Kim’s image among Americans remains
deeply negative (6% favorable, 91% unfavorable).
According to a CBS News poll, a plurality of
Americans (47%) think the summit produced mixed
results for the United States; just one-third think
it was a success (32%).
39
While Americans are
less likely to sense a critical threat from North
Korea’s nuclear program now (59%) than in
2017 (75%), it is still the top-rated threat after
international terrorism (see Appendix Figure 1).
15
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
When asked about the global inuence of other nations around the world, Americans are clearly aware
of a rising China. They see China as the second-most inuential country in the world (7.3), up slightly
from 2017, followed by the European Union (6.8) and Russia (6.6) (See Figure 5.) While American views
of Russian inuence have also risen slightly, perceptions of European inuence have, on average,
remained stable since 2002 despite signicant shifts in both directions each year. Over the past decade,
American impressions of Japanese inuence have declined somewhat, falling from an average of 6.4 in
2010 to 5.7 in 2018. Meanwhile, views of South Korean inuence have remained steady.
6.4
6.4
6.6
6.4
6.1
6.0
5.7
4.7
4.4
4.4
4.6
4.4
4.8
6.7
6.0
6.6
7.2
6.5
6.7
7.0
6.3
7.5
6.8
7.4
7.1
7.1
6.8
7.3
6.4 6.7
6.5
5.6
6.0
6.2
5.8
6.2
6.5
6.6
9.1
8.5
8.3
8.6
8.5
8.3
8.5
8.3 8.3
Russia
United States
Figure 5: Global Influence
I would like to know how much influence you think each of the following countries has in the world. Please
answer on a 0 to 10 scale, with 0 meaning they are not at all influential and 10 meaning they are extremely
influential. (mean score)
n = 2,046
2018 Chicago Council Survey
2002 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2017 2018
European Union
China
Japan
South Korea
2016
5.9
6.8
The United States should be using its resources and
capabilities to help other countries when possible.
—38-year-old man from Florida
16
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
COMMITTED TO ALLIANCES
Perhaps because of a sense that the United States is losing allies around the world, the US public
now underscores the value of US alliances and partnerships in East Asia and Europe. In 2017,
Chicago Council Survey results showed that Americans believed security alliances in Europe and
East Asia beneted both the United States and its allies. Now, in 2018, Americans are rearming
those commitments.
40
While some Trump administration ocials have praised NATO, the president has repeatedly criticized
NATO allies for not spending enough on defense; at one point Trump reportedly threatened to withdraw
from the alliance.
41
But the president’s attacks have done little to deter public support for NATO.
A majority of Americans continue to favor maintaining (57%) or increasing (18%) the US commitment to
NATO (Figure 6), as they have since the Council began asking this question in 1974. In fact, the
18 percent of Americans who want to increase the US commitment to NATO is the highest level ever
recorded in Chicago Council Surveys. In contrast, 16 percent want to decrease the US commitment,
and just 6 percent want to withdraw entirely.
Figure 6: NATO Commitment
2018 Chicago Council Survey
Do you feel we should increase our commitment to NATO, keep our commitment what it is now,
decrease our commitment to NATO, or withdraw from NATO entirely? (%)
n = 2,046
Keep commitment the same
Increase commitment
9
4
1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2004 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
9
8
4
5
9
11
14
10
7
12 12
18
50
58 58
62
56
56
59
65
58 66
68
66
63
57
54
67 67
70
60
61
68
76
72
76
75
78
75 75
17
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
US relationships with Asian allies have also been strained in the past several years, including during
the Obama administration.
42
More recently, America’s South Korean and Japanese allies have watched
the Trump administration swing from discussions of preemptive strikes on North Korea to a historic
summit between North Korean and American leaders.
43
Economic tensions have added additional levels
of concern, with Korean and Japanese businesses facing new tari barriers to US markets.
Despite these tensions, the American public’s anity for Asian allies has strengthened. Long friendly
toward Japan and South Korea, Americans have warmed even further over the rst two years of
the Trump administration. Majorities of Americans are also condent in their Japanese (62%) and South
Korean (50%) allies to handle world problems responsibly, and large majorities consider Japan (86%)
and South Korea (78%) partners to the United States while few see them as rivals. In contrast, the
US public is more divided on its view of China (49% rival, 50% partner).
44
While Americans do see China as important to the US economy (92%) and for US security (85%), two-
thirds of Americans (66%) think the United States should prioritize building up strong relations with Japan
and South Korea even if it diminishes US relations with China (Figure 7). About one-quarter think the
United States should put a higher priority on building a new partnership with China (26%). Support for
prioritizing US relationships with Asian allies has risen steadily since 2012, following the announcement
of a new US pivot to Asia.
45
Since then, Americans have increasingly preferred to build strong
relationships with their Korean and Japanese allies.
Building a new partnership with
China, even if this might diminish
our relations with our traditional
allies
Building up our strong relations
with traditional allies like South
Korea and Japan, even if this
might diminish our relations with
China
Figure 7: US Policy in Asia
Now thinking about US foreign policy in Asia, do you think the United States should put a higher
priority on: (%)
n = 1,011
2018 Chicago Council Survey
58
31
2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
53
40
59
33
62
28
66
26
18
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
CHINA IS NOT SEEN AS A CRITICAL THREATSID EBAR
Figure: Threat of China
Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each
one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an
important threat at all: The development of China as a world power (% critical threat)
n = 2,046
2018 Chicago Council Survey
1990 1994 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008
40
2010 2012 2014 2017 2018
57 57
56
33
36
40
43
40
41
39 39
TWO-THIRDS OF AMERICANS (66%) THINK THE UNITED STATES
SHOULD PRIORITIZE BUILDING UP STRONG RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND
SOUTH KOREA EVEN IF IT DIMINISHES US RELATIONS WITH CHINA.
While Americans prefer developing ties with other
Asian allies over ties with China, it is not because
they see China as a critical threat. In contrast to
the ocial US government view that China is
a strategic competitor—as stated in the 2017
National Security Strategy—this characterization
has not taken hold among the public.
46
Just
39 percent of Americans consider the develop-
ment of China as a world power a critical threat
facing the United States. This makes it one of
the lowest-ranked threats included in this year’s
survey and is largely unchanged since 2006.
Additionally, a separate February-March 2018
Chicago Council survey found that few Americans
felt that the development of Chinese economic
(31%) or military (39%) power poses a critical threat
to the United States.
47
19
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
US Support for Allies
While President Trump has at times said he would like to reduce the overseas presence of US troops,
growing majorities of Americans support long-term military bases in a number of allied nations.
48
Three
in four (74%) support maintaining US bases in South Korea, and two-thirds (65%) support bases in Japan—
both all-time high levels of support since the Council began asking the question in 2002 (Figure 8).
37
47
58
46
46
50
43
40
43
53
69
57 57
59
52
51
57
61
60
67
62 62 62
63
60
64
70
74
63
52
57
58
50
51
55
60
65
South Korea
Japan
Figure 8: US Bases Abroad
Do you think the United States should or should not have long-term military bases in the following
places? (% should have)
n = 2,046
2018 Chicago Council Survey
Turkey
Germany
Poland
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
In Europe, a majority of Americans (60%) continue to favor US bases in Germany, as they have for
nearly two decades. Support for US bases elsewhere has also risen sharply in recent years, including
in Poland (47%, up from 37% in 2014, when rst asked) and Turkey (53%, up from 43% in 2014).
Large majorities of Americans support using US troops to defend allies, including generic scenarios
where a US ally is invaded (85% favor) and if another country seizes territory of a US ally (73% favor).
(See Appendix Figure 4.) Moreover, support for defending US allies in specic cases has risen notably
in recent years.
For example, 64 percent of Americans now favor using US troops to defend South Korea. This is a sharp
rise from 2015, when Americans were divided, with 47 percent of Americans supporting and 49 percent
opposing the use of US troops to defend South Korea from a North Korean invasion. Two-thirds (64%) of
Americans also support using US troops to defend Japan against an attack from North Korea. This
stance, too, is a dramatic change from 2015, when Americans were more hesitant to commit US troops
to the defense of Japan (48% favored, 47% opposed). (See Appendix Figure 3.)
20
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
Similar shifts have occurred with US public support for the defense of NATO allies. Today, 54 percent
are in favor of using US troops if Russia were to invade a NATO ally like Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania,
while 42 percent oppose (Figure 9). This is a new high since the Council began asking this question in
2014 and a signicant change from 2015, when only 45 percent of Americans supported defending
these same Baltic allies with US troops (51% opposed).
48
64
33
40
41
44
45
52
54
27
32
33
32 32
25
28
26
28
35
24
44
39
30
36
43
45
41
40
41
47
47
62
64
If China invaded Taiwan
If North Korea invaded South Korea
Figure 9: Use of US Troops
There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other
parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use
of US troops: (% favor)
n = 1,051
2018 Chicago Council Survey
If China initiates a military conflict
with Japan over disputed islands
If Russia invades a NATO ally like
Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia
If North Korea attacks
Japan
1990 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015 2017 20181986 1994
In contrast, Americans are reluctant to enter into a conict with China. Minorities of Americans support
the use of US troops if China initiates a conict with Japan over disputed islands or if China invades
Taiwan. Yet support for US involvement in both conicts has risen since 2015. One in three Americans
(35%) favors using US troops if China invades Taiwan, up from 28 percent in 2015 and an all-time high
level of support for US involvement since the question was rst asked in 1998. Similarly, current support
for deploying US troops in the event of a Chinese-initiated conict with Japan over disputed islands
(41%) is up 8 percentage points since 2015, when the question was rst asked.
21
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
HIGH ON TRADE
In 2018, trade became an issue of serious public debate as President Trump enacted his more skeptical
approach to trade deals through taris imposed on allies and competitors alike. These taris, according
to the Trump administration, will rebalance trade in America’s favor after years of other countries taking
advantage of the United States. Most economists, however, believe taris are counterproductive: in
the March 2018 IGM Economic Experts Panel survey, the panel uniformly agreed that imposing new US
taris on steel and aluminum would not improve Americans’ welfare.
49
And polls show that American
opinion on the taris imposed by the Trump administration is divided at best.
50
Today, the American public is more optimistic about the benets of trade than ever before, surpassing
even the previous highs of 2017. Large majorities of Americans (Figure 10) say that trade is good
for consumers like you (85%), the US economy (82%), and creating jobs in the United States (67%).
51
Along with increasingly positive views of the benets of international trade over the past two years,
support for specic trade deals has increased as well.
Consumers like you
The US economy
Figure 10: International Trade
Overall, do you think international trade is good or bad for: (% good)
n = 2,046
2018 Chicago Council Survey
Creating jobs in the United States
73
70 70
78
2004 2006 2016 2017 2018
85
57
54
59
72
82
38
37
40
57
67
Strong economic relationships are the backbone of
global peace.
—41-year-old woman from Georgia
22
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
Trump campaigned strongly against the TPP agreement, which was championed by President Obama,
and withdrew the United States from TPP negotiations upon taking oce. The 2018 survey results,
however, show that a majority (61%) of Americans supports US participation in the Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacic Partnership (CPTPP), a trade agreement among 11 Pacic
nations formed by the signatories to the original TPP (without the United States).
52
American
support for this type of trade agreement is consistent with past Chicago Council Survey results; when
previously asked about the TPP in the 2016 Chicago Council Survey, 60 percent of Americans
favored US participation.
Meanwhile, NAFTA has been under continued renegotiation and even existential threat during Trump’s
presidency; as the president has said, “the way you’re going to make the best deal is to terminate
NAFTA.”
53
But the 2018 survey results, conducted before the United States and Mexico announced
a breakthrough in the negotiations, show that 63 percent of Americans now say NAFTA is good for
the US economy (Figure 11), an all-time high and an increase of 10 percentage points from 2017, when
a narrow majority (53%) said the same.
42
42
50
53
63
Bad
Good
Figure 11: Views of NAFTA
Overall, do you think the North American Free Trade Agreement, also known as NAFTA, is good or bad
for the US economy? (%)
n = 2,064
2018 Chicago Council Survey
20182017201320082004
43
55
46
42
32
Concerned about Trade War with China
The Trump administration has made the US trade decit a key focus of its trade policy.
54
President Trump
has repeatedly claimed that “we lose $800 billion a year on trade, every year,” an assertion that one
trade economist said “dees the most basic of economics.”
55
Despite the volume of discussion about the
US trade decit in recent years, it remains a low priority for most Americans. Only four in 10 (42%) name
reducing the trade decit a very important goal for US foreign policy.
However, Americans are currently confronted with the possibility of serious trade disruptions, with the
United States and China currently imposing ever-greater taris on one another. While only four in
10 Americans name a possible trade war with China as a critical threat, a combined seven in 10 are very
23
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
CONCLUSION
President Trump has presented the American public with a new vision of the United States and its
role in the world. This vision places primacy on short-term US interests, discounts US allies and their
importance to the United States, and eschews multilateral frameworks. However, this perspective
has been greeted with limited enthusiasm among the American public. In fact, the survey results
demonstrate that most Americans have rejected that vision and are moving in the opposite direction.
Support for the Paris Agreement on climate change and the nuclear agreement with Iran have increased.
Americans increasingly value close alliances with Japan and South Korea and remain committed to
NATO. A greater majority of Americans now than ever before would favor sending US troops to defend key
allies if they are attacked. Support has also increased for the States’ working with allies and through
the United Nations even if it means sacricing preferred policy outcomes for the United States. And the
benets of free trade are more recognized now than at any time in the past.
A US foreign policy that pursues a nationalist agenda without regard for the interests of its partners and
allies is not a foreign policy that is supported by the majority of Americans. The public has shown
that it prefers an American foreign policy that supports free trade, values its allies, and works within the
international system.
Figure 12: Trade Wars
2018 Chicago Council Survey
Not very concerned
Somewhat concerned
Very concerned
If the United States gets into a trade war with (China/Mexico), how concerned are you that this would
hurt the local economy in your area? (%)
Not concerned at all
Trade war
with China
n = 995
Trade war
with Mexico
n = 1,051
31 41 21 6
19 33 32 13
Note: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
(31%) or somewhat (41%) concerned that a trade war with China—the United States’ largest trading
partner—will hurt their local economy (Figure 12).
56
Trade disputes with Mexico, the United States’ third-
largest trading partner, are somewhat less concerning to the US public: half are very (19%) or some-
what (33%) concerned about the impact a trade war with Mexico would have on their local economy.
57
24
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
APPENDIX
2018 Chicago Council Survey
RepublicansDemocrats Independents
Overall
Political polarization in the
United States
North Korea’s nuclear program
International terrorism
6661 64 74
Russian influence in American
elections
The possibility of a new arms
race between Russia and the
United States
The decline of democracy around
the world
Iran’s nuclear program
The possibility of a trade war with
China
The development of China as a
world power
Large numbers of immigrants and
refugees coming into the United States
Drug related violence and instability
in Mexico
Economic competition from
low-wage countries
5962 53 61
5250 48 59
5057 50 41
4470 36 19
4456 40 32
4354 36 36
4254 40 28
3940 35 42
3920 37 66
35
30
34 42
2123 19 19
Appendix Figure 1: Threats to the United States
Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years.
For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat,
or not an important threat at all: (% critical threat)
n = 2,046
25
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
2018 Chicago Council Survey
RepublicansDemocrats Independents
Overall
Improving America’s reputation
with the world (n=993)
Protecting the jobs of American
workers
Preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons
7276 66 74
Maintaining superior military
power worldwide
Promoting international trade
Strengthening the United Nations
Improving America's standing in
the world (n=1,053)
Defending our allies' security
Reducing our trade deficit with
foreign countries
Controlling and reducing illegal
immigration
Protecting weaker nations against
foreign aggression
6965 67 79
6068 55 53
5873 54 39
5141 47 70
4656 43 37
4361 34 29
4353 36 38
4234 42 53
4220 43 71
31
42
25 24
Appendix Figure 2: US Foreign Policy Goals
Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select
whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat
important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all: (% very important goal)
n = 2,046
26
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
2018 Chicago Council Survey
RepublicansDemocrats Independents
Overall
If North Korea invaded South
Korea
To stop Iran from obtaining
nuclear weapons
If North Korea attacks a US
military base in the Pacific
8483 82 90
To stop Iran from supporting
terrorist groups
To fight against violent Islamic
extremist groups in Iraq and
Syria
If Russia invades a NATO ally like
Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania
If North Korea attacks Japan
Appendix Figure 3: Use of US Troops Abroad in Specific Scenarios
There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other
parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use
of US troops: (% favor)
n = 1,051
If Israel were attacked by its
neighbors
If Israel bombs Iran’s nuclear
facilities, and Iran were to
retaliate against Israel
To stop the Rohingya genocide
in Myanmar
If China initiates a military
conflict with Japan over disputed
islands
If China invaded Taiwan
To overthrow Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad
6562 60 77
6462 63 70
6463 61 70
5857 51 67
5754 51 69
5461 50 52
5345 50 69
4536 43 63
4250 41 35
41
42
37 47
3536 33 39
3032 28 31
27
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
2018 Chicago Council Survey
RepublicansDemocrats Independents
Overall
To stop another country from
obtaining nuclear weapons
To stop a government from
committing genocide and killing
large numbers of its own people
If a US ally is invaded
8584 81 91
To stop a country from supporting
a terrorist group
To fight violent Islamic extremist
groups abroad
To overthrow a dictator
If another country seizes
territory belonging to a US ally
Appendix Figure 4: Use of US Troops Abroad in General Scenarios
There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other
parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of
US troops: (% favor)
n = 995
7781 72 80
7373 71 78
7065 66 82
6458 63 75
6460 62 72
3537 30 37
28
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
METHODOLOGY
This report is based on the results of a survey commissioned by the Chicago Council on Global Aairs.
The 2018 Chicago Council Survey, a project of the Lester Crown Center on US Foreign Policy, is the
latest eort in a series of wide-ranging surveys on American attitudes toward US foreign policy. The
2018 Chicago Council Survey is made possible by the generous support of the Crown family, the
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the US-Japan Foundation, the Korea Foundation, and
the Robert R. McCormick Foundation. Special thanks to the team at Le Communications for
professional editing, design, and layout.
The survey was conducted from July 12 to 31, 2018, among a representative national sample of
2,046 adults. The margin of sampling error for the full sample is ±2.37, including a design eect of 1.1954.
The margin of error is higher for partisan subgroups or for partial-sample items.
Partisan identication is based on respondents’ answers to a standard partisan self-identication
question: “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
Independent, or what?”
A full listing of questions asked in the 2018 Chicago Council Survey, including details on which questions
were administered to split samples, is available online at www.thechicagocouncil.org.
The survey was conducted by GfK Custom Research, a polling, social science, and market research rm
in Palo Alto, California, using a randomly selected sample of GfK’s large-scale nationwide research
panel, KnowledgePanel® (KP). The survey was elded to a total of 3,520 panel members yielding a total
of 2,200 completed surveys (a completion rate of 62.5%). The median survey length was 22 minutes.
Of the 2,200 total completed surveys, 154 cases were excluded for quality control reasons, leaving a
nal sample size of 2,046 respondents:
Respondents were excluded if they failed at least one of three key checks:
• Respondents who completed the survey in eight minutes or less.
• Respondents who refused to answer half or more of the items in the survey.
• Respondents who failed two or three of the following checks:
— Refused or skipped the question that was specically designed to make sure respondents
were paying attention. (“In order to make sure that your browser is working correctly, please
select number 4 from the list below.”)
— Refused one or more full lists that included ve items or more (there were 17 such lists).
— Respondents who gave exactly the same answer (“straight-lined”) to every item on one of
four grid questions in the survey (Q5, Q7, Q44, or Q130).
The GfK Knowledge Panel (KP) was originally based exclusively on a national Random Digit Dialing
(RDD) sampling methodology. To improve the representation of the panel, GfK migrated to using an
Address-Based Sampling (ABS) methodology via the Delivery Sequence File (DSF) of the USPS for
recruiting panel members in 2009. This probability-based sampling methodology improves population
coverage and provides a more eective sampling infrastructure for recruitment of hard-to-reach
29
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
individuals, such as young adults and those from various minority groups. It should be noted that under
the ABS recruitment, households without an internet connection are provided with a web-enabled
device and free internet service. Thus, the sample is not limited to those in the population who already
have internet access.
In general, the specic survey samples represent an equal probability selection method (EPSEM)
sample from the panel for general population surveys. The raw distribution of KP mirrors that of the
US adults fairly closely, barring occasional disparities that may emerge for certain subgroups due
to dierential attrition.
To ensure selection of general population samples from KP behave as EPSEM, additional measures
are undertaken, starting by weighting the pool of active members to the geodemographic bench-
marks secured from the latest March supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) along several
dimensions. Using the resulting weights as measure of size, in the next step a PPS (probability
proportional to size) procedure is used to select study specic samples. It is the application of this
PPS methodology with the imposed size measures that produces fully self-weighting samples from
KP, for which each sample member can carry a design weight of unity. Moreover, in instances where
a study design requires any form of oversampling of certain subgroups, such departures from an
EPSEM design are accounted for by adjusting the design weights in reference to the CPS benchmarks
for the population of interest.
The geodemographic benchmarks used to weight the active panel members for computation of size
measures include:
• Gender (male, female)
• Age (18–29, 30–44, 45–59, 60 or older)
• Race/Hispanic ethnicity (white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, other non-Hispanic, two-plus
races non-Hispanic, Hispanic)
• Education (less than high school, high school, some college, bachelor’s degree or higher)
• Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West)
• Household income (less than $10,000, $10,000–$24,999, $25,000–$49,999, $50,000–$74,999,
$75,000–$99,999, $100,000–$149,999, $150,000 or more)
• Home ownership status (own, rent/other)
• Metropolitan area (yes, no)
Once the study sample has been selected and the survey administered, the survey administered, and
all the survey data edited and made nal, design weights are adjusted to account for any dierential
nonresponse that may have resulted during the eld period. Depending on the specic target population
for a given study, geodemographic distributions for the corresponding population are obtained from
the CPS, the American Community Survey (ACS), or in certain instances from the weighted KP prole data.
For this purpose, an iterative proportional tting (raking) procedure is used to produce the nal
weights. In the nal step, calculated weights are examined to identify and, if necessary, trim outliers at
the extreme upper and lower tails of the weight distribution. The resulting weights are then scaled
to aggregate to the total sample size of all eligible respondents.
30
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
For this study, the following benchmark distributions of the US adult general population (age 18 or
older) from the most recent data (March 2017 Supplement) from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
were used for the raking adjustment of weights:
• Gender (male, female) by age (18–29, 30–44, 45–59, 60 or older)
• Race/Hispanic ethnicity (white non-Hispanic, black, non-Hispanic, other, Non-Hispanic, two
or more races non-Hispanic, Hispanic)
• Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West) by metropolitan status (metro, nonmetro)
• Education (high school or less, some college, bachelor’s degree or higher)
• Household income (less than $25,000, $25,000–$49,999; $50,000–$74,999, $75,000–$99,999,
$100,000–$149,999, $150,000 or more)
For more information about the sample and survey methodology, please visit the GfK website at
www.g.com.
For more information about the Chicago Council Survey, please contact Craig Kafura, research
associate, at ckafura@thechicagocouncil.org.
31
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
ABOUT THE SURVEY SAMPLE
2018 Chicago Council Survey
% of 2018
sample
n=2,046
Average
age
White,
non-Hispanic
Black,
non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Other,
non-Hispanic
Racial
composition
(%)
18–29
30–44
45–59
60+
Age (%)
High school or
less
Some college/
associate's
degree
College
graduates
Education (%)
Female
27
50
84
2
8
6
16
23
29
32
37
32
31
49
51
37
48
48
22
21
9
21
25
25
29
40
27
33
56
44
34
46
67
9
16
9
24
27
25
24
42
28
30
48
52
Male
Gender (%)
Democrat Independent Republican
Democrat Independent Republican
Conservative
Moderate
Liberal
Ideology (%)
74
19
6
8
36
55
27
52
20
32
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
ABOUT THE CHICAGO COUNCIL
SURVEY
The Chicago Council Survey, conducted every four years since 1974, biennially since
2002, and annually since 2014, is a trusted and widely cited source of longitudinal
data on American public opinion about a broad range of US foreign policy and
international issues. Since its inception, the survey has captured the sense of
particular eras—post-Vietnam, post-Cold War, post-9/11—and identied critical shifts
in American public thinking. With its combination of time series and comprehensive
coverage, the Chicago Council Survey is a valuable resource to policymakers,
academics, media, and the general public. The Chicago Council Surveys are highly
respected and widely used in policy circles and academic research both in the
United States and abroad. Several scholarly works have drawn on Chicago Council
survey data, including The Foreign Policy Disconnect (Page, Bouton), Public
Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Holsti), Faces of Internationalism (Wittkopf),
and The Rational Public (Page, Shapiro). All of the Chicago Council Survey data sets
are available to the public via the Roper Center and the Inter-university Consortium
for Political and Social Research, and the 2018 data will soon be available on
www.thechicagocouncil.org.
In addition to the annual Chicago Council Survey of American public opinion and
US foreign policy, the Council’s polling has often expanded to international polling
in Asia, Europe, Mexico, and Russia. In fact, the Council was awarded a two-year
grant from the Carnegie Corporation to conduct public and elite opinion surveys in
partnership with the Levada Analytical Center in Moscow. The Council has also
reintroduced a leaders’ survey as an important component of the 2014, 2016, and
2018 Chicago Council Surveys. Besides these comprehensive reports, the Chicago
Council Survey team publishes and disseminates short opinion briefs on topical
issues such as international trade, immigration, North Korea’s nuclear program, and
Iran. These short reports can be found on the Council’s website and on the Chicago
Council Survey blog www.thechicagocouncil.org/RunningNumbers.
33
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
1
For example, see Thomas Wright, “The 2016 Presidential
Campaign and the Crisis of US Foreign Policy,” Lowy
Institute, October 10, 2016, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/
publications/2016-presidential-campaign-and-crisis-us-
foreign-policy; see also Daniel L. Byman et al., “Experts
Weigh In: What this Election Means for US Foreign
Policy and Next Steps,” Brookings: Order from Chaos,
November 9, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
order-from-chaos/2016/11/09/experts-weigh-in-what-this-
election-means-for-u-s-foreign-policy-and-next-steps/.
2
Most items in the 2018 Chicago Council Survey were
elded to the full sample of 2,046 respondents. Some
questions were asked to partial samples; these are noted
throughout in gures.
3
This question elicits a striking number of volunteered
responses. Forty percent choose “other,” and when
asked to specify, common responses include that the
United States is laughed at, a joke, or ridiculed (13%), is
neither feared nor admired (5%), is disliked/hated (4%), is
both feared and admired (3%), and is weak/falling apart
(2%).
4
Amanda Macias and John W. Schoen, “Trump Pushes
NATO Allies to Increase Spending as US Funding Slows,”
CNBC, July 10, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/10/
trump-pushes-nato-allies-to-increase-spending-as-us-
funding-slows.html.
5
This puts a trade war with China well below more
pressing national security concerns such as international
terrorism (66% critical threat) and North Korea’s nuclear
program (59% critical threat). See Appendix Figure 1 for
full results.
6
Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura, “Record Number of
Americans Endorse Benets of Trade,” Chicago
Council on Global Aairs, August 27, 2018, https://www.
thechicagocouncil.org/publication/record-number-
americans-endorse-benets-trade.
7
Josh Rogin, “Trump’s New Foreign Policy Team is
Looking a lot More Republican,” Washington Post, April
12, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
global-opinions/trumps-foreign-policy-is-about-to-
get-a-lot-more-republican/2018/04/12/4af5f37c-3e95-
11e8-8d53-eba0ed2371cc_story.html?utm_term=.
cd5d0f4d76a9.
8
“Read the Full Transcript of Trump’s Speech on the Iran
Nuclear Deal,” New York Times, May 8, 2018, https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/us/politics/trump-speech-
iran-deal.html.
ENDNOTES
9
“Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate
Accord,” June 1, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briengs-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-
climate-accord/.
10
Adam Taylor, “A Timeline of Trump’s Complicated
Relationship with the TPP,” Washington Post, April
13, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
worldviews/wp/2018/04/13/a-timeline-of-trumps-
complicated-relationship-with-the-tpp/?utm_
term=.50b3b61d9a.
11
Patrick Gillespie, “Trump Hammers America’s ‘Worst
Trade Deal,’” CNN Money, September 27, 2016, https://
money.cnn.com/2016/09/27/news/economy/donald-
trump-nafta-hillary-clinton-debate/.
12
Ron Elving, “Trump’s Helsinki Bow to Putin Leaves World
Wondering: Why?” NPR, July 17, 2018, https://www.npr.
org/2018/07/17/629601233/trumps-helsinki-bow-to-putin-
leaves-world-wondering-whats-up.
13
For a detailed look at the views of these core Trump
supporters, see Dina Smeltz et al., “What Americans
Think about America First,” Chicago Council on Global
Aairs, October 2, 2017, https://www.thechicagocouncil.
org/sites/default/les/ccgasurvey2017_what_americans_
think_about_america_rst.pdf.
14
Donald Trump, “Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd
Session of the UN General Assembly,” speech, New York,
NY, September 19, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briengs-statements/remarks-president-trump-72nd-
session-united-nations-general-assembly/.
15
Although they answered the question, some participants
commented that their position is actually in between the
two response options of “active part” and “staying out”
of world aairs. For example, “We cannot be divorced
from world aairs, but we too frequently have gotten too
deeply involved… We ought never to have been involved
in Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance. And with the global
economy becoming a fact, we must be friends with our
trading partners ...”
16
On North Korea, see: Noah Bierman, “Trump Warns
North Korea for ‘Fire and Fury,’” Los Angeles Times,
August 8, 2017; on threats made toward Iran, see,
Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), To Iranian President
Rouhani: NEVER, EVER THREATEN THE UNITED STATES
AGAIN OR YOU WILL SUFFER CONSEQUENCES THE
LIKES OF WHICH FEW THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAVE
EVER SUFFERED BEFORE. WE ARE NO LONGER A
COUNTRY THAT WILL STAND FOR YOUR DEMENTED
WORDS OF VIOLENCE & DEATH. BE CAUTIOUS!, July
22, 2018, 8:24 p.m., https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
status/1021234525626609666.
34
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
17
In 2017, 47 percent of Americans said that maintaining
US military superiority was a very eective approach
to achieving US foreign policy goals. This response
trailed only maintaining existing alliances (49% very
eective). For more, see Smeltz et al., “What Americans
Think about America First.” Note: In 2018, 51 percent
of Americans say that maintaining a super military
worldwide is a very important foreign policy goal for
the United States. This level is the lowest reading since
2004, when it was 50 percent. See Appendix Figure 2
for full results.
18
Howard Stoer, “What Trump’s ‘America First’ Policy
Could Mean for the World,” Time, November 14, 2016,
http://time.com/4569845/donald-trump-america-rst/.
19
Timothy Cama and Devin Henry, “Trump: We Are
Getting Out of Paris Climate Deal,” The Hill, June 1, 2017,
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/335955-
trump-pulls-us-out-of-paris-climate-deal.
20
Mark Landler, “Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He
Long Scorned,” New York Times, May 8, 2018, https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/
trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html.
21
Jade Scipioni, “Pruitt vs. Tillerson: Trump’s Team
Split on Paris Agreement,” FoxBusiness, April 18, 2017,
https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/pruitt-vs-
tillerson-trumps-team-split-on-paris-agreement; Ellen
Mitchell, “Mattis Defends Iran Deal as Trump Considers
Withdrawal,” The Hill, April 26, 2018, http://thehill.com/
policy/defense/385094-mattis-defends-iran-deal-as-
trump-considers-withdrawal.
22
Anthony Zurcher, “Three Reasons Behind Trump
Ditching Iran Deal,” BBC News, May 8, 2018, https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43902372.
23
The terms described in the wording of this question
reect the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed
by President Obama in 2015.
24
Colum Lynch, “White House Seeks to Cut Billions in
Funding for United Nations,” Foreign Policy, March 13,
2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/13/white-house-
seeks-to-cut-billions-in-funding-for-united-nations/.
25
This response is the highest recorded level for the
question since it was rst asked in the 2004 Chicago
Council Survey (66%).
26
Jon Stone, “Trump Attacks Angela Merkel for Giving
Sanctuary to Refugees,” Independent, June 18, 2018,
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/
trump-angela-merkel-germany-refugees-sanctuary-
twitter-us-immigration-a8404501.html; Andy Blatchford
and Mike Blancheld, “Trump Bashes Trudeau as ‘Very
Dishonest and Weak’ as G7 Agreement Crumbles,” CTV
News, June 9, 2018, https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/
trump-bashes-trudeau-as-very-dishonest-and-weak-
as-g7-agreement-crumbles-1.3966661; Tom Newton
Dunn, “Trump’s Brexit Blast,” Sun, July 13, 2018, https://
www.thesun.co.uk/news/6766531/trump-may-brexit-us-
deal-o/.
27
Anna Field, “Seoul Tries to Ignore Trump’s Criticism:
‘They Worry He’s Kind of Nuts,’ One Observer Says,”
Washington Post, September 3, 2017, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacic/in-latest-test-
north-korea-detonates-its-most-powerful-nuclear-
device-yet/2017/09/03/4c5202ea-90b4-11e7-8754-
d478688d23b4_story.html?utm_term=.86ef0f2f9201.
28
Cat Contiguglia, “Trump: EU is One of United States’
Biggest Foes,” Politico, July 15, 2018, https://www.politico.
eu/article/donald-trump-putin-russia-europe-one-of-
united-states-biggest-foes/.
29
Twelve percent said that the United States is gaining
allies, while 31 percent stated there has been no change.
30
Whenever this question has been included in Chicago
Council Surveys, six in 10 have consistently said that the
United States is less respected than 10 years ago.
31
Americans who say that the United States has maintained
the same number of allies over the past year rate the
United States an 8.3 (mean score).
32
For more on this topic, see Karl Friedho and Craig Kafura,
“American Views Toward US-Japan Relations and Asia-
Pacic Security,” Chicago Council on Global Aairs, April
17, 2018, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/
american-views-toward-us-japan-relations-and-asia-
pacic-security.
33
Philip Rucker, “‘Dictator Envy’: Trump’s Praise of
Kim Jong Un Widens His Embrace of Totalitarian
Leaders,” Washington Post, June 15, 2018, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/dictator-envy-trumps-
praise-of-kim-jong-un-marks-embrace-of-totalitarian-
leaders/2018/06/15/b9a8bbc8-70af-11e8-afd5-
778aca903bbe_story.html?utm_term=.dad799625977.
34
Steve Denning, “Inside the Trump-Putin Bromance,”
Forbes, July 29, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/
stevedenning/2018/07/29/understanding-the-trump-
putin-bromance/#70bf79a0675b.
35
For example, see Karl Friedho and Craig Kafura,
“American Views Toward US-Japan Relations and Asia-
Pacic Security,” Chicago Council on Global Aairs, April
17, 2018, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/
american-views-toward-us-japan-relations-and-asia-
pacic-security.
36
According to a Quinnipiac poll, half of Americans think the
Helsinki Summit was a failure for the United States (52%),
while three in four Americans think it was a success for
Russia (73%). For more see https://poll.qu.edu/national/
release-detail?ReleaseID=2557.
37
Erica Pandey, “Trump: ‘Xi and I Will Always Be Friends’
Despite Trade Issues,” Axios (blog), April 8, 2018, https://
www.axios.com/trump-xi-jinping-china-friends-trade-
tweet-1ed4706b-dd7e-4e14-9c48-65b867bf58db.html.
38
See Friedho and Kafura, “American Views Toward US-
Japan Relations and Asia-Pacic Security,” April 17, 2018.
35
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
39
Jennifer De Pinto et al., “Mixed Views of Trump-Kim
Summit, Fewer Uneasy About Conict Now,” CBS News,
June 18, 2018, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mixed-
views-of-trump-kim-summit-fewer-uneasy-about-conict-
now/.
40
The 2017 Chicago Council Survey results found that
majorities in the United States thought that alliances
in Europe and East Asia benetted both allies and
the United States. For more see Smeltz et al., “What
Americans Think about America First,” October 2017.
41
Just hours after President Trump left the NATO summit
this summer, Pentagon ocials arrived to assure NATO
members of the US commitment to the alliance, stressing
that US military commitments, their bases, and troop
levels, will not be reduced; for more see Carol E. Lee
et al., “Pentagon Goes Into ‘Damage Control’ Mode
to Reassure NATO Allies,” NBC News, July 13, 2018,
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/
pentagon-goes-damage-control-mode-reassure-nato-
allies-n891096.
42
David E. Sanger, “Despite Obama’s Moves, Asian Nations
Skeptical of US Commitment,” New York Times, May 23,
2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/world/asia/
vietnam-arms-embargo-obama.html.
43
David E. Sanger, “How Trump Went From ‘Fire and
Fury’ to Dismissing North Korean Nuclear Capabilities,”
New York Times, July 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/07/04/us/politics/trump-north-korea-nuclear.
html.
44
For a more detailed analysis of attitudes toward Asia, see
Friedho and Kafura, “American Views Toward US-Japan
Relations and Asia-Pacic Security,” April 17, 2018.
45
Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama to the
Australian Parliament,” speech, Canberra, Australia,
November 17, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/the-press-oce/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-
australian-parliament.
46
Donald Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United
States of America,” December 18, 2017, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-
Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
47
For more on this issue please see Friedho and Kafura,
“American Views Toward US-Japan Relations and Asia-
Pacic Security,” April 17, 2018.
48
For example, see Choe Sang-Hun and Motoko Rich,
“Trump’s Talk of US Troop Cuts Unnerves South Korea
and Japan,” New York Times, May 4, 2018, https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/05/04/world/asia/south-
korea-troop-withdrawal-united-states.html; John
Hudson et al., “US Assessing Cost of Keeping Troops
in Germany as Trump Battles with Europe,” Washington
Post, June 29, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/us-assessing-cost-of-
keeping-troops-in-germany-as-trump-battles-with-
europe/2018/06/29/94689094-ca9f-490c-b3be-
b135970de3fc_story.html?utm_term=.e8fc5c9ecc.
49
For more see “Steel and Aluminum Taris,” Chicago Booth
IGM Forum, March 12, 2018, http://www.igmchicago.org/
surveys/steel-and-aluminum-taris.
50
For example, a July 15–18, 2018 NBC News and Wall
Street Journal poll found that half of Americans (49%)
believed raising taris would raise costs of consumer
goods and hurt the economy; one in four (25%) thought
it would protect jobs and help the economy; 16 percent
believed it would not have much impact. For more see
www.pollingreport.com/trade.htm.
51
For a more detailed analysis of the 2018 survey results
on trade, see Smeltz and Kafura, “Record Number of
Americans Endorse Benets of Trade,” August 27, 2018.
52
Seventy-four percent also approve of US participation
in the International Criminal Court, according to 2018
Chicago Council Survey results.
53
Phil Levy, “Trump’s NAFTA Withdrawal Threat Is Real,”
Forbes, January 22, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/
phillevy/2018/01/22/the-nafta-withdrawal-threat-is-real/.
54
Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), “The United States
has an $800 Billion Dollar Yearly Trade Decit because
of our ‘very stupid’ trade deals and policies. Our jobs
and wealth are being given to other countries that
have taken advantage of us for years,” Twitter, March
3, 2018, 11:43 a.m., https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
status/969991653393039361.
55
Kim Gittleson, “US trade: Is Trump Right About the Decit?”
BBC News, March 10, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-43336599; Linda Qiu, “Trump Claims the US
Would Save Money Without Trade. That’s Not What a
Trade Decit Represents,” New York Times, July 26, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/us/politics/trump-
trade-decit-fact-check.html.
56
This puts a trade war with China well below more pressing
national security concerns such as international terrorism
(66% critical threat) and North Korea’s nuclear program
(59%). See Appendix Figure 1 for full results.
57
Smeltz and Kafura, “Record Number of Americans
Endorse Benets of Trade,” August 27, 2018.
36
America Engaged 2018 Chicago Council Survey
Additional reports based on surveys conducted by the Chicago Council are
available at www.thechicagocouncil.org:
“Despite Last Year’s Expectations,
Publics Sense Strains in US-Russia
Relations,” Dina Smeltz, Lily Wojtowicz,
and Stepan Goncharov, February 7,
2018.
“American and Russian Opinion at a
Stando on Crimea Sanctions,” Dina
Smeltz, Lily Wojtowicz, and Stepan
Goncharov, January 24, 2018.
“For First Time, Majority of Mexicans
Hold Unfavorable View of United States,”
Craig Kafura, Dina Smeltz, Duncan
Wood, Esteban Guzmán Saucedo, and
Rene Bautista, January 18, 2018.
“Record Number of Americans Endorse
Benefits of Trade,” Dina Smeltz and
Craig Kafura, August 27, 2018.
“The Clash of Generations?
Intergenerational Change and American
Foreign Policy Views,” Trevor Thrall,
Dina Smeltz, Erik Goepner, Will Ruger,
and Craig Kafura, June 25, 2018.
“US-Russia Experts Paint a Dim Picture
of Bilateral Relations Before Summit,”
Dina Smeltz, Lily Wojtowicz, Denis
Volkov, and Stepan Goncharov, July 12,
2018.
“American Support for US Strikes against
Syria Split along Partisan Lines,” Dina
Smeltz and Lily Wojtowicz, May 9, 2018.
“American Views toward US-Japan
Relations and Asia-Pacific Security,”
Karl Friedho and Craig Kafura, April 17,
2018.
Chicago Council on Global Aairs
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Suite 1400
Chicago, Illinois 60601
The Chicago Council on Global Aairs is an
independent, nonpartisan membership organization
that provides insight—and influences the public
discourse—on critical global issues. We convene
leading global voices, conduct independent
research, and engage the public to explore ideas
that will shape our global future. The Council is
committed to bringing clarity and oering solutions
to issues that transcend borders and transform
how people, business, and governments engage
the world.
Learn more at thechicagocouncil.org and follow
@ChicagoCouncil.