Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multinational Survey of Public

Soft Power in Asia:

Results of a 2008 Multinational

Survey of Public Opinion

Christopher B. Whitney, Project Director

David Shambaugh, Senior Project Consultant

New Results and Analysis

2009 Edition

In Partnership with

New Results and Analysis

2009 Edition

Soft Power in Asia:

Results of a 2008 Multinational

Survey of Public Opinion

Christopher B. Whitney, Project Director

David Shambaugh, Senior Project Consultant

In partnership with

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Table of Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Section I: Attitudes Towards Economic Cooperation and Security in Asia . . . . . . . 3

Economic Integration ...................................................3

Regional Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Section II: Soft Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Overall Soft Power Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Section III: Perceptions of Individual Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Perceptions of the United States ........................................ 11

Perceptions of China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Perceptions of Japan ...................................................18

Perceptions of South Korea .............................................20

Section IV: Bilateral Perceptions ............................................23

China–United States ...................................................23

United States–Japan ...................................................26

China–Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

Japan–South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

Conclusion ................................................................34

Appendix A: Soft Power Indices .............................................35

Questions included for each index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

Appendix B: Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Appendix C: Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

1ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

Asia is in ﬂux. Although ostensibly peaceful, rela-

tions between Asian states are changing rapidly. In

recent years Asian economies have posted world-

best growth statistics (although they have been

severely hit by the economic downturn, especially

since the onset of the international ﬁnancial cri-

sis in September 2008). Regional interdependen-

cies are binding economies and societies together

like never before. Multilateral mechanisms are

growing, and intergovernmental cooperation has

reached new levels. While terrorism is a persistent

problem in Southeast Asia, no interstate or intra-

state wars rage in the region. Conﬂict around the

normally volatile Tawain Strait has been notably

muted. Previous hostilities have been quieted and

relations among former adversaries normalized.

Yet beneath the surface, suspicions and ten-

sions among societies are evident. Historical

memory has not been erased between longtime

regional adversaries. The rise of China is reshap-

ing the strategic map.

Japan’s former Prime

Minister Yasuo Fukuda’s “Asia First” policy indi-

cated a desire for his country to reengage on the

regional stage. The Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) gained a new level of conﬁdence

1. See Evan S. Medeiros et al, Paciﬁc Currents: The Responses

of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China’s

Rise (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 2008); David

Shambaugh, Power Shift: China & Asia’s New Dynamics

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Robert

Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (Lanham,

MD: Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 2005); Kokubun Ryosei and Wang

Jisi, eds., The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order

(Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004).

and regional engagement after celebrating its for-

tieth anniversary and promulgating a new char-

ter. Beyond shifting power, regional “hotspots”

like North Korea and the “black spot” of Myanmar

fester and continue to threaten regional stability.

Globalization and nontraditional security con-

cerns affect all countries in the region.

The region is also experiencing a shift in

power, both in terms of U.S.-China relations

and key regional relationships. The emergence

of China as a major power has strengthened the

region’s role as a global economic engine and

altered the regional balance of power. While the

United States remains the leading military power

in Asia and the region’s primary export market,

some have questioned its reliability, responsibil-

ity, and continued military presence in the region.

China has used its growing economic power,

increased East Asian economic interdependence,

and skillful diplomacy to co-opt the interests of

its neighbors and assert its inﬂuence. As a result

of these and other developments, East Asia as

a region is facing a new political task of ﬁnding

ways to reduce tensions, misunderstandings,

and misinterpretations prevalent in any period of

power shift and transition.

To better understand the power shift and the

U.S. role compared to China and other regional

actors, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and

the East Asia Institute (EAI) surveyed people in six

countries—China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam,

Introduction

2 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

Indonesia, and the United States—in the ﬁrst half

of 2008 about regional security and economic

integration in Asia and about how these nations

perceive each other. In a new era of interconnect-

edness and growing interdependencies, the goal

was to examine Asian perceptions of these six

nations’ “soft power” in the region. Which coun-

try has the most soft power, or ability to achieve its

goals through “attraction rather than coercion or

payments” (Nye 2005)?

How do citizens of these

nations view each other’s popular culture, com-

mercial prowess and brands, intellectual inﬂuence,

diplomatic reputations, and political systems?

This report aims to outline trends in the current

and potential use of soft power in East Asia.

The surveys included more than forty ques-

tions in each country and were completed prior to

the global economic downturn during the second

half of 2008. The Council published initial ﬁndings

in its 2008 report Soft Power in Asia. This report

presents the project’s complete ﬁndings.

The ﬁndings were unexpected. The responses

directly called into question the conventional

wisdom that China was chipping into, if not over-

shadowing, U.S. soft power and showed that the

United States continues to wield considerable soft

power in the region.

Section one of this report deals with attitudes

towards economic integration and regional secu-

rity in East Asia. Section two analyzes the impli-

cations of the survey results for soft power in the

region. Section three examines the perceptions of

the surveyed countries towards one another, and

section four analyzes four important bilateral rela-

tionships: U.S.–China, U.S.–Japan, China–Japan,

and Japan–South Korea.

2. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in

World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

3ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

Economic Integration

Intraregional interactions at all levels have signiﬁ-

cantly intensiﬁed across East Asia in recent years.

All major trading states in East Asia now engage in

greater intraregional trade than with other parts of

the world. East Asia is the world’s largest regional

recipient of foreign direct investment, and the vast

majority of it originates in the region. Deep eco-

nomic interdependencies have developed along-

side increases in trade and investment. Dramatic

rises in intraregional tourism, student and cul-

tural exchanges, professional interactions, and

electronic communications have supplemented

economic connections. Intraregional diplomacy

is also intensive. Leaders and government ofﬁ-

cials constantly tour the region to strengthen

bilateral ties. In addition, multilateral institu-

tions and groupings have proliferated across Asia

in recent years, creating an institutional archi-

tecture of overlapping organizations. While East

Asia has nowhere near the institutionalized level

of pan-regional cooperation as Europe, Asian

multilateralism is following its own path and is

developing rapidly.

These connections among Asian societ-

ies have multiplied with remarkable speed and

intensity over the past decade. But are they lead-

ing to greater regionalism and regional identities?

Are these interconnections doing for Asia what

occurred in Europe in the 1990s?

On the question of identity, respondents in

China and South Korea—and to a lesser extent

Japan—tend to view themselves less as either

“East Asian” or “Asian” than as their own nation-

ality (see Figure 1). On separate 0 to 10 scales ask-

ing how much a respondent thinks of himself or

herself as the country’s nationality, East Asian,

or Asian, Japanese, Chinese, and South Koreans

identify most closely with their own countries

(averaging 7.5, 9.2, and 8.8, respectively, on the

scale). While these same citizens see themselves

less as East Asians (5.4, 7.7, and 6.2, respectively)

Section I: Attitudes Towards Economic Cooperation and

Security in Asia

Figure 1 – Identity

Average rating by respondents in each country on how

much they think of themselves as the following

(0 to 10 scale).

9.2

7.5

8.8

8.5

5.9

7.3

7.7

5.4

6.2

Own nationality Asian East Asian

China Japan South Korea

4 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

and Asians (5.9, 8.5, and 7.3, respectively), these

ratings are not low. This indicates that there is def-

initely some identiﬁcation with the greater region

beyond national borders. Thus, as in Europe, there

is evidence that Asians simultaneously think of

themselves in both national and regional terms.

Another indicator of growing regional inte-

gration is the widespread support for bilateral free

trade agreements (FTAs) as well as surprisingly

strong support for an intraregional East Asian

free trade area including China, Japan, and South

Korea (see Figure 2).

If such an FTA were formed, 56 percent

of Americans say the United States should

be included. However, only Chinese support

American inclusion (67%). Fifty-seven percent of

Japanese and South Koreans are against it.

A strong majority of Chinese (68%) favor the

integration of East Asian countries into a regional

community similar to the European Union (EU),

calling into question the idea that Chinese are

state-centric realists. South Koreans are even more

in favor (71%), while Japanese are more skeptical,

with only 40 percent in favor.

Regional Security

Greater interdependence between East Asian

countries, facilitated by rapidly growing trade in

recent years, has led some experts of the region to

hypothesize that the historical tensions between

countries will give way to greater cooperation and

make military conﬂict unthinkable. Current mili-

tary patterns, however, suggest that fears of one

another persist. Survey data conﬁrm that even

though cooperation has grown and the publics

are in favor of even stronger economic ties, Asians

fear the military power of their neighbors and the

United States in the region. The data also show that

while there is unease about the American pres-

ence, it is overwhelmed by concerns about neigh-

boring countries. Although East Asia is presently

peaceful, important changes are under way.

Almost all militaries across the Asian region

are modernizing their forces.

In 2007 Asia

accounted for ﬁve of the world’s ten largest stand-

ing armies (China, India, North Korea, South

Korea, Vietnam) and the world’s four largest sur-

face navies (if the United States and Russian navies

are included, along with China and Japan). In

terms of total defense expenditures, Asia ranked

equal to European NATO nations in 2005 ($256

billion for Asia versus $259 billion for European

NATO countries), but totaled only half that of the

United States ($495 billion). China and Japan had

the second and fourth largest defense budgets in

the world in 2005 (the United States ranked ﬁrst

and Russia third). For most East Asian nations,

military modernization programs involve import-

ing sophisticated weaponry from abroad. Six of the

world’s top ten arms importers are in Asia (China,

India, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan),

although in aggregate the Middle East still imports

more than Asia. China’s military modernization

program has been particularly intensive over the

3. See Ashley Tellis, Mercy Kuo, and Andrew Marble, eds.,

Strategic Asia 2008-2009: Challenges and Choices (Seattle:

National Bureau of Asian Rsearch, 2008); David Shambaugh

and Michael Yahuda, eds., International Relations in Asia

(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 2008).

4. See Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia

2005-2006: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty

(Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005).

Figure 2 – Free Trade Areas

Percentage in each country who favor the following.

Favor free trade

area including

China, Japan, and

South Korea

If such an area is

created, favor

including the U.S.

Favor East Asian

countries

integrating into

EU-like community

NA NA

100

China

Japan

South Korea

U.S.

5ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

past two decades, and this has raised concerns in

the United States and throughout the region. To

offset China’s growing capabilities and uncertain

intentions, the United States has been strengthen-

ing its ﬁve bilateral alliances in the region (with

Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Philippines,

and Thailand) as well as building defense ties with

nonallied states such as Singapore, Indonesia,

Mongolia, Vietnam, and India.

The regional insecurity suggested in this mili-

tary buildup is further reﬂected in Asian responses

to questions about how greater trade and more

cultural ties in East Asia have affected the possi-

bility of conﬂict in the region. Most answer that

the potential for conﬂict has increased. Nearly 60

percent of Chinese respondents believe that the

potential for conﬂict has either “very much” (29%)

or “somewhat” (29%) increased. Japanese opinion

is split. Only in South Korea does a majority (60%)

say that the possibility of conﬂict has decreased.

It is possible that South Koreans see much more

opportunity for growth in economic relationships

with the much larger economies of China and

Japan, whereas citizens from these larger Asian

countries are more wary of the potential for con-

ﬂict over natural resources necessary for growth.

Respondents were also asked to rate the like-

lihood of future military conﬂict in East Asia

in the next ten years on a 0 to 10 scale in which

0 means no possibility for conﬂict and 10 means

that conﬂict is extremely likely. The average score

falls right around the middle of the scale—within

4.5 and 5.9 for all four countries where the ques-

tion was asked (China, Japan, United States, and

South Korea).

Still, majorities or pluralities in every country

are at least “somewhat worried” that China could

become a military threat to their country in the

future (see Figure 3).

Despite Japan’s “peace con-

stitution,” majorities in China (62%), South Korea

(66%), and Indonesia (58%) are worried that Japan

may pose a future military threat to their respec-

tive countries. The Chinese are even more wor-

ried about a military threat from the United States

(76%) than Americans are worried about a Chinese

5. This question was not asked in Vietnam.

military threat (70%). While most Japanese and

South Koreans are not worried about a threat

from the United States, a substantial number are

at least somewhat worried (43% of Japanese and

49% of South Koreans). The greatest concern

about the United States is in Indonesia, a largely

Muslim country, where 83 percent of the popula-

tion is at least somewhat worried about a future

military threat. This view likely reﬂects concern

over U.S. military involvement in the Middle East

in recent years.

However worried some Japanese and Koreans

may be of a possible U.S. military threat to their

countries, majorities in South Korea (72%) and

Japan (68%) believe that the U.S. military pres-

ence in the region increases stability. Chinese are

more wary of American military forces in Asia

than the Japanese and South Koreans, with a slight

majority of Chinese (52%) believing that the U.S.

military presence in Asia decreases stability. Yet in

all ﬁve Asian countries, majorities believe that if

the United States removed its armed forces from

the region, it could spark a competitive military

buildup between China and Japan (see Figure 4).

Eighty-nine percent in South Korea, 79 percent in

Figure 3 – Future Threats

Percentage in each country who are either

somewhat or very worried that China/U.S./Japan

could become a military threat in the future.

NA NA NA NA

China U.S. Japan South Korea Indonesia

China as threat

U.S. as threat

Japan as threat

6 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

Japan, 75 percent in the United States, 61 percent

in China, and 57 percent in Indonesia say such a

scenario is at least “somewhat likely.”

A large U.S. presence in Asia is seen as a coun-

terbalance to the growing inﬂuence and power of

China in the region. Asked if they favor or oppose

their country supporting the United States in an

effort to balance China’s rise as a great political

and military power, 69 percent in Japan and 68

percent in South Korea are in favor. A slight major-

ity of Americans (51%) are in favor of a U.S. attempt

to contain China’s political and military power.

China has not softened the effect of its grow-

ing military power through effective diplomacy.

Throughout the region China is viewed as some-

what ineffective in dealing with regional prob-

lems. This is surprising given Beijing’s central role

in the Six Party Talks. When it comes to working to

resolve the North Korea nuclear issue, majorities

in Japan (59%) and South Korea (56%), along with

half of those surveyed in the United States (50%),

believe that China has been somewhat or very inef-

fective. By contrast, Chinese have a very positive

attitude on the effectiveness of other members of

the Six-Party Talks. They have an especially posi-

tive view of North Korea, with 69 percent saying

the country has been somewhat or very effective

in resolving the North Korea nuclear issue. The

United States is the only country about which

majorities or pluralities in all other countries say it

has been effective in resolving this nuclear weap-

ons problem.

On another regional security dilemma—per-

sistent tensions between China and Taiwan—fewer

respondents in each country agree that China and

the United States have been effective in dealing

with this issue. However, 64 percent of Chinese

agree that Taiwan has been “somewhat” or “very

effective” in helping to manage tensions. This per-

centage is only second to Chinese approval of their

own country’s handling of the issue.

Other territorial disputes in the region caus-

ing tensions between neighbors include (1) the

dispute between Korea and Japan over the island

known as “Dokdo” in Korean and as “Takashima”

in Japanese and (2) the dispute between China

and Japan over the islands “Diaoyu” or “Senkaku”

in their respective languages. Judging by pub-

lic attitudes, these islands are still very conten-

tious. On the Korea–Japan dispute, 78 percent

of South Koreans and 69 percent of Japanese say

their country should not be willing to compro-

mise on the issue. With regard to the China–Japan

dispute, 80 percent of Chinese and 72 percent of

Japanese say their country should not be willing

to compromise.

Overall, signs of hostility and suspicion still

exist among East Asian neighbors despite the

increased pace of regional economic integration.

The United States is perceived as an important

actor in the region, balancing the power of a rising

China and contributing to conﬂict resolution and

peaceful relations between neighbors.

Figure 4 – China–Japan Arms Race

Percentage in each country who think it is somewhat

or very likely that China and Japan would build up their

militaries to compete with each other if the U.S.

removed its armed forces from East Asia.

Indonesia

South Korea

Japan

China

U.S.

0102030405060708090 100

7ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

As interdependencies have grown, Asians (and

analysts of Asia) have increasingly begun to focus

on a new level of interaction—soft power— to bet-

ter understand regional dynamics and how we

might mitigate tensions between states. Harvard

University Professor Joseph Nye coined the term in

his famous book Soft Power: The Means to Success

in World Politics.

In his now classic study, Nye

equates soft power with attraction and asserts: “In

international politics, the resources that produce

soft power arise in large part from the values an

organization or country expresses in its culture, in

the examples it sets by its internal practices and

policies, and in the way it handles its relations with

others.”

Subsequent to the publication of Nye’s

book, many studies of American and European

soft power and public diplomacy ensued. More

recently, journalists, scholars, and government

analysts have begun focusing on China’s alleged

soft power.

6. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in

World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

7. Ibid, 8.

8. Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft

Power is Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University

Press, 2008); Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and

Limits of Chinese Soft Power,” Survival 48, no. 2 (Summer

2006): 17-36; Ingrid d’Hooghe, “Into High Gear: China’s Public

Diplomacy,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 3 (2008): 37-61;

Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), China’s

Soft Power in Developing Regions (Washington, DC: CSIS Press,

March 2009); Congressional Research Service (CRS), China’s

Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” in South America, Asia, and

Africa (Washington, DC: United States Senate Committee

on Foreign Relations and U.S. Government Printing Ofﬁce,

April 2008).

This study is the ﬁrst public opinion survey

to evaluate soft power in Asia regionally. It ques-

tions how these nations view each other’s popular

culture, commercial prowess and brands, intel-

lectual inﬂuence and appeal, universities, diplo-

matic reputations and political systems. While the

People’s Republic of China has gained increasing

attention for its Asian diplomacy and regional soft

power, the other nations, aside from the United

States, have not been as closely examined, and

China’s alleged soft power has not been carefully

scrutinized using empirical survey data. This

study ﬁlls this gap and provides unique insights

into soft power in Asia.

Overall Soft Power Findings

To assist in the analysis of the report’s ﬁndings, the

results of many questions were combined to pro-

duce indices for each of ﬁve general areas of soft

power: economic, cultural, human capital, politi-

cal, and diplomatic. These ﬁve indices were then

averaged to produce an overall “Soft Power Index”

(see Figure 5). Changes in opinion were tracked on

a few key questions that were asked both in this

survey and in The Chicago Council’s 2006 Global

Views survey.

According to the overall Soft Power Index—

and contrary to conventional wisdom—the United

9. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Global Views 2006

(Chicago: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2006).

Section II: Soft Power

8 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

States continues to possess signiﬁcant soft power

in Asia. There is high recognition of U.S. economic,

cultural, and human capital soft power in all sur-

vey countries as well as great respect for its politi-

cal and diplomatic standing. American inﬂuence

in Asia has clearly not diminished recently and

remains very strong, especially among citizens of

the major powers. This gives the Obama admin-

istration a strong base to build upon. The United

States ranks highest on the index among Chinese,

Japanese, South Koreans, and Indonesians, and

second to Japan among Vietnamese, though not by

much. South Korea comes out consistently ahead

of China among Americans and Japanese. Con-

verse ly, Japan ranks last among Chinese respon-

dents. Although animosities are not as high as

expected, Chinese and Japanese generally rate the

other country lowest on most forms of soft power,

while general admiration is apparent between

Chinese and South Koreans. In contrast to the

great powers, Indonesian and Vietnamese citizens

believe Japan has slightly greater soft power than

the United States and that China ranks ahead of

South Korea. Thus, there appears to be a division

between the great powers and Indonesia/Vietnam

in terms of perceptions of soft power in Asia.

The following sections summarize the ﬁndings

for each of the ﬁve speciﬁc soft power indices.

Economic Soft Power

Every country has high respect for U.S. economic

soft power (see Appendix A). The United States

comes out on top among Japanese, Chinese, and

South Koreans, and second among Indonesians

and Vietnamese. Citizens in China,

Japan, and

South Korea believe the economic relationship

with the United States is their most important,

that the United States has the greatest economic

inﬂuence in Asia,

the U.S. economy is the most

10. Chinese give the economic relationship with the United

States and the European Union the same average score.

11. This ranking applies only to those given by each natio-

nal public to the other countries. Chinese believe the econo-

mic inﬂuence of their country is greater in Asia than that of the

United States. Japan places the United States a close second to

China in terms of economic inﬂuence.

internationally competitive, and the U.S. econ-

omy provides the best opportunities for its work-

force. Japan is a close second to the United States

in terms of perceived economic soft power and

is ranked even higher than the United States by

Indonesians and Vietnamese. China and South

Korea are almost always at the bottom of this

index, although China is generally slightly ahead

of South Korea. China tends to rank ahead of South

Korea in terms of perceived economic importance

to other countries and on the international com-

petitiveness and economic inﬂuence of China’s

economy in Asia. South Korea understandably

receives lower ratings on these questions com-

pared with the economic powerhouses of the

United States, China, and Japan. China suffers

Figure 5 – The Soft Power Index

Average level of inﬂuence on a 0 to 1 scale

when soft power questions are combined,

followed by rank (see Appendix A for questions included).

Survey

Countries

U.S. soft

power

China soft

power

Japan soft

power

South

Korea soft

power

United States

— .47 (3) .67 (1) .49 (2)

China

.71 (1) — .62 (3) .65 (2)

Japan

.69 (1) .51 (3) — .56 (2)

South Korea

.72 (1) .55 (3) .65 (2) —

Indonesia

.72 (2) .70 (3) .72 (1) .63 (4)

Vietnam

.76 (2) .74 (3) .79 (1) .73 (4)

How the Soft Power Index Is Calculated

The questions in this survey were designed to measure Asian

attitudes regarding soft power. Various indices were created

as summary measures that represent the average rating for

each country for different aspects of soft power and provide

one basic rating of the overarching concepts. Each index was

created by standardizing the scales for several questions on a

particular aspect of soft power (i.e., cultural soft power), add-

ing together the scores for those questions, and then averag-

ing to arrive at a combined rating for “cultural soft power.”

Overall soft power is broken down into ﬁve separate indices

that each measures a different form of soft power—economic,

cultural, human capital, political, and diplomatic. Please refer

to Appendix A for a detailed listing of the questions includ-

ed in each index. The overall Soft Power Index was created

by averaging the soft power index scores for each of the ﬁve

different forms of soft power. Each of the soft power indices

was considered equally important and therefore they were

weighted equally in the overall score no matter how many

questions were included for that particular index.

9ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

from perceptions of low product quality, a lack of

humanitarian assistance to other Asian countries,

and the perception that there are few economic

opportunities for its workforce.

Cultural Soft Power

There is a clear divide between citizens of the major

powers and citizens of Indonesia and Vietnam in

their perceptions of cultural soft power. The United

States ranks

ﬁrst according to Japanese, Chinese,

and South Koreans, but is last according to both

Indonesians and Vietnamese, who consider China

the preeminent purveyor of cultural soft power

in Asia (see Appendix A). Chinese, Japanese, and

South Koreans believe the United States has a great

degree of cultural inﬂuence in Asia, ﬁnd American

culture appealing, and believe that the spread of

U.S. popular culture is positive. Indonesians ﬁnd

U.S. culture appealing in general and think that

it has a great deal of inﬂuence in Asia, yet nearly

all Indonesians feel that the spread of U.S. culture

is a “bad thing” and has a negative inﬂuence on

Indonesia. Despite the fact that most Indonesians

think U.S. culture is attractive, Indonesians who

believe U.S. inﬂuence in Asia has increased in the

past ten years are less likely to think the spread of

U.S. culture is good. In contrast, Indonesian and

Vietnamese citizens believe Chinese culture has

a large and mainly positive impact on their own

societies. China is not considered much of a cul-

tural soft power by citizens of the major powers,

even though there is a general perception that

China possesses a rich cultural heritage. Japan and

South Korea generally rank in the middle on the

Soft Power Index. Although ratings of cultural soft

power differ somewhat on individual questions,

overall, Americans and Indonesians have greater

respect for Japanese cultural soft power, while

Vietnamese and Chinese have greater respect for

South Korean cultural soft power.

Human Capital Soft Power

Similar to economic soft power, citizens in nearly

every country surveyed (except Vietnam) believe

the United States possesses the greatest degree of

human capital soft power (see Appendix A). It is

notable that the United States rates so highly on this

scale and that there is a considerable gap between

the United States and the rest of the major powers.

There is general agreement that the United States

has a highly educated population, that it possesses

advanced science and technology, that it has qual-

ity universities, and that it is very important to

learn English. Japan, China, and South Korea are

once again second, third, and fourth, respectively,

on the index for nearly all of the surveyed coun-

tries. There is considerable respect for Japanese

science and technology among respondents in all

countries. China’s advantage over South Korea in

terms of human capital soft power lies in the higher

ratings it receives for science and technology and

the importance of learning Chinese over Korean.

Diplomatic Soft Power

The diplomatic Soft Power Index again shows a

major power/Southeast Asia divide. Japanese,

South Koreans, and Chinese believe the United

States possesses the greatest diplomatic soft power,

although Chinese rank South Korea slightly higher

than the United States (see Appendix A). Contrary

to conventional wisdom, within these countries

the United States has a good reputation for its use

of diplomacy, respect for sovereignty, and lead-

ership in international institutions. In contrast,

Indonesians and Vietnamese rate Japan slightly

higher and China relatively equal to the United

States on the overall diplomatic Soft Power Index.

Indonesians believe China and Japan use diplo-

macy more effectively to resolve key problems in

Asia and have a greater respect for sovereignty

than the United States. In addition, animosity

between Japan and China is evident on this index.

Citizens in neither country believe the other uses

diplomacy effectively (i.e., negotiations regard-

ing North Korea’s nuclear program and tensions

between China and Taiwan), and both Chinese

and Japanese believe the other fails to build trust

and cooperation among Asian countries. South

Korea is second and China third on the index in

10 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

the eyes of the United States and Japan, while

South Korea ranks last according to Indonesians

and Vietnamese in diplomatic soft power.

Political Soft Power

The United States and Japan are highly regarded

in the area of political soft power (see Appendix

A).

Citizens of China, Japan, and South Korea

believe the United States has the greatest respect

for human rights and possesses a political sys-

tem that serves the needs of its people. Japan has

ratings in the same range as the United States

from people in every country except China.

Interestingly, China rates quite poorly on this par-

ticular index. Citizens of the other major powers

agree that China possesses limited political soft

power, believing its political system does not serve

the needs of its people and that it has little respect

for human rights.

12. The Vietnamese index was based only on perceived

success of promoting policies in Asia. Vietnamese rank China

and South Korea equally, which places these countries third

after Japan and the United States on this index.

13. The questions on political soft power were not included

in the Vietnamese survey.

11ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

Perceptions of the United States

For much of the post-World War II period,

America’s soft power has been felt strongly in Asia.

American universities have educated several gen-

erations of Asian professionals and elites, and its

popular culture—movies, music, sports, designer

goods—have penetrated deeply into Asian societ-

ies. The American democratic model has inspired

many Asian countries as they transitioned from

authoritarian to democratic political systems. The

American economy has been the main export mar-

ket for Asian producers for many years. American

missionaries have proselytized their religious

practices through Asian societies. Asian tourists

have ﬂocked to Hawaii and the U.S. mainland.

Despite this sixty-plus-year legacy of American

soft power in Asia, the media has been ﬁlled with

reports in recent years of America’s declining

appeal throughout the region. This survey indi-

cates quite clearly that America’s soft power is still

robust and pervasive.

On a 0 to 10 scale of economic inﬂuence, the

United States ranks as either the ﬁrst or second most

inﬂuential economic power in Asia in all the sur-

veyed countries. The United States receives a mean

level of 8.4 among South Koreans (see Figure 6),

ahead of both China and Japan. The United States

ties with Japan for ﬁrst place among Vietnamese

(8.0) and Indonesians (7.9). However, the United

States ends up as the second most important eco-

nomic power after China among Chinese (7.3 to

8.0) and Japanese (8.0 to 8.2), with Chinese seeing

a larger gap between the two. American military

strength is perceived as signiﬁcantly higher than

Section III: Perceptions of Individual Countries

Figure 6 – Economic Relations and

Inuence of the United States

Average rating by respondents in each country

(0 to 10 scale) on the following:

8.5

8.4

8.0

7.7

7.6

7.3

China

Indonesia

Japan

Vietnam

South Korea

01 23 45 678 910

Importance of economic relations with

the U.S. such as trade and investment

to their country's economy.

Level of U.S. economic influence in Asia

12 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

Chinese military strength among Japanese (9.0 vs.

7.9), South Koreans (8.7 vs. 7.7), and Indonesians

(8.6 vs. 6.7). However, Chinese and Americans see

the United States as just slightly behind China in

military power (8.0 to 8.1 among Chinese and 7.5

to 7.6 among Americans). Additionally, a majority

of Indonesians (58%) and pluralities of Japanese

(47%), Chinese (45%), and South Koreans (42%)

believe overall U.S. inﬂuence in Asia has increased

over the past ten years. Minorities ranging from 11

percent to 28 percent in the surveyed countries

believe U.S. inﬂuence has declined (see Figure 7).

Feelings toward the United States are relatively

warm among the publics of the surveyed coun-

tries and have grown warmer among those coun-

tries that were also surveyed in the 2006 Chicago

Council “Global Views” study. On a scale of 0 to

100 where 50 is neutral, Chinese give the United

States a warm average of 61, ten points higher than

its average score in 2006 and the third highest rat-

ing overall after South Korea and Taiwan.

There

is a more modest warming trend in feelings toward

the United States among South Koreans (up three

points from 58 in 2006 to 61) and Indonesians (up

two points from 54 to 56), although this increase

is within the survey’s margin of error. The United

States receives its highest rating from Vietnamese

(68) followed by the Japanese (62). Unlike other

14. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Global Views

2006 (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2006).

international surveys that have shown a generally

unfavorable perception of U.S. global inﬂuence,

citizens of the surveyed Asian countries generally

perceive the United States as a positive inﬂuence

in their region. Majorities in Vietnam (76%), Japan

(69%), China (66%), and South Korea (54%) say

the United States is having a “somewhat” or “very

positive” inﬂuence in Asia. Only in Indonesia,

where perceptions of the U.S. role may be inﬂu-

enced by U.S. foreign policy in other regions such

as the Middle East, do people feel more negative. A

plurality (48%) of Indonesians believe the United

States plays a “somewhat” or “very negative” role,

compared to 24 percent who say the opposite.

Broadly held beliefs within the surveyed

countries of the economic importance of the

United States to Asia likely contribute to positive

perceptions of the overall U.S. role in Asia. There

is wide recognition that U.S. ideas on the beneﬁts

of free markets and open competition have been

inﬂuential in the region. Majorities in all surveyed

countries—94 percent in Japan, 93 percent in

South Korea, 76 percent in Indonesia, 71 percent

in China, and 56 percent in Vietnam—say these

ideas have been “somewhat’ or “very important”

in their countries’ economic development. There

is also a prevalent perception that the United

States has the most competitive economy. On a 0

to 10 scale evaluating economic competitiveness

of different economies, the United States both

scores the highest among all assessed countries

and is signiﬁcantly ahead of both Japan and China.

The United States receives an average score of 8.9

among Vietnamese, compared to 8.6 among South

Koreans, 8.4 among Japanese, and 8.1 among both

Chinese and Indonesians.

On the same 0 to 10 scale, the United States is

considered the most important trade and invest-

ment partner (see Figure 6) for Japan (8.0) and

Vietnam (8.0). Chinese give both the United States

and the European Union the same score (7.6), sig-

niﬁcantly ahead of Japan (6.7) and South Korea

(6.8). Similarly, support for signing free trade

agreements with the United States (see Figure 8)

is higher than that for any other potential bilateral

agreement asked of the surveyed Asian popula-

Figure 7 – U.S. Inuence in Asia

Percentage in each country who say U.S.

inﬂuence over the past ten years has decreased, increased,

or remained about the same.

265022

452428

473220

423324

581811

Indonesia

South Korea

Japan

China

U.S.

60 40 20 020406080

Increased

Remained about

the same

Decreased

13ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

tions except for the Japanese—a slightly higher

percentage say their country should have a free

trade agreement with South Korea.

Asians also generally regard the United States

as a highly advanced technological power with

strong multinational corporations that are posi-

tively engaged in the region. On a 10-point scale

assessing the degree to which countries possess

advanced science and technology, the United

States scores the highest in every country: 9.1 in

Vietnam, 8.9 in South Korea, 8.8 in Indonesia and

China, and 8.4 in Japan. The United States also

receives the highest average scores of any coun-

try on the degree to which it has leading multi-

national companies. American companies are

generally viewed favorably, with majorities in

Vietnam (86%), Japan (80%), South Korea (75%),

China (73%), and Indonesia (54%) believing

U.S. companies make a positive contribution in

their countries.

Asians have mixed perceptions of the impact

of the U.S. military presence in the region. Strong

majorities of South Koreans (72%) and Japanese

(68%) believe the U.S. military presence increases

stability in East Asia, while 52 percent of Chinese

disagree. Indonesians are split (35 percent say it

increases stability and 38 percent say the oppo-

site). Indonesians and Chinese also have the

strongest concerns about the United States as a

potential military threat to their countries. South

Koreans are surprisingly mixed on this question,

with 49 percent worried and 50 percent not wor-

ried. However, there is agreement in all surveyed

countries, including the United States, that the

U.S. military presence keeps China and Japan

from entering into an arms race.

Asians generally consider U.S. public diplo-

macy in the region to be effective. On a 0 to 10 scale

evaluating how successful the United States and

China are in promoting their ideas about the best

world order, Japanese (6.0), South Koreans (6.3),

and Indonesians (7.0) all see the United States as

signiﬁcantly more effective (see Figure 9) than

China (4.5, 4.9, and 6.6, respectively). Chinese dis-

agree, giving their own country a score of 7.7 com-

pared to 6.7 for the United States. Vietnamese see

China and the United States as equally effective

(6.3). A similar pattern emerges on a 10-point scale

assessing the effectiveness of the U.S., Chinese,

Figure 9 – Promoting Ideas/Policies in Asia

Average rating by respondents in each country

(0 to 10 scale) on the following:

7.0

7.1

6.7

6.5

6.1

6.3

6.1

6.3

6.8

6.0

6.2

Japan

Vietnam

South

Korea

U.S.

China

Indonesia

Rank

01 2 34 56 7 8910

How effective the U.S. has been in

promoting its ideas about the best

world order

How effective the government of

the U.S. has been in promoting its

policies to the people of Asia

*The United States tied with China on this question among Vietnamese.

Figure 8 – Free Trade Agreements

with the United States

Percentage who think their country should have a free

trade agreement with the United States.

Japan

South Korea

China

0102030405060708090 100

14 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

Japanese, and South Korean governments in pro-

moting their policies to people in Asia. The United

States gets the highest average score (see Figure

9) among Indonesians (7.1), Japanese (6.2), and

South Koreans (6.1), but is second to China in the

eyes of Chinese (6.5 compared to 7.8) and second

to Japan in the eyes of Vietnamese (6.8 compared

to 7.1).

Asians also generally see the United States

as the most effective of the four countries in its

leadership of international institutions like the

United Nations and the World Trade Organization.

American efforts to promote democracy and

human rights internationally are generally viewed

as having had a positive effect on Asia by majori-

ties of Japanese (60%), South Koreans (55%),

Indonesians (50%), and Chinese (50%). American

use of diplomacy to resolve problems in Asia is

also generally well regarded. On a 0 to 10 scale

assessing this issue (see Figure 10), the United

States receives the highest average score of any

foreign country from Chinese (6.0, on par with

South Korea), South Koreans (5.7), and Japanese

(5.6). Among Indonesians, the United States

places third (6.6) behind Japan (7.1) and China

(6.8). Majorities of South Koreans (70%), Chinese

(67%), and Japanese (57%) also believe the United

States has been “very” or “somewhat effective” in

working to resolve the problem of North Korea’s

nuclear weapons program. A surprisingly strong

majority of Chinese (63%) believe the United

States has been effective (“very” and “somewhat”

combined) in managing tensions between main-

land China and Taiwan, although Chinese percep-

tions of U.S. respect for sovereignty is lower (5.1 on

a 0 to 10 scale).

U.S. cultural inﬂuence is both pervasive and

considered generally positive among surveyed

Asian countries. It is seen as the strongest foreign

popular culture inﬂuence among Indonesians

(7.9 on a 0 to 10 scale), Japanese (7.8), and South

Koreans (7.6). Among Chinese, it is second only to

South Korea in cultural inﬂuence (6.4 compared

to 6.5). Among Vietnamese, U.S. cultural inﬂuence

ranks last of the four assessed cultures (American,

Figure 10 – Use of Diplomacy

Average rating by respondents in each country on

how well the U.S./China uses diplomacy to resolve

key problems in Asia (0 to 10 scale).

3.8

6.0

5.6

4.8

5.7

5.3

6.6

6.8

Indonesia

South Korea

Japan

China

U.S.

012345678

U.S. use of diplomacy

China’s use of diplomacy

Figure 11 – U.S. Cultural Inuence

6.4

7.8

7.6

7.9

6.6

Vietnam

Indonesia

South Korea

Japan

China

0 12345678910

0102030405060708090 100

Level of influence U.S. culture has on

each country’s popular culture (mean

score on a 0 to 10 scale)

Percentage in each country who think the

influence of U.S. popular culture on their

country’s popular culture is mainly positive

15ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean). The United

States ranks ﬁrst in terms of the appeal of its pop-

ular culture in every surveyed country except for

Vietnam, where it ranks fourth after China, Japan,

and South Korea. American movies, television pro-

grams, and music are the most frequently viewed

or listened to among all non-native entertainment

in every surveyed country with the exception of

Vietnam, where South Korean and Chinese enter-

tainment rank higher.

Strong majorities of Japanese (83%), Chinese

(70%), South Koreans (64%), and Vietnamese

(60%) believe U.S. cultural inﬂuence on their

popular culture is generally positive (see Figure

11). Indonesians strongly disagree (60% believe it

is negative). Similarly, the spread of U.S. cultural

inﬂuence in Asia is considered a positive develop-

ment by the publics of all surveyed Asian coun-

tries except Indonesia, where 75 percent see it as

negative. In contrast, 72 percent of Japanese, 69

percent of Chinese, 63 percent of Vietnamese, and

57 percent of South Koreans view the spread of

U.S. cultural inﬂuence favorably.

Overwhelming majorities (96% to 100%) in the

ﬁve Asian countries surveyed believe it is at least

somewhat important for children in their country

to learn English in order to succeed in the future.

Many Asians also look to the United States as an

educational destination for their children. The

United States is the ﬁrst- or second-choice des-

tination for higher education for the children of

Asian parents, and there is a belief that the United

States has the highest quality universities.

Perceptions of China

Much has been made in recent years of China’s

growing inﬂuence and soft power globally, par-

ticularly in Asia.

Many media reports even

link China’s improved image in Asia as com-

ing at the expense of America’s, which is seen as

in decline.

15. See n. 8.

16. Jane Perlez, “The Charm from Beijing: China Strives

to Keep Its Backyard Tranquil,” New York Times, October 8,

2003; Jane Perlez, “Asian Leaders Find China a More Cordial

Neighbor: Beijing’s Soaring Economy Weakens U.S. Sway,” New

Yet the data from this survey indicate China’s

soft power in the region is, in fact, uneven. On

several indices it is quite limited. Beijing scores

consistently higher in Southeast Asia (Indonesia

and Vietnam) than in other respondent countries

(United States, Japan, and South Korea), where

respondents are much more circumscribed in

their perceptions of Chinese soft power (see Figure

12). Chinese hold a very high opinion of their own

country’s soft power—ranking China considerably

higher than it ranks in other respondent countries

across virtually all categories.

Overall, perceptions of China in the region

are mainly positive. Clear or strong majorities in

all respondent countries assess China’s overall

regional inﬂuence as either “very” or “somewhat

positive” (53% in the United States, 62% in Japan,

58% in South Korea and Indonesia, and 76% in

Vietnam). Majorities of respondents in all coun-

tries (except Indonesia) also believe that China

York Times, October 18, 2003; Jane Perlez, “As U.S. Inﬂuence

Wanes, A New Asian Community,” New York Times, November

4, 2004; Editorial, “China’s More Nuanced Diplomacy,” New

York Times, October 14, 2003; Philip Pan, “China’s Improving

Image Challenges U.S. in Asia,” Washington Post, November 15,

2003; Michael Vatikiotis and Murray Hiebert, “How China Is

Building an Empire,” Far Eastern Economic Review, November

20, 2003, 30–33.

Figure 12 – Ratings of China’s Soft Power:

The View Is Better from the South

Average level of inﬂuence on a 0 to 1 scale when

soft power questions are combined for ﬁve key areas

(see Appendix A for questions included).

Survey

Countries

Economic

Human

Capital

Cultural

Diplomatic

Political

United

States

0.52 0.55 0.56 0.40 0.34

Japan

0.57 0.58 0.57 0.44 0.41

South

Korea

0.57 0.64 0.54 0.51 0.48

Indonesia

0.73 0.74 0.62 0.69 0.71

Vietnam

0.70 0.80 0.77 0.67 —

16 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

will be the “leader of Asia” in the future. Only

in Vietnam is a majority of the public comfort-

able with this possible future development (see

Figure 13).

On a 0 to 100 scale of feelings toward China

where 50 is neutral, the country scores lower. The

mean score given by Americans is a chilly 35, while

the mean given by Japanese is 45. South Koreans

have neutral feelings at 50, down from 57 in the

2006 Chicago Council survey. Indonesians have

warmer feelings at 60, as do Vietnamese at 62.

Skepticism about China is also evident when

respondents are asked whether their country

shares similar values with China. With the notable

exception of Vietnam and to a lesser extent South

Korea, majorities in the United States, Japan, and

Indonesia all believe that their values converge

either “a little” or to “no extent” with China. With

respect to China’s political system, when asked

whether China’s political system serves the needs

of its people, with the exception of Indonesia, the

mean score is 5.1 or below on a 10-point scale.

Similarly, on a 10-point scale of respect for human

rights and the rule of law, with the exception of

Indonesians (6.8), China receives low average

ratings from Americans (2.7), Japanese (3.9), and

South Koreans (4.5).

Concerning economic dimensions of soft

power, China does fairly well. On the question of

how important economic relations with China are

to their country, responses in all countries aver-

age between 6.5 and 8.3 on a 0 to 10 scale. Further,

China’s economic inﬂuence in Asia is consid-

ered to be very high, scoring between 7.6 and 8.2

across all survey countries (see Figure 14). This is

an important ﬁnding, given China’s centrality in

the regional production chain and as a catalyst

for economic growth in East Asia. Nevertheless,

Chinese are judged to have somewhat average

entrepreneurial spirit, and the quality of Chinese

products receives mixed reviews.

Chinese diplomacy, unlike its economic inﬂu-

ence, receives surprisingly low assessments. Asked

if China uses diplomacy to resolve key problems in

Asia or builds trust and cooperation among Asian

Figure 14 – Economic Inuence

Average rating by respondents in each country on how

much economic inﬂuence the U.S./China has in Asia

(0 to 10 scale).

7.0

7.6

7.3

8.0

8.2

8.4

8.1

7.9

7.6

8.0

7.7

Vietnam

Indonesia

South Korea

Japan

China

U.S.

012345678910

U.S. economic influence

China’s economic influence

Figure 13 – China as Leader of Asia

Percentage in each country who say the following.

Vietnam

Indonesia

South Korea

Japan

China

U.S.

0102030405060708090 100

China will be the leader of Asia

% comfortable with this outcome

17ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

countries (two separate questions), Americans,

Japanese, and South Koreans give China mean

scores in the low to mid range on a 10-point scale

(see Figure 10). Even more surprising, majorities

in the United States (50%), Japan (59%), and South

Korea (56%) rate China as either “somewhat” or

“very ineffective” in resolving the problem of North

Korea’s nuclear weapons program. China also

receives negative assessments of its effectiveness

in helping to manage tensions between Taiwan and

the mainland—55 percent in the United States, 62

percent in Japan, and 53 percent in South Korea

rate it as at least “somewhat ineffective.”

Thus, China’s regional diplomacy is not per-

ceived by respondents to be as effective as is

commonly portrayed in the media and the policy

expert community. Moreover, China’s own efforts

to popularize its ideas about world order and the

conduct of foreign policy do not resonate in Asia.

Large majorities of the publics in each country

have not heard of China’s concept of a “harmo-

nious world” (和谐世界). This is not good news

for the Chinese government, which has invested

considerable effort and resources to popularize

this idea since 2007. Similarly, on a 0 to 10 scale

China receives low scores regarding its ability to

promote its ideas about the best world order from

South Koreans (4.9), Japanese (4.5), and Americans

(4.0). However, China does considerably better

on this question among Indonesians (6.6) and

Vietnamese (6.3).

China receives better, but still mixed ratings on

soft power indicators concerning contemporary

Chinese culture. When asked to assess whether

China’s popular culture has a mainly positive or

negative inﬂuence on their own popular culture,

majorities only in Vietnam (80%) and Japan (63%)

say this inﬂuence is “somewhat” or “very positive”

(see Figure 15). Citizens in all the countries sur-

veyed have a high regard for China’s “rich cultural

heritage,” with mean scores ranging between 7.8

and 8.6. However, when asked to rate the appeal

of China’s popular culture on a 0 to 10 scale, mean

scores fall around the midpoint—between 5.5 and

6.4—with the notable exception of Vietnam (8.2).

Chinese cultural products do not seem to be suc-

cessful in terms of penetrating the popular culture

of its neighbors. Strong majorities of Japanese and

South Koreas and pluralities of Indonesians say

they “rarely” or “never” view Chinese movies or

television. Only in Vietnam does a plurality view

such Chinese entertainment “every day” (16%) or

“more than once a week” (29%).

One explanation for China’s relatively low

scores on cultural soft power (see Appendix A)

may be that Chinese movies, television programs,

and literature, among other offerings, are almost

exclusively available only in the Chinese language.

Hence their appeal may be limited to overseas

Chinese communities in other Asian countries.

However, majorities in all countries except the

United States feel it is at least somewhat important

for their children to learn Chinese—despite the

fact that China ranks low relative to other coun-

tries as a preferred destination for their children’s

higher education.

In sum, the survey’s ﬁndings indicate that

China’s soft power image in Asia and the United

States is more limited than the scholarly and jour-

Figure 15 – Inuence of Chinese Culture

4.6

5.1

4.8

6.5

7.6

Vietnam

Indonesia

South Korea

Japan

U.S.

012 345678910

0102030405060708090 100

Level of influence Chinese culture has

on each country’s popular culture

(mean score on a 0 to 10 scale)

Percentage in each country who think the

influence of Chinese popular culture on their

country’s popular culture is mainly positive

18 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

nalistic communities have suggested in recent

years. Naturally, China emerges as one of the

stronger regional actors in terms of its economic

power and attractiveness, but this is not matched

by its ability to serve as a regional negotiator and

political and cultural leader.

Perceptions of Japan

Japan boasts the world’s second largest economy

after the United States measured by gross domes-

tic product and third largest after the United States

and China adjusted to purchasing power parity.

Due to China’s rising economic clout in East Asia

and Japan’s slow economic growth throughout the

1990s and until 2003, Japan has been perceived by

some as slowly losing its competitive edge and its

leadership position in the global economy. The

country’s ability to increase its soft power in the

region has been plagued by its military expansions

in the region in the twentieth century. Also, due to

Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visits

to the Yasukuni shrine, a war shrine containing

the remains of Japanese war criminals, Japan lost

some of its soft power in the region, compromising

its image as a peaceful and cooperative nation.

Japan’s soft power, however, has been helped

by admiration from others for its technologically

advanced economy and its highly educated work-

force. Some of its cultural exports have also gained

recognition in the region. Japanese cuisine and

manga have become known and sought around

the world, and some of its music, ﬁlms, and ani-

mation have become popular in the region. Its

diplomatic efforts have been recognized and val-

ued, especially by Indonesians and Vietnamese.

While some have expressed skepticism about

Japan’s soft power in the region and its ability to

expand it in the face of a growing China, our data

show that the country is still greatly admired for

its advanced economy and that the hostility for its

wartime actions is not as prominent amongst its

neighbors as one might expect.

Overall, feelings towards Japan on a 0 to 100

scale are mainly positive. The lowest score comes

from the Chinese, who give Japan their low-

est rating of 46, slightly below the neutral point.

Koreans give Japan a neutral rating. Americans,

Indonesians, and Vietnamese register much

warmer feelings, giving Japan their warmest rat-

ings of any country asked about (58, 66, and 68,

respectively). Japan’s overall inﬂuence in Asia

is regarded as at least “somewhat positive” by

majorities in all countries polled. There is greater

disagreement regarding perceptions of Japanese

economic inﬂuence in Asia. Indonesians and

Vietnamese rank Japan ﬁrst (along with the United

States) in terms of economic inﬂuence in Asia, but

Chinese and South Koreans give Japan the lowest

relative ratings among the major powers.

Despite the fact that Japan is not seen as tre-

mendously inﬂuential economically, it ranks very

well on a variety of other economic soft power indi-

cators. Japan’s economic Soft Power Index score

takes the top spot among Americans, Indonesians,

and Vietnamese and the second place among

Chinese and Koreans (see Appendix A).

Majorities of respondents in all countries

say that knowing a product is made in Japan

increases the likelihood they will buy the product

(see Figure 16). When it comes to quality of prod-

ucts, Japan gets the highest rating of any other

country’s products on a 0 to 10 scale from South

Koreans, Indonesians, and Vietnamese. It gets the

second highest from Americans and Chinese (see

Figure 16).

This high level of trust in the quality of

Japan’s products by Indonesians and Vietnamese

extends to trust in its companies. Thirty percent

of Indonesians and 31 percent of Vietnamese

believe Japanese companies make a very positive

contribution in their countries. These percentages

are higher than that for any other country. This

conﬁdence in Japan’s technological prowess and

economic strength is also expressed in the will-

ingness of its Asian neighbors to enter into free

trade agreements with Japan. Seventy-nine per-

cent of Chinese and 74 percent of South Koreans

believe they should have a Free Trade Agreement

with Japan. These percentages, however, are lower

than those who think their country should have

a free trade agreement with the United States

and ASEAN.

19ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

A further testament to Japan’s economic

attractiveness is the perception that the country

helps other Asian countries develop economi-

cally. Japan receives the highest ratings relative

to the other major powers on a 0 to 10 scale from

Indonesians (7.4) and Vietnamese (7.8) on this

indicator. In terms of the importance of overall

economic relations with Japan, both the United

States and Indonesia rank their economic rela-

tionship with Japan as more important than any

other country surveyed.

Unlike its economy, Japan’s political system

and the way it conducts its foreign policy in the

region is not viewed as particularly effective by

others. When asked to rate the level of respect for

the sovereignty of other Asian nations on a 0 to 10

17. Americans rate the importance of economic relations

with Japan higher than that of the EU and China.

scale, Japan receives higher ratings than any other

country only from Americans and Indonesians.

South Koreans rate Japan on the same level as

China (4.9) on this indicator, but higher than the

United States (4.8).

Similar to its political soft power, Japan’s

regional diplomacy receives somewhat mixed

ratings. On the question of the use of diplomacy

to resolve problems in Asia, Americans and

Indonesians again give Japan their highest rat-

ings (6.5 and 7.1, respectively). Chinese and South

Koreans rank Japan’s use of diplomacy around the

midpoint (5.4 and 5.5, respectively). Japan’s efforts

to solve the North Korea nuclear issue are consid-

ered “very” or “somewhat effective” by a slight

majority only in China. Japan’s diplomatic efforts

in managing tensions between mainland China

and Taiwan are considered “very” or “somewhat

ineffective” by majorities or pluralities in all sur-

veyed countries except the United States, where a

plurality thinks Japan has been at least “somewhat

effective.” Apparently, Japan’s attempts at regional

diplomacy have not resonated with the Chinese

and South Korean publics, and it emerges as one of

the weaker aspects of Japan’s overall soft power.

One surprising ﬁnding is that Japan’s govern-

ment receives above average ratings across the

board for its effectiveness in promoting its poli-

cies in the region. Lower ratings might have been

expected because of Japan’s territorial disputes

with China and South Korea over islands in the

Paciﬁc and because of the loud protests in recent

years in both countries over visits to the Yasukuni

shrine as well as the approval of a Japanese history

textbook glossing over Japanese wartime aggres-

sion. In terms of resolving the territorial disputes,

none of the Chinese, South Korean, or Japanese

publics has a conciliatory attitude. When it comes

to the Yasukuni shrine visits, both the Chinese

and Korean publics agree that they should pro-

test them in some manner (only 2 percent in each

country think their country should not protest

these visits).

Unlike attitudes towards its politics and

diplomacy, admiration for Japan’s human capital

earns the country higher marks. On most indi-

Figure 16 – Appeal/Quality of Japanese Products

Average rating by respondents in each country

(0 to 10 scale) on the following.

8.7

8.9

7.5

8.2

6.6

8.1

5.6

7.5

5.5

7.0

U.S.

China

South Korea

Japan

Indonesia

Vietnam

012345678910

Influence on buying decision of

products being made in Japan

(0 meaning less likely to buy,

10 meaning more likely to buy)

Quality of products made in Japan

(0 meaning extremely poor, 10

meaning extremely good quality)

20 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

cators, such as the level of education of Japan’s

population, the quality of its universities, and its

advanced science and technology, Japan is ranked

ﬁrst by Americans and Vietnamese and second

usually only to the United States by Chinese, South

Koreans, and Indonesians (see Figure 17).

Perceptions of the cultural component of

Japan’s soft power are also mixed. Majorities in

every country except South Korea (which is split)

think that the inﬂuence of Japanese popular

culture is either “very” or “somewhat positive.”

Overall, majorities in all countries except South

Korea believe the spread of Japan’s cultural inﬂu-

ence in Asia is mainly a “good thing” rather than

a “bad thing.”

Yet there is little agreement as to whether the

inﬂuence of Japan’s popular culture on the respon-

dents’ culture is positive or negative. In South

Korea, only a weak plurality believes Japan’s inﬂu-

ence on Korea’s popular culture is positive. A solid

majority of Chinese (59%) think that the inﬂu-

ence of Japan’s popular culture is mostly positive,

but this is the lowest relative rating given by the

Chinese (between China, the United States, Japan,

and South Korea). While South Koreans may not

view Japan’s cultural inﬂuence as very positive,

they give Japan the second highest ranking of

appeal of its popular culture after that of American

popular culture. Vietnamese rank the appeal

of Japanese culture after that of China. Japan is

ranked second by almost every country on indica-

tors such as the appeal of its popular culture, the

richness of its cultural heritage, and its attractive-

ness as an international tourist destination. On

most cultural indicators, the two Southeast Asian

countries rank Japan after China.

Generally, Japanese soft power is felt through-

out the region but is limited on the diplomatic

front. While the survey ﬁnds that the United

States has the greatest power of attraction in

almost all surveyed countries, Japan usually ranks

close behind.

Perceptions of South Korea

South Korea has high aspirations for its role in

Northeast Asia and sees itself as a pivotal player

in the politics of the region, acting as broker, bal-

ancer, or hub of the great powers that surround it.

South Korea has taken an active role in promoting

regional integration, seeking trade agreements

with its allies, and looking to actively mediate dis-

putes between the United States and North Korea

and potential tensions between China and Japan.

However, being surrounded by great powers,

South Korea has struggled to gain recognition for

its achievements and dynamism. South Korea is

the thirteenth largest economy in the world, but

is physically located between the second (Japan)

and the fourth (China) and is an ally of the United

States. South Korea’s products and technology are

becoming trusted international brand names, but

Korea still lacks Japan’s “Gross National Cool.”

Regionally, South Korea has developed a

closer relationship with China both economically

and politically, as China has become an attrac-

tive place for Korean investment and has taken (or

been handed) a more active role in dealing with

North Korea. South Korean relations with Japan

are publicly warming (despite recent dustups over

Japan’s colonial legacy), as younger generations

have grown up with Japanese cultural exports and

no living memory of the Korean War.

While South Korea struggles to stand out

among its neighbors politically and economically,

Figure 17 – Japan’s Human Capital Soft Power

Overall score on a 0 to 10 scale with rank in parentheses

(see Appendix A for questions included in the score).

Survey Countries Japan soft power

U.S.

.69 (1)

China

.68 (2)

Japan

—

South Korea

.75 (2)

Indonesia

.80 (2)

Vietnam

.91 (1)

21ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

its cultural impact on the region is growing. The

Hallyu wave of popular dramas and Korean pop

music have spread throughout Asia. South Korea’s

stars, sounds, and fashion have found regional

and global appeal.

But what does this mean for the soft power of

South Korea? Have stronger cultural exports and

regional ties increased South Korea’s soft power?

Perceptions of South Korea are relatively posi-

tive among the major powers, especially among

Chinese, but somewhat less so among Indonesians

and Vietnamese. On the 0 to 100 scale of feelings

toward countries, Chinese give South Korea a

very warm average rating of 65, higher than they

give both the United States (61) and Japan (46).

Such positive Chinese feelings towards South

Korea are evident in many areas of soft power

discussed below. Americans and Japanese both

show much warmer feelings toward South Korea

than they do toward China. In contrast, although

Vietnamese and Indonesians show warm feelings

toward South Korea in an absolute sense (64 and

53, respectively), Vietnamese show warmer feel-

ings toward both the United States and Japan,

while Indonesians put all three major powers (the

United States, Japan, and China) ahead.

Not surprisingly, South Korea’s overall eco-

nomic and military power rates behind that of the

three major powers (Vietnam and Indonesia were

not asked about). In both cases, however, South

Korea still receives moderate absolute ratings of

economic inﬂuence in Asia (between 5.5 and 6.8

on a 0 to 10 scale among all surveyed countries)

and of military strength (between 5.3 and 6.3).

Similarly, Americans, Chinese, Japanese,

Indonesians, and Vietnamese rate South Korea

last in terms of the importance of economic rela-

tions, economic inﬂuence in Asia, and the interna-

tional competitiveness of its economy compared

to that of the United States, China, and Japan. The

only exception is that Chinese rate the importance

of economic relations with South Korea slightly

higher than the importance of economic relations

with Japan and with Indonesia. South Korea is also

at a comparative disadvantage in terms of entre-

preneurial spirit and having leading multinational

companies, ranking at the bottom on both (except

that Japanese think South Korea’s entrepreneurial

spirit is higher than that of China).

Although South Korea’s economic stature

ranks relatively low compared to the major pow-

ers, South Korea remains an important economic

partner. Americans, Japanese, and Chinese are

quite interested in a free trade agreement with

South Korea. While citizens in most surveyed

countries believe that it is most important to have

a free trade agreement with the United States, a

free trade agreement with South Korea (see Figure

18) is second in importance for Americans (49%

in favor).

In Japan, a trade agreement with South

Korea receives the highest level of support (63% in

favor, tied with Japanese support for an FTA with

the United States).

South Korea also rates well on helping other

Asian countries develop their economies. Chinese

rate South Korea highest, Americans rank South

Korea second (ahead of China), and Japanese rank

it second on par with China, though the average

scores on this indicator are moderate.

South Korea has a moderate degree of political

soft power in Asia. Americans give it average marks

on respect for human rights (5.0 on a 0 to 10 scale)

and on whether its political system serves the

needs of its people (5.2 on the same scale), ranking

18. Entrepreneurial spirit question was not asked of

Indonesian and Vietnamese samples.

19. Americans were not asked about a free trade agreement

with ASEAN.

20. This question was not asked in Vietnam.

Figure 18 – Free Trade Agreements

with South Korea

Percentage in each country who say their country should

have a free trade agreement that would lower barriers such

as tariffs with South Korea.

U.S.

Japan

China

0102030 40 50 60708090 100

22 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

it behind Japan but ahead of China. Japanese rate

South Korea slightly higher on these questions (5.6

and 5.8, respectively), placing it behind the United

States but ahead of China. Chinese respondents

have a much more positive view of South Korea’s

respect for human rights (6.6) and its political sys-

tem (6.9), ranking South Korea in second place

behind the United States and ahead of Japan.

Indonesians give South Korea a 6.7 on its politi-

cal system, though it still ranks behind the United

States, Japan, and China. However, Indonesians

rank South Korea’s respect for human rights (6.8)

on par with the United States and China and only

a little lower than Japan (7.2). In terms of provid-

ing assistance in the event of humanitarian crises

in Asia, South Korea rates ﬁrst among Chinese

(6.3) and second among Americans (4.6) and

Japanese (4.9), though these last two are below-

average scores.

South Korea receives moderate marks for its

regional diplomacy. Americans give South Korea

a 5.3 in terms of its use of diplomacy to solve key

problems in Asia, placing it after Japan but before

China. Chinese give South Korea their highest rat-

ing (6.4) when it comes to building trust and coop-

eration among Asian countries. Americans and

Japanese rank South Korea second on all these

aspects of diplomacy, usually ahead of China, and

Japanese even rank South Korea slightly ahead of

the United States in its respect for the sovereignty of

other Asian countries. Only in China do a majority

of respondents say South Korea has been “some-

what” or “very effective” in working to resolve the

problem of North Korea’s nuclear weapons pro-

gram. South Korea also gets average scores in its

leadership of international institutions, its effec-

tiveness in managing tensions between China and

Taiwan, and its effectiveness in promoting its poli-

cies to people in Asia. Indonesian and Vietnamese

ratings of South Korean diplomacy are not as

informative, given that very few questions were

asked on this topic. But it is safe to say that these

countries do not rank South Korea as high as the

major powers in terms of diplomacy.

There is a high degree of variance in percep-

tions of South Korea’s cultural inﬂuence. Ameri-

cans and Indonesians do not think South Korea

has much cultural soft power, but Vietnamese,

Chinese, and Japanese have high respect for

South Korean cultural power. Majorities or plu-

ralities in every country agree that the spread

of South Korean cultural inﬂuence is “mainly a

good thing” (79% in China, 78% in Japan, 44% in

Indonesia, and 83% in Vietnam). Americans and

Indonesians also do not think that South Korea’s

popular culture is as appealing or its cultural heri-

tage as rich as that of China and Japan. In contrast,

Chinese give South Korea high relative ratings on

these questions.

While South Korea receives positive scores on

measures of human capital soft power, it still ranks

lower than the major powers in this area. Learning

Korean ranks last in all surveyed countries in

its importance to future success. Americans,

Chinese, and Indonesians

also rate South Korea’s

universities,

the educational level of its popula-

tion, and its science and technology last compared

with the other major powers. Japanese give South

Korea a mean rating of 6.0 in terms of its advance-

ment of science and technology, though Japanese

still rate other countries higher. Respondents in

the other surveyed countries all give South Korea

an equal or higher score on this measure, but,

again, South Korea still ranks lower compared

to the other major powers. Chinese, Japanese,

and Americans all give South Korea moderate

scores in terms of the quality of its universities.

Vietnamese rate South Korea low on these mea-

sures. Interestingly, Japanese give South Korea its

highest score (7.2) in terms of the level of educa-

tion of the Korean population. South Korea ranks

last on this measure according to Indonesians and

third according to Vietnamese.

21. Indonesians were not asked to rate South Korean

universities.

22. The question on the quality of universities was not

asked of the Indonesian and Vietnamese samples.

23ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

China–United States

The Sino-American relationship is increasingly

recognized as the most important bilateral geo-

political relationship in both Asian and inter-

national affairs. It is, at the same time, a deeply

interdependent and ambivalent relationship. Both

powers’ economies and national security inter-

ests are deeply intertwined. Cooperation occurs

amidst competition, while mutual trust exists

alongside suspicions.

At the governmental level, the relationship

has never been more deeply institutionalized and

productive. Beijing and Washington are working

together on a broad range of regional and global

issues—including the North Korean and Iranian

nuclear problems, stability across the Taiwan

Strait, stability and improvement of human rights

in Myanmar and Sudan (Darfur), nonproliferation

of weapons of mass destruction, counterterror-

ism, public health pandemics, relief after natu-

ral disasters, international trade liberalization,

global climate change, and many other challenges

to Asian and global governance.

At the substate level the two societies have

never been more deeply intertwined. Two-way

trade in 2007 totaled a staggering $387 billion,

a relationship in which the United States ran an

unprecedented deﬁcit of $256 billion. In 2008

China surpassed Japan as America’s largest for-

eign creditor. By September 2008 Beijing owned

$1 out of every $10 of U.S. national debt—a total of

$585 billion in U.S. Treasury bonds, pulling ahead

of Japan’s $573.2 billion. As China also purchases

U.S. debt instruments through third countries,

estimates are that Beijing’s holdings may total

$800 billion or more.

Instantaneous telecommu-

nications link the two societies every minute of

every day. Professionals from various sectors work

together on collaborative projects. More than

67,000 Chinese students studied in American uni-

23. Anthony Faiola and Zachary A. Goldfarb, “China Tops

Japan in U.S. Debt Holdings: Beijing Gains Sway Over U.S.

Economy,” Washington Post, November 19, 2008, D1, 4.

Section IV: Bilateral Perceptions

Figure 19 – Feelings Toward China/U.S.

Average rating of Chinese/American feelings

toward each other’s country on a 0 to 100 scale.

100 = Very warm, favorable feeling

50 = Not particularly warm or cold feeling

0 = Very cold, unfavorable feeling.

2004 2006 2008

Chinese feelings toward U.S.

American feelings toward China

24 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

versities in the 2006-07 academic year, while more

than 11,000 Americans were resident on Chinese

campuses. In 2006, 1.7 million American tourists

visited China, while 457,728 Chinese tourists vis-

ited the United States.

Despite the deep interdependence and coop-

eration between the United States and China, the

bilateral relationship remains troubled by mutual

strategic suspicions, trade tensions, and vastly dif-

ferent political systems. Frictions are growing in

the economic realm, particularly for Americans,

due to the bourgeoning U.S. trade deﬁcit with

China and the outsourcing of U.S. jobs to China.

Human rights concerns in China continue to

cloud the relationship. This ﬂuid environment is

reﬂected in the survey’s ﬁndings.

American Perceptions of China

Overall, Americans have very cool feelings toward

China. On the 0 to 100 temperature scale where

50 is neutral, Americans give China a low aver-

age rating of 35, down ﬁve points from 40 in 2006

(see Figure 19). Fifty-one percent of Americans

rate their feelings toward China below the neutral

point of 50, while only 16 percent rate it above 50.

There is a strong belief among Americans that

China is an increasingly inﬂuential power in Asia.

Accordingly, Beijing is viewed as a more serious

economic and strategic competitor to the United

States. The American public believes that Chinese

economic inﬂuence and military strength in the

region is stronger than any other country, includ-

ing the United States. On a 0 to 10 scale, Americans

rate China’s military strength in Asia at 7.6. A con-

siderable majority of Americans (70%) are either

“very worried” (25%) or “somewhat worried” (46%)

that China could become a military threat to the

United States.

Americans rate the international competitive-

ness of China’s economy highly (7.7 on a 0 to 10

scale), though they rate the level of education of

its population lower (6.1 on the same scale). They

also think China produces inferior products in

comparison to Japan, the United States, and South

Korea. While Americans believe China has the

greatest economic inﬂuence in Asia, its economic

relationship with the United States is not viewed

as important as the relationships with Japan and

the European Union. Americans also do not think

China’s economy offers many opportunities for its

workforce (4.9 on a 0 to 10 scale) and a majority

(54%) thinks that Chinese companies make a very

or somewhat negative contribution in the United

States (see Figure 20).

24. Adding together “very worried” and “somewhat wor-

ried” equals 70% and not 71% due to rounding of the original

categories.

Figure 20 – Contribution of Chinese Companies

Percentage who think, on balance, companies from China make a positive or negative contribution in their country.

U.S.

Japan

South Korea

Indonesia

Vietnam

60 40 20 0 20 40 60 80

16 63

2 10 49

11 34 50

7 39 44

18 36 36

Somewhat negativeVery negative Somewhat positive

Very positive

25ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

A majority of Americans (53%) acknowledge

that China has a mainly positive inﬂuence in Asia,

with 39 percent saying China’s inﬂuence in Asia

is mainly negative. However, on speciﬁc regional

issues such as North Korea’s nuclear weapons pro-

gram, 50 percent of Americans believe Beijing has

been either very or somewhat ineffective in work-

ing to resolve the problem. On the key bilateral issue

of managing tensions between China and Taiwan,

a majority of Americans (55%) believe China has

been either “very” or “somewhat ineffective.”

On other indicators of soft power, Americans

consistently give China low mean ratings on the

0 to 10 scale (see Figure 21), from its respect for

human rights and the rule of law (2.7), to its abil-

ity to build trust and cooperation among Asian

nations (3.5), and its use of diplomacy to resolve

problems in the region (3.8). However, Americans

give China credit for having an internationally

competitive economy (7.7), advanced science

and technology (7.0), leading multinational com-

panies (6.5), great entrepreneurial spirit (6.1), a

highly educated population (6.1), and a rich cul-

tural heritage (8.0) as well as for being an attrac-

tive destination for international tourism (6.6).

Americans do not, however, think they share a way

of life with the Chinese—68 percent say they share

“no” or “little” values in common with Chinese.

Nor do Americans see Chinese culture as partic-

ularly inﬂuential on their own culture. Fifty-four

percent of Americans think the spread of Chinese

culture in Asia is “mainly a bad thing.” Despite the

increased awareness of China in American society,

29 percent of Americans think it’s only “slightly

important” for their children to study Chinese,

and 34 percent think it is “not at all important.”

Chinese Perceptions of America

Chinese views of the United States are much more

positive. Chinese give the United States an aver-

age of 61 on the 0 to 100 scale of feelings, much

warmer than American feelings toward China (see

Figure 19). Although Chinese do not feel as nega-

tive towards the United States, they do not have a

sense of shared values with Americans. A major-

ity of Chinese (68%) believe they share values to

“little” or “no extent” with Americans.

With respect to Chinese perceptions of the

United States in Asia, an overwhelming num-

ber believe the United States exerts strong eco-

nomic and military inﬂuence in the region. A

majority (66%) thinks the United States has a

“very” or “somewhat positive” inﬂuence in Asia.

Chinese give the United States ratings slightly

above the midpoint on the 0 to 10 scale in terms

of Washington’s use of diplomacy to resolve key

problems in the region (6.0), helping Asian coun-

tries develop their economies (5.9), building trust

and cooperation among Asian countries (5.9), and

providing assistance to Asian countries in the

event of humanitarian crises (5.8). Chinese give

the United States better than expected ratings on

its effectiveness in managing tensions between

China and Taiwan (63% believe the United States

has been either “very” or “somewhat effective”),

perhaps reﬂecting mutual disenchantment with

the former Chen Shui-bian government in Taipei.

However, concerning security, 76 percent of

Chinese are either “very” or “somewhat worried”

that the United States could become a military

threat to China in the future (see Figure 3).

Figure 21 – Bilateral China–U.S. Perceptions

U.S. and Chinese ratings of each other

(0 to 10 scale) on the following.

5.9

3.5

6.1

2.7

7.4

4.0

8.1

7.7

Internationally

competitive economy

Political system

serves the needs

of its people

Respect for

human rights

Builds trust

and cooperation

012345678910

U.S. view of China

Chinese view of U.S.

26 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

Nevertheless, on a wide range of soft power

indicators, America remains strong in the view of

Chinese. Chinese believe that economic relations

(trade and investment) with the United States are

extremely important to their country’s economy

(7.6 on a 0 to 10 scale). In addition, a plurality of

Chinese (44%) would pick the United States as

their ﬁrst choice for their children’s higher edu-

cation (the next choice is the EU at 23%), and 82

percent believe it is “very important” for their

children to learn English in order to succeed in

the future. Chinese also express across-the-board

admiration on the 0 to 10 scale for the quality of

American universities (8.7) and the educational

level of its population (8.1) as well as for having

advanced science and technology (8.8), an appeal-

ing popular culture (7.5), economic opportunity

for its workforce (7.5), entrepreneurial spirit (7.9),

and a political system that serves the needs of its

people (7.4).

United States–Japan

The relationship between Japan and the United

States has been exceptionally strong since the end

of hostilities in World War II. Japan became a sta-

ble, open-market democracy and the closest ally

of the United States in the region. Despite some

difﬁculties on the economic and political fronts,

the U.S.–Japanese relationship remains one of the

strongest for both countries overall, and certainly

the strongest for both within the region.

Japan is the fourth largest U.S. trading part-

ner, trailing only Canada, China, and Mexico. The

United States remains the most important trading

partner for Japan. In 2007 trade between the two

countries totaled $218 billion, with Japan import-

ing $63 billion from the United States and the

United States importing $145 billion from Japan.

As these numbers indicate, the United States runs

a large trade deﬁcit with Japan, totaling $83 billion

in 2007, though this is only roughly one-third of the

U.S. deﬁcit with China. As U.S. trade with China

has increased, the dominance of the U.S.–Japan

economic relationship has diminished somewhat.

Once viewed as an economic threat to the United

States, Japan is now seen in a positive, nonthreat-

ening light as a strong economic partner.

The two countries also have a strong secu-

rity alliance, and there are many important U.S.

military bases on Japanese territory. However,

there are signs of growing resentment of the U.S.

military presence in Japan and South Korea due to

incidents such as the alleged rape of a Japanese girl

by a U.S. marine stationed at Okinawa. Relations

were also further strained when Japan suspended

refueling activities that supported U.S. operations

in Afghanistan.

Japanese citizens have a great respect for and

interest in the American political and economic

system and its popular culture and entertain-

ment. In comparison to other Asian countries,

Americans also have high respect for Japanese

culture and its economy. Japan and the United

States have also worked closely on North Korean

nuclear disarmament talks.

Japan underwent several changes of leader-

ship during the George W. Bush administration,

from Yoshiro Mori (2000-01), Junichiro Koizumi

(2001-06), and Shinzo Abe (2006-07), to Yasuo

Fukuda (2007-08) and Taro Aso (2008 to present).

The “Elvis-loving” Koizumi and Bush enjoyed a

close relationship, and both worked to strengthen

U.S.–Japanese political, economic, and security

ties. Japan participated in the U.S. military mission

in Iraq under Koizumi’s tenure despite signiﬁcant

domestic opposition. These strong afﬁnities con-

tinue, reﬂecting a strong sense of shared values.

American Perceptions of Japan

American citizens have an appreciation for the

longstanding partnership between the United

States and Japan going back to the end of World

War II. In comparison to China and South Korea,

Americans rank Japan far ahead on all of the soft

power indicators—economic, human capital, cul-

tural, diplomatic, and political. Japan is in a cat-

egory all its own in terms of American perceptions

of positive inﬂuence and soft power.

Americans do not show particularly warm

feelings toward any of the Asian countries except

27ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

Japan. Every country surveyed receives ratings

on the cooler end of the scale (less than 50). By

contrast, Japan receives an overall positive rat-

ing of 58, a feeling that is mutual (see “Japanese

Perceptions of America”).

On economic soft power indicators, Americans

rate Japan very highly on a 0 to 10 scale. Americans

believe the Japanese economy is very inﬂuential

(7.3), that Japan has an internationally competi-

tive economy (8.1), and that economic relations

with Japan are very important for America (7.2).

In comparison to U.S. ratings of other Asian coun-

tries, the Japanese economy also receives high

marks for the contribution of its companies to

the U.S. economy (81 percent say Japanese com-

panies make “very” or “somewhat” positive con-

tributions), its leading multinational companies

(8.0), overall product quality (7.0), and providing

economic opportunities for its workforce (7.1).

A clear majority (59%) is also in favor of a free

trade agreement with Japan, higher support than

exists for free trade agreements with China and

South Korea.

Americans also give Japanese culture much

higher average ratings on a 0 to 10 scale than the

other Asian countries. There is a perception that

Japan possesses a rich cultural heritage (8.4), is an

attractive tourist destination (7.8), and has high

quality universities (7.2). Americans also believe

that Japan has a fairly high degree of inﬂuence on

American culture (5.9). An exceptional majority

(76%) thinks that the inﬂuence of Japanese popu-

lar culture is “very” or “somewhat positive” (see

Figure 22).

Although a plurality of Americans (33%) think

learning Japanese is not at all important to future

success, this is true for Americans with regard to

all Asian languages. Japan is highly regarded in

terms of the educational level of its population (8.4

on a 0 to 10 scale) and its advanced science and

technology (8.6 on the same scale).

Japan clearly possesses the closest relation-

ship to the United States in terms of its political

system and use of diplomacy. On the 0 to 10 scales,

most Americans believe Japan has a good degree

of respect for human rights (6.5) and has a political

system that serves the needs of its people (6.9), a

clear differentiation from views of China on these

items. On a 0 to 10 scale, Americans also believe

that Japan generally uses diplomacy to solve prob-

lems in Asia (6.5), respects the sovereignty of other

Asian countries (6.5), builds trust and coopera-

tion among Asian states (5.8), provides assistance

in humanitarian crises in Asia (6.2), and provides

leadership in international institutions (6.3).

However, Americans are ambivalent concerning

Japanese effectiveness in dealing with the North

Korean nuclear situation and managing tensions

between China and Taiwan.

Japanese Perceptions of America

Japanese are equally positive about American

inﬂuence and power in the region. The United

States comes in ﬁrst among Japanese in every

category of soft power. The close economic, dip-

lomatic, and cultural ties between Japan and the

United States are clearly evident on these mea-

sures. On a 0 to 100 scale of feelings, Japanese give

the United States their highest average score of 62.

Forty-seven percent believe U.S. inﬂuence in Asia

has increased over the past ten years, and a very

strong majority (69%) feels U.S inﬂuence in Asia

is either “very” or “somewhat positive.” Japanese

think the United States has been quite effective in

promoting its policies in Asia, giving it a mean of

6.2 on a 0 to 10 scale. The United States receives an

exceptionally high rating on military strength in

Figure 22 – Inuence of Japanese and U.S.

Popular Culture

Percentage who think the inﬂuence of Japanese or U.S.

popular culture on their country is mainly positive or negative.

Influence of U.S. popular

culture on Japan

Influence of Japanese

popular culture on U.S.

20 020406080 100

217

31259

Very negative

Somewhat negative

Somewhat positive

Very positive

28 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

Asia (9.0 on a 0-10 scale), and Japanese are positive

about the effect of the strong American military

presence in East Asia, with 68 percent believing it

increases stability in the region (see Figure 23).

Similar to U.S. views of Japan, Japanese give

the United States high marks for both its hard

and soft economic power. There is a great respect

for the strength of the U.S. economy. On a 0 to 10

scale, Japanese believe that the United States has

a lot of economic inﬂuence in Asia (8.0), that it has

an internationally competitive economy (8.4), and

that economic relations with the United States are

very important for Japan (8.0). Japanese also think

the United States has leading multinational com-

panies (8.5), a great entrepreneurial spirit (7.7),

provides economic opportunities for its work-

force (6.6), and has high quality products (6.3).

Sixty-three percent would like to have a free trade

agreement with the United States. A strong major-

ity of Japanese (80%) believe American companies

make “very” or “somewhat” positive contributions

to the Japanese economy.

Interest in American culture among Japanese

is also very high. Japanese believe the United

States has had a very high degree of inﬂuence on

Japanese popular culture (7.8 on a 0 to 10 scale),

and most Japanese (83%) think this inﬂuence is

“very” or “somewhat positive” (see Figure 22). A

majority of Japanese (53%) watch American mov-

ies and television or listen to American music

more than once a week. There is near unanimity

among Japanese (98%) that it is “very” or “some-

what important” to learn English in order to suc-

ceed in the future. There is also high appreciation

for American human capital. Japanese give the

United States 8.4 on a 0 to 10 scale in terms of its

science and technology, and 8.6 out of 10 for the

quality of American universities.

Lastly, Japanese give the United States above-

average ratings on the 10-point scale for its respect

for human rights (6.3) and the degree to which

its political system serves the needs of its people

(6.8), though these ratings are not as high as one

might expect. While Japanese believe the United

States provides leadership in international insti-

tutions (7.0), they give the United States lower

relative scores on use of diplomacy to solve prob-

lems in Asia (5.6), assistance in humanitarian

crises to Asian countries (5.6), and building of

trust and cooperation among Asian states (5.5).

A majority sees the United States as effective in

dealing with the North Korean nuclear situation

(57 percent say it has been “very” or “somewhat

effective”). However, when it comes to managing

tensions between China and Taiwan, 55 percent

of Japanese say the United States has been “very”

or “somewhat ineffective.” Thus, Japanese are less

enthusiastic about U.S. political and diplomatic

inﬂuence than other areas, but these ratings are

by no means negative, and the overall relationship

between Japan and America remains extremely

strong and positive.

China–Japan

The China–Japan relationship is critical to Asian

stability and prosperity. For more than a century,

when Sino–Japanese ties have been adversarial

or strained, Asia as a whole has been unstable.

Conversely, during the 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s when

the bilateral relationship improved in the wake of

normalization of diplomatic relations and the tri-

angular “Grand Bargain” among Beijing, Tokyo,

and Washington, Asia enjoyed greater stability.

However, beginning in the late-1990s and con-

Figure 23 – Effect of U.S. Military

Presence in Asia

Percentage who think the U.S. military presence in East Asia

increases or decreases stability in the region.

Indonesia

China

United States

Japan

South Korea

60 40 20 020406080

23 72

25 68

36 60

52 41

38 35

Decreases stability Increases stability

29ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

tinuing throughout Japanese Prime Minister

Koizumi’s tenure (2001-06), relations deteriorated

steadily. Various opinion polls in both countries

showed overwhelming majorities of negative

opinions of the other. However, under Koizumi’s

successors (Prime Ministers Abe, Fukuda, and

Aso), bilateral ties at the governmental level have

not only stabilized, but have improved markedly.

Abe and Fukuda paid successful “ice-breaking”

visits to Beijing, while China’s Premier Wen Jiabao

and President Hu Jintao reciprocated with suc-

cessful “ice-melting” visits to Tokyo. Despite the

ups and downs of political ties and diplomatic

relations, commerce continues to bind the two

nations together. Bilateral trade exceeded $236

billion in 2007.

Japanese Perceptions of China

Is the upturn in government-to-government rela-

tions reﬂected in public opinion? According to this

study, the China-Japan relationship is not nearly

as frigid as might be assumed from the often-trou-

bled diplomatic relationship and previous opinion

surveys in both countries. Although Japanese give

China an average rating of 45 on the 100-point scale

of overall feelings (where 50 is neutral), this is not

as low as one might expect. And, while 55 percent

of Japanese say they share similar values with the

Chinese to “little” or “no extent,” most Japanese

now view China’s regional inﬂuence in Asia either

as “very” (19%) or “somewhat” (43%) positive.

There is clear recognition among Japanese of

the economic importance of China. Japanese view

China’s regional economic inﬂuence as very high

(8.2 on a 0 to 10 scale). They also give the Chinese

economy relatively high rankings in terms of its

international competitiveness (7.4 on a 10-point

scale) and its advanced science and technology

(6.1). A slight majority (53%) of Japanese supports

a bilateral free trade agreement with China.

Seventy percent of Japanese respondents think

that learning Chinese is “very” or “somewhat

important” for the future success of Japanese chil-

dren. There is also moderate Japanese respect for

the educational level of Chinese citizens (5.8 out

of 10), China’s entrepreneurial spirit (5.8), and its

multinational corporations (5.4).

On the cultural side, there is strong recogni-

tion of the richness of Chinese cultural heritage

(8.2). And Japanese believe Chinese popular cul-

ture has a limited but mainly positive inﬂuence

on Japan.

These somewhat encouraging ﬁndings are

partially offset, however, by the continuing nega-

tive views of China’s military power and diplo-

macy. Japanese are worried about China’s growing

military strength in Asia, which they rate at an

average of 7.9 out of 10. Seventy-four percent of

Japanese are either “very” or “somewhat worried”

that China could become a military threat to their

country (see Figure 24). Seventy-nine percent of

Japanese believe that in the absence of U.S. mili-

tary presence, the two countries would compete

for military dominance in the region.

On the diplomatic side, Japanese do not give

China a very high score for using diplomacy

to solve regional problems (4.8 on the 10-point

scale). When asked speciﬁcally about China’s role

in working to resolve the problem of North Korea’s

nuclear weapons program, a majority of Japanese

(59%) also say Beijing has been either “somewhat”

or “very ineffective.” This may be due in part to the

fact that China has not placed the same priority on

the “abductees issue” as Japan.

Japanese also do not perceive China as respect-

ing the sovereignty of other Asian countries (4.2),

providing assistance to other Asian nations in

the event of humanitarian crises (4.0), respecting

Figure 24 – China–Japan Military Threat

Percentage who are worried that China/Japan

could become a military threat to their country.

Worry among Chinese

about Japan becoming

a threat

Worry among Japanese

about China becoming

a threat

40 20 020406080

8184529

21 15 39 23

Not worried at all

Not very worried

Somewhat worried

Very worried

30 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

human rights (3.9), or having a political system

that serves the needs of its people (4.2).

Chinese Perceptions of Japan

Chinese views of Japan are generally parallel.

Chinese give Japan an average of 46 on the 0 to 100

scale of overall feelings, almost identical to the

ratings Japanese give China. Although this score

is not as low as one might expect given the history

between these two nations, it ranks last among

all countries asked of the Chinese (the United

States, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan,

Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam). An even

larger majority of Chinese than Japanese (64%)

believe that China and Japan share “similar val-

ues and a way of life” to “little” or “no extent” (see

Figure 25).

Yet Chinese show a strong pattern of open-

ness to economic integration and favor a strong

economic relationship with Japan. While Chinese

do not rate Japan’s regional economic inﬂuence

quite as high as Japanese rate China’s (6.5 out of

10 compared with 8.2), they are more enthusias-

tic than the Japanese about a free trade agreement

between the two countries (79% in favor). Sixty-

eight percent of Chinese also believe Japanese

companies make “very” or “somewhat positive”

contributions in their country. A majority of

Chinese (60%) also believe that Japan has a “very”

or “somewhat positive” inﬂuence in Asia. As mea-

sured on the 10-point scale, Chinese give Japan

high average marks in terms of the level of educa-

tion of the Japanese (7.4), Japan’s advanced science

and technology (8.0), and the economic opportu-

nities that Japan provides for its own workers (6.9).

However, Japan’s culture does not resonate much

in China—63 percent of Chinese respondents

“rarely” (37%) or “never” (26%) watch movies or

television or listen to music from Japan.

Despite the basically positive views of Japan’s

soft power and the desire for economic coopera-

tion with Japan, there is similar concern among

Chinese as among Japanese on the diplomatic and

military front. Chinese give Japan only a midrange

mark on use of diplomacy to solve problems (5.4

out of 10), and 50 percent of Chinese respondents

believe Japan has been at least “somewhat ineffec-

tive” in ameliorating tensions between China and

Taiwan. Alarmingly, but probably predictably, 80

percent of Chinese respondents do not think their

government should compromise with Japan on

their territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku

islands, while 72 percent of Japanese feel their

government should not compromise. In addition,

military fears are strong: 62 percent of Chinese are

“somewhat” or “very worried” that Japan could

present a future military threat to their country

(see Figure 24).

Overall, these ﬁndings are signiﬁcant, given

the past negativity and mistrust as well as the

potential for regional rivalry between these two

predominant regional actors. Citizens of both

countries are not terribly positive towards one

another relative to their perceptions of the United

States and South Korea. However, the results are

not as negative as one might expect and point to

the possibility for further integration and coopera-

tion between the dominant powers of the region.

Japan–South Korea

Public relations between South Korea and Japan

have often been strained. Yet recent changes in

government have helped bring Japan and South

Korea closer together, allowing the two countries

to forge a strong working relationship despite

their differences. In April of 2008, Japanese Prime

Figure 25 – China–Japan Shared Values

Percentage who think China/Japan shares

similar values and a way of life with the other.

Japanese who

think China shares

similar values

Chinese who think

Japan shares

similar values

80 60 40 20 0204060

18 37 36 8

26 38 23 6

To no extent

To a little extent

To some extent

To a great extent

31ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

Minister Fukuda and Korean President Lee met

in Tokyo, marking the beginning of shuttle diplo-

macy between the two nations and recommitting

them to negotiating a free trade agreement.

Crucial differences still remain between the

two countries. While Japan is unsure about the

rise of China, South Korea has embraced the emer-

gence of a production powerhouse at its border and

has shifted investment there, making China its

number one trading partner. Territorial disputes

over Dokdo/Takeshima, Japanese government–

authorized textbooks that gloss over Japanese

colonial atrocities and former Prime Minster

Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to the Yosukuni shrine

have inﬂamed Korean (and Chinese) national-

ism and sparked demonstrations against Japan.

Meanwhile, South Korea’s strategy for engag-

ing North Korea in spite of North Korea’s recent

nuclear tests is at odds with Japan’s more hard-line

stance on North Korea and stronger insistence on

working with the United States on regional issues.

Japanese Perceptions of South Korea

South Korea is perceived positively by Japanese in

many ways, but remains in the shadows on most

measures of soft power. There is an overall posi-

tive feeling towards South Korea among Japanese

(55 on the 0 to 100 scale), ranking behind only the

United States and Taiwan on this measure. A strong

majority of Japanese (70%) believe that South

Korean inﬂuence in Asia is either “very” or “some-

what positive” (see Figure 26). Politically, Japanese

do not rank South Korea far behind the United

States in terms of soft power. They believe South

Korea has a moderate degree of respect for human

rights (5.6 out of 10) and has a political system that

serves the needs of its people (5.8 out of 10).

Japanese rate South Korea strongly on eco-

nomic power, but far behind the United States

and China. South Korea receives a 6.4 out of 10 on

economic inﬂuence in Asia, a 6.1 on international

competitiveness, and 6.6 on the importance of its

economic relationship to Japan. Interestingly, the

same percentages of Japanese (63%) favor a free

trade agreement with South Korea as they do with

the United States. There is general ambivalence

on most other measures of economic soft power.

Thus, despite the fact that South Korea’s perceived

economic inﬂuence is less than the economic

powerhouses of the United States and China,

there is clearly a positive valence associated with

its inﬂuence.

Japanese believe that South Korea has had a

moderate degree of inﬂuence on Japanese culture

(6.1 out of 10). Reﬂecting the popularity of Korean

cultural exports across Asia, exceptional majori-

ties think that this inﬂuence has been “very” or

“somewhat positive” (79%). Despite these positive

ratings, Japanese do not consume ver y much South

Korean entertainment. A majority (64%) says they

“rarely” or “never” consume South Korean tele-

vision, movies, and music. South Korea receives

moderate scores on its attractiveness as a tourist

destination (5.6 on a 0 to 10 scale) and on the quality

of its universities (5.4 on the same scale). Japanese

recognize the signiﬁcance of South Korea’s human

capital. Japanese give South Korea their highest

average rating in terms of the educational level of

its population (7.2 on a 0 to 10 scale).

However, South Korea is not perceived very

positively in terms of diplomatic soft power. There

is not much difference between Japanese ratings

of China and South Korea on the overall diplo-

matic Soft Power Index, both of which fall below

the midpoint at 4.8 out of 10. More speciﬁcally,

Japanese do not feel South Korea has been very

effective in promoting its policies in Asia (4.8 on

Figure 26 – South Korean/Japanese

Inuence in Asia

Percentage who think South Korea/Japan is having

a positive or negative inﬂuence in Asia.

South Korean view of

Japan’s influence

Japanese view of

South Korea’s influence

60 40 20 020406080

3195911

10 33 50 4

Very negative

Somewhat negative

Somewhat positive

Very positive

32 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

a 0 to 10 scale). On other measures, Japanese rate

South Korea’s respect for the sovereignty of other

Asian countries around the midpoint at 5.2, its

promotion of trust and cooperation among Asian

states at 5.4, its provision for assistance to other

Asian nations in the event of humanitarian cri-

ses at 4.9, and leadership in international institu-

tions at 4.5. A majority of Japanese believe South

Korea has been “somewhat” or “very ineffective”

in working to resolve the North Korean nuclear sit-

uation (57%) and in managing tensions between

China and Taiwan (60%).

South Korean Perceptions of Japan

South Koreans see a clear hierarchy among the

great powers in Asia. America leads the way, with

Japan following close behind and China last in

terms of economic, human capital, cultural, and

political soft power. While South Koreans recog-

nize Japanese economic, military, and human

capital power, there is considerable apprehen-

sion among South Koreans regarding the degree

of Japanese military and cultural inﬂuence in

the region. The results overall show ambivalence

among South Koreans toward Japan.

South Koreans’ feelings toward Japan lie at a

neutral average of 50 on the 0 to 100 scale. A slight

majority (54%) thinks that Japanese inﬂuence in

Asia is either “very” or “somewhat positive.”

South Koreans have great respect for Japanese

economic power. South Koreans give Japan a mean

of 8.0 out of 10 in terms of economic inﬂuence in

Asia, a 7.8 on the international competitiveness

of its economy, and a 7.8 on the importance of

their country’s economic relationship with Japan.

There is considerable support (74%) for a free

trade agreement with Japan. South Koreans also

give Japan high average ratings for the quality of

its products (8.1), for having leading multinational

companies (7.8), for its entrepreneurial spirit (7.8),

and for the economic opportunities it provides its

workforce (7.2).

Japan is also rated highly by South Koreans on

its human capital soft power. Most South Koreans

(77%) believe that learning Japanese is “very” or

“somewhat important” for future success, and

they show great respect for the advanced state of

Japanese science and technology (8.5 out of 10),

the educational level of its population (7.5 out of

10), and for the quality of its universities (7.7 out

of 10).

There is a perception among South Koreans

that Japanese popular culture has a great deal

of inﬂuence on South Korean culture (7.0 on a

10-point scale), despite the fact that few South

Koreans consume Japanese entertainment.

However, respondents are split on whether this

inﬂuence is positive (49%) or negative (48%). Japan

still receives high ratings for the richness of its cul-

tural heritage (7.1 out of 10) and its attractiveness

as a tourist destination (7.5 out of 10).

In terms of political soft power, South Koreans

give Japan positive ratings, but not nearly as posi-

tive when it comes to diplomatic soft power. South

Koreans rate Japan’s respect for human rights

and the ability of its political system to serve the

needs of its people above the midpoint at 6.5 and

6.8 out of 10, respectively. Yet they rate Japan much

lower on average (in the same range as China) on

diplomatic indicators such as its respect for the

sovereignty of other Asian nations (4.9), build-

ing trust and cooperation among Asian countries

(5.0), and its use of diplomacy to solve problems in

Asia (5.5). South Koreans believe that the Japanese

government has been only moderately effective in

promoting its policies to people in Asia (5.8). On

speciﬁc problems, majorities of South Koreans

Figure 27 – South Korea–Japan Military Threat

Percentage who are worried that South Korea/Japan

could become a military threat to the other.

Worry among Japanese

about South Korea

becoming a threat

Worry among South

Koreans about Japan

becoming a threat

80 60 40 20 020406080

20 44 29

Not worried at all

Not very worried

Somewhat worried

Very worried

33ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

see Japan as “very” or “somewhat ineffective” in

working to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue

(67%) and in helping to manage China-Taiwan

tensions (75%).

Indeed, there is still substantial distrust of

Japan by South Koreans, reﬂecting a strong his-

torical memory of occupation. South Koreans

rate Japanese military strength highly (7.5 out of

10), and a strong majority (66%) is either “some-

what” or “very worried” that Japan could become

a military threat to their country in the future (see

Figure 27).

34 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

Outward regional hostilities and tensions in

Asia have eased considerably in recent years.

Interdependencies in terms of economics, diplo-

macy, culture, and politics have grown between

individual Asian countries and between Asian

countries and the rest of the world. There is now

unanimous recognition of China’s growing hard

military and economic power in Asia. There has

also been a great deal of attention paid to China’s

attempts to foster its regional soft power and its

supposed growth in this area. Importantly and

somewhat surprisingly, the survey results indicate

that China’s “charm offensive” has thus far been

ineffective. Citizens of the other major regional

powers—the United States, Japan, and South

Korea—have a relatively low opinion of Chinese

economic, cultural, human capital, diplomatic,

and political soft power compared to the other

regional powers.

On the other hand, also somewhat surpris-

ingly, American soft power in Asia remains strong.

It is clear in this survey that the United States is

still the preeminent power in Asia despite China’s

continued economic rise and diplomatic efforts.

There is a high level of recognition of U.S. eco-

nomic, cultural, and human capital soft power

in all survey countries as well as great respect for

its political and diplomatic standing. Asians have

great respect for American businesses, popu-

lar culture, education, diplomatic efforts, and its

political system.

Conclusion

The survey shows that historical animosities

between China and Japan remain, although they

are not as strong as one might predict based on

previous surveys. Chinese and Japanese gener-

ally rate the other country lowest on most forms

of soft power, but not as low as one might have

predicted. Conversely, the strong relationship and

mutual respect among Japanese and Americans

remains. Americans generally rate Japan higher

than China and South Korea on most measures

of soft power. A general admiration is also appar-

ent between Chinese and South Korean citizens.

Lastly, in contrast to the great powers, Indonesian

and Vietnamese citizens tend to rate Japanese

soft power slightly ahead of the United States

and China ahead of South Korea, indicating an

apparent division between the major powers and

Indonesia/Vietnam in terms of perceptions of soft

power in Asia.

The insights on the distribution of soft power

in Asia provided by this survey address many

outstanding questions regarding inﬂuence in the

region, while also bringing up new questions and

topics for study. For instance, why have Chinese

efforts to increase its political and diplomatic

standing in the region so far failed to affect atti-

tudes and perceptions? Why does America enjoy

such continued high levels of soft power in Asia,

and what are the underlying sources of strong

American inﬂuence in the region? These and

other issues deserve careful monitoring in the

years ahead.

35ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

Economic Soft Power

Survey

Countries

U.S. soft

power

China soft

power

Japan soft

power

South

Korea soft

power

U.S.

— .52 (2) .69 (1) .50 (3)

China

.73 (1) — .68 (2) .67 (3)

Japan

.70 (1) .57 (3) — .58 (2)

South

Korea

.75 (1) .57 (3) .71 (2) —

Indonesia

.73 (2) .73 (2) .77 (1) .66 (4)

Vietnam

.80 (2) .70 (3) .81 (1) .68 (4)

Cultural Soft Power

Survey

Countries

U.S. soft

power

China soft

power

Japan soft

power

South

Korea soft

power

U.S.

— .56 (2) .72 (1) .51 (3)

China

.66 (2) — .57 (3) .67 (1)

Japan

.69 (1) .57 (3) — .61 (2)

South

Korea

.66 (1) .54 (3) .59 (2) —

Indonesia

.53 (3) .62 (1) .59 (2) .53 (3)

Vietnam

.67 (4) .77 (1) .71 (3) .74 (2)

Diplomatic Soft Power

Survey

Countries

U.S. soft

power

China soft

power

Japan soft

power

South

Korea soft

power

U.S.

— .40 (3) .58 (1) .47 (2)

China

.60 (2) — .52 (3) .61 (1)

Japan

.56 (1) .44 (3) — .47 (2)

South

Korea

.59 (1) .51 (3) .52 (2) —

Indonesia

.69 (2) .69 (2) .72 (1) .65 (4)

Vietnam*

.68 (2) .67 (3) .71 (1) .67 (3)

*Vietnam diplomatic index based solely on Q910:

Government’s effectiveness of promoting policies in Asia.

Political Soft Power

Survey

Countries

U.S. soft

power

China soft

power

Japan soft

power

South

Korea soft

power

U.S.

— .34 (3) .67 (1) .51 (2)

China

.68 (1) — .63 (3) .68 (1)

Japan

.66 (1) .41 (3) — .57 (2)

South

Korea

.75 (1) .48 (3) .67 (2) —

Indonesia

.73 (2) .71 (3) .74 (1) .68 (4)

Vietnam*

— — — —

*Not rated

Appendix A: Soft Power Indices

Average level of inﬂuence on a 0 to 1 scale when soft power questions for each category are combined, fol-

lowed by rank. See page 35 for survey questions included in each index and page 8 for an explanation of how

the indices are calculated. For complete survey questions and results, visit www.thechicagocouncil.org.

36 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

Human Capital Soft Power

Survey

Countries

U.S. soft

power

China soft

power

Japan soft

power

South

Korea soft

power

U.S.

— .55 (2) .69 (1) .46 (3)

China

.87 (1) — .68 (2) .61 (3)

Japan

.83 (1) .58 (2) — .57 (3)

South

Korea

.87 (1) .64 (3) .75 (2) —

Indonesia

.91 (1) .74 (3) .80 (2) .64 (4)

Vietnam

.89 (2) .80 (4) .91 (1) .82 (3)

Questions included for each index

Economic

Q80: Importance of economic relations

Q90: Probability of buying product

Q110: Free trade agreement

Q220: Economic inﬂuence in Asia

Q291C: Helps Asian countries develop economies

Q291E: Humanitarian assistance

Q347A: Contribution of companies

Q795A: Competitive economy

Q795H: Economic opportunities for workforce

Q795J: Entrepreneurial spirit

Q795K: Leading multinational corporations

Q850: Product quality

Human Capital

Q780: Learn language

Q795B: Highly educated population

Q795C: Advanced science/tech

Q795L: Quality universities

Cultural

Q680: Spread of cultural inﬂuence

Q681: Inﬂuence of popular culture

Q685: Positive inﬂuence of popular culture

Q790: Movies, TV, music

Q795D: Popular culture

Q795E: Rich cultural heritage

Q795F: Tourist destination

Diplomatic

Q291A: Uses diplomacy to solve problems

Q291B: Respects sovereignty

Q291D: Builds trust and cooperation

Q291E: Humanitarian assistance

Q291F: Leadership in international institutions

Q360: North Korean nuclear program

effectiveness

Q370: China/Taiwan tensions effectiveness

Q910: Promoting policies in Asia effectiveness

Political

Q291G: Respect for human rights

Q795G: Political system that serves its people

Note: Questions 240, 345, 750, and 905 were not

included because they referred speciﬁ-

cally to U.S. and Chinese soft power.

37ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs would like

to express its appreciation to the many organiza-

tions and individuals who contributed in different

capacities to this report. The project would not

have been possible without the generous ﬁnan-

cial support of several institutions. The Chicago

Council is very grateful for the continued sup-

port provided by the Korea Foundation, which

was instrumental in the execution of this year’s

study and has also made the Korean-U.S. compo-

nent of the last two Chicago Council public opin-

ion studies possible. We are also very thankful for

the support of Joong Ang Ilbo, which allowed us to

expand the survey beyond its original parameters.

The Chicago Council would also like to thank the

Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA)

for its support both in the conceptualization phase

of the study and for its partnership in the execu-

tion of the survey in Indonesia.

In undertaking its public opinion studies, it

has been the Chicago Council’s practice to assem-

ble a project team whose members possess the

necessary expertise and a willingness to dedicate

a substantial amount of their time and work in a

highly collaborative environment. The Chicago

Council is very fortunate once again to have the

participation of such a distinguished project team

that contributed at every phase of the study’s

development. This year’s project team included

David Shambaugh, director of the China Policy

Program at the Elliott School of International

Affairs, George Washington University; Steven

Kull, director of PIPA; Benjamin I. Page, Gordon

Scott Fulcher Professor of Decision Making in the

Department of Political Science at Northwestern

University; Gregory Holyk, visiting lecturer in

American politics at the University of Illinois

at Chicago; and Catherine Hug, president of

Hug Communications.

Appendix B: Acknowledgments

Special recognition is due to Christopher

Whitney, now former executive director for stud-

ies at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs,

who as project director and editor-in-chief had

overall responsibility for developing and imple-

menting the study. We also want to recognize

Silvia Veltcheva, who served as project ofﬁcer, for

her excellent work in carrying out this project in

all its phases. Thomas Wright, executive direc-

tor for studies at The Chicago Council oversaw

the ﬁnal leg of this project and helped with edit-

ing and publicizing the ﬁnal report. Dr. Takashi

Inoguchi of Chuo University and David Tully of

Northwestern University assisted the team in the

planning phase; Andrew Sherry provided valuable

assistance in the editing of the short version of this

report; Stephen Webber and Evan Lewis of PIPA

also provided important support to the project.

Chicago Council staff and interns, including Arya

Alatsas, Naima Brown, Sebastian Burca, Zachary

Gebhardt, Victoria Strokova, and Katherine

Shepherd provided assistance on the project.

The Chicago Council would like to express

sincere thanks and appreciation to Kim Byung-

Kook, former director of the Center for Foreign

Affairs and Security at the East Asia Institute

(EAI), for making the collaboration on this proj-

ect as productive and successful as the work we

jointly undertook in 2004 and 2006. We also would

like to thank Lee Sook-jong, who is currently serv-

ing as EAI president, for continuing our successful

collaboration. Special thanks goes to Jeong Han-

Wool for all his efforts in coordinating the Korea

aspect of the survey. We would also like to thank

all the members of the South Korea study team:

Lee Nae-Young, Lee Yong-Wook, Lee Shin-wha,

and Jhee Byong-Keun.

The Chicago Council is also grateful to Bill

McCreedy and Stefan Subias at Knowledge

38 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

Networks and Lloyd Hetherington and Ilda Islas

at Globescan for all the hard work they dedicated

to the study.

The data from this survey will be placed on

deposit with the Inter-University Consortium for

Political and Social Research at the University

of Michigan at Ann Arbor; the Roper Center

for Public Opinion in Storrs, Connecticut; and

NORC (National Opinion Research Center) at

the University of Chicago. It will be available to

scholars and other interested professionals. The

report will also be available on the Internet at

www.thechicagocouncil.org.

Marshall M. Bouton

President

39ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

United States

The survey of the United States was conducted by

Knowledge Networks (KN), a polling, social sci-

ence, and market research ﬁrm in Menlo Park,

California. The survey was conducted between

January 17 and February 6, 2008, with a total

sample of 1,029 American adults who had been

randomly selected from KN’s respondent panel

and answered questions on screens in their own

homes. The survey was ﬁelded to a total of 1,470

panel members, which yielded 1,029 completed

surveys, for a cooperation rate of 70 percent. The

margin of sampling error is approximately plus or

minus 3.1 percentage points.

The survey was ﬁelded using a randomly

selected sample of KN’s large-scale, nationwide

research panel. This panel is itself randomly

selected from the national population of house-

holds with telephones. These households are

subsequently provided Internet access for the

completion of surveys (and thus the sample is not

limited to those in the population who already

have Internet access). The distribution of the

sample in the Web-enabled panel closely tracks

the distribution of United States Census counts

for the U.S. population eighteen years of age or

older on age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, geographi-

cal region, employment status, income, educa-

tion, etc. Poststratiﬁcation weights are applied to

the sample based on gender, age, race, education,

region, metro area, and Internet access to adjust

for any nonresponse or noncoverage biases. The

panel is recruited using stratiﬁed random digit

dialing (RDD) telephone sampling. RDD pro-

vides a nonzero probability of selection for every

U.S. household with a telephone. Households that

agree to participate in the panel are provided with

free Web access and an Internet appliance (if nec-

essary), which uses a telephone line to connect to

the Internet and uses the television as a monitor.

For more information concerning the methodol-

ogy of the U.S. sample, please visit the KN Web site

at www.knowledgenetworks.com.

China

The survey of China was conducted by the inter-

national polling ﬁrm Globescan. The survey was

conducted between January 25 and February 19,

2008, with a total sample of 1,237 respondents. The

survey was ﬁelded to a total of 24,442, with 1,237

completed interviews, 17,326 partial interviews,

and 5,879 refusals, a cooperation rate of 5 percent.

All interviews were conducted by telephone in

Chinese. The sample has a margin of error of plus or

minus 3 percentage points. The sample is nation-

ally representative of those eighteen years of age

or older and was drawn by a stratiﬁed multistage

sampling method. All thirty-one provinces were

divided into three strata according to their geo-

graphical location and their Human Development

Index (HDI). The sample was weighted to repre-

sent the 2005 census, which indicated that 43 per-

cent of Chinese people live in cities or towns and

57 percent of people live in villages.

Japan

The survey of Japan was also conducted by

Globescan. The survey was conducted January

16-29, 2008, with a total sample of 1,000 respon-

dents. The survey was ﬁelded to a total of 6,914,

with 1,000 completed interviews, 124 partial

interviews, and 5,790 refusals, which resulted in a

cooperation rate of 14 percent. All interviews were

Appendix C: Methodology

40 ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

conducted by telephone in Japanese. The sample

has a margin of error of plus or minus 3.1 percent-

age points. The sample is nationally representa-

tive of those eighteen years of age or older.

South Korea

The survey of South Korea was conducted by Han-

Kook Research Company for the East Asia Institute

and The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. The

survey was conducted between January 22 and

February 5, 2008, with a total sample of 1,029

respondents. All interviews were conducted face-

to-face in Korean. The sample is nationally repre-

sentative of those nineteen years of age or older.

The survey employed multistage quota sam-

pling of South Korea’s administrative divisions

(Seoul Metropolitan Area, Busan City, Daegu City,

Incheon City, Gwangju City, Daejun City, Ulsan

City, Gyeonggi Province (Do), Gangwon Province,

Chungbuk Province, Chungnam Province,

Junbuk Province, Junnam Province, Gyeongbuk

Province, Gyeongnam Province (Jeju Island was

excluded based on its low percentage of the total

South Korean population (1.1%), its remote loca-

tion, and the high costs required to survey in the

area). Respondents were randomly chosen from

among the ﬁfteen administrative divisions based

on known age and gender distributions from

the 2005 Korean Resident Registration Census.

Poststratiﬁcation weights were applied based on

region, gender, and age.

Vietnam

The survey of Vietnam was conducted by the

international polling ﬁrm Globescan. The survey

was conducted between February 22 and March

8, 2008, with a total sample of 1,000 respondents.

All interviews were conducted face-to-face in

Vietnamese. The sample has a margin of error of

plus or minus 3.1 percentage points. Only residents

in and around major cities were sampled because

it was considered unfeasible to properly sample

the rural areas of Vietnam. Some questions asked

in other countries that were considered sensitive

were not included in the Vietnamese sample.

Indonesia

The survey of Indonesia was conducted by

Synovate. The survey was conducted between

January 19 and 29, 2008, with a total sample of 811

respondents and a margin of error of 3.5 percent-

age points. There was a total of 1,449 contacts,

resulting in 811 successful interviews and 649

unsuccessful interviews, yielding a total response

rate of 55 percent. All interviews were conducted

face-to-face in Indonesian. The sample is nation-

ally representative of those eighteen years of age

or older. The survey employed multistage quota

sampling of respondents in Aceh, Sumatera Utara,

Sumatera Barat, Riau, Jambi, Sumatera Seletan,

Bengkulu, Lampung, Dki Jakarta, Jawa Barat,

Jawa Tengah, Di Yog Yakarta, Jawa Timur, Banten,

Kalimant An Barat, Bali, Sulawesi Selatan, and

Maluku. Poststratiﬁcation weights were applied

based on region, gender, and age.

41ASIA SOFT POWER SURVEY 2009 EDITION

The Chicago Council

on Global Affairs,

founded in 1922

as The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations,

is a leading independent, nonpartisan organization

committed to inuencing the discourse on global

issues through contributions to opinion and policy

formation, leadership dialogue, and public learning.