What Americans Think about America First

What

Americans

Think about

America

First

RESULTS OF THE 2017 CHICAGO

COUNCIL SURVEY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC

OPINION AND US FOREIGN POLICY

Dina Smeltz

Ivo Daalder

Karl Friedho

Craig Kafura

2017 Chicago Council

Survey Team

Joshua Busby

Associate Professor of Public

Aairs, The University of Texas

Karl Friedho

Fellow, Public Opinion and

Foreign Policy, Chicago Council

on Global Aairs

Gregory Holyk

Senior Research Analyst,

Langer Research

Grace Kim

Intern, Chicago Council on

Global Aairs

Craig Kafura

Research Associate, Chicago

Council on Global Aairs

Dina Smeltz

Senior Fellow, Public Opinion

and Foreign Policy, Chicago

Council on Global Aairs

Karen Whisler

Intern, Chicago Council on

Global Aairs

Lily Wojtowicz

Research Associate, Chicago

Council on Global Aairs

Foreign Policy Advisory Board

Ivo Daalder

President, Chicago Council on

Global Aairs

Michael Desch

Professor, Department

of Political Science, University

of Notre Dame

Daniel Drezner

Professor of International Politics,

Fletcher School of Law and

Diplomacy, Tufts University

Peter Feaver

Professor of Political Science

and Public Policy, Duke University

Bruce Jentleson

Professor of Political Science

and Public Policy, Duke University

Ellen Laipson

Distinguished Fellow and

President Emeritus, Stimson

Center

Tod Lindberg

Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute

James Lindsay

Senior Vice President, Director

of Studies, Council on Foreign

Relations

Diana Mutz

Samuel A. Stouer Professor

of Political Science and

Communication, University of

Pennsylvania

Kori Schake

Distinguished Research Fellow,

Hoover Institution

James Steinberg

University Professor, Maxwell

School of Citizenship and Public

Aairs, Syracuse University

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Aairs is an independent,

nonpartisan organization.

All statements of fact and

expressions of opinion contained

in this report are the sole

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do not necessarily reﬂect the

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Council on Global Aairs.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

AMERICANS AND

ALLIANCES

AMERICANS AND

TRADE

AMERICANS ON

IMMIGRATION AND

CLIMATE CHANGE

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

METHODOLOGY

ABOUT THE

SURVEY SAMPLE

ABOUT THE

CHICAGO COUNCIL

SURVEY

ENDNOTES

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

President Trump’s inaugural address, like his campaign, signaled a major departure from the past seven

decades of American foreign policy and engagement with the rest of the world. While never fully parsed,

the slogans “Make America Great Again,” “America First,” and “Americanism, not Globalism,” along with

the president’s speeches and tweets, prescribed greater protectionism in trade, a new ﬁnancial reckoning

with our security allies, and a withdrawal from major international agreements.

The 2017 Chicago Council Survey, conducted roughly six months into the Trump administration, tested

the appeal of these ideas among the American public. The results suggest their attraction remains limited.

For now, public criticism of trade deals, support for withholding US security guarantees from allies, and

calls for restricting immigration mainly appeal to a core group of Trump supporters (deﬁned in this report

as those Americans with a very favorable view of President Trump). Yet, aside from the president’s core

supporters, most Americans prefer the type of foreign policy that has been typical of US administrations,

be they Republican or Democrat, since World War II.

“FROM THIS DAY FORWARD, IT’S GOING TO BE ONLY AMERICA FIRST.

AMERICA FIRST. EVERY DECISION ON TRADE, ON TAXES, ON IMMIGRATION,

ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WILL BE MADE TO BENEFIT AMERICAN WORKERS

AND AMERICAN FAMILIES.”

—PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP, INAUGURAL SPEECH, JANUARY 20, 2017

“CORE TRUMP SUPPORTERS” ARE THOSE IN THE SAMPLE WHO SAY THEY

HAVE A “VERY FAVORABLE” VIEW OF US PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP. THIS

GROUP CONSTITUTES 21 PERCENT OF THE OVERALL SAMPLE; 62 PERCENT

SELF-IDENTIFY AS REPUBLICANS, 31 PERCENT AS INDEPENDENTS, AND

5 PERCENT AS DEMOCRATS.

Majorities continue to endorse sustaining American engagement abroad (Figure A) as well as maintaining

alliances, supporting trade, and participating in international agreements. Indeed, in key instances,

Americans have doubled down on these beliefs. Public support has risen to new highs when it comes to

willingness to defend allies, the perceived beneﬁts of trade, and a desire to grant undocumented

workers a path to citizenship.

Americans Value Allies and Are More Willing Than Ever

to Defend Them

During the 2016 campaign and into his presidency, Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized allies of free-

riding on America’s security guarantee and argued that US alliances were not serving American interests.

Executive Summary

RepublicansIndependentsDemocrats

Figure A: US Role in World Aairs

Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world aairs or if

we stay out of world aairs? (% active part)

n = 2,020

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1998

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2015

2016

2017

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Overall

But the US public disagrees. Americans have repeatedly rated alliances as one of the most eective

ways for the United States to achieve its foreign policy goals since the question was ﬁrst asked in 2014.

Today, the US public is more convinced than ever of their importance. Americans rate maintaining existing

alliances as the most eective foreign policy tool, with 49 percent responding “very eective” (Figure B),

followed by maintaining US military superiority (47%) and building new alliances with other countries (36%).

RepublicansIndependentsDemocrats

Figure B: Maintaining Existing Alliances

How eective do you think each of the following approaches is to achieving the foreign policy goals of the

United States: Maintaining existing alliances (% very eective)

n = 2,020

2014 2015 2016 2017

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Overall

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

Americans also express conﬁdence in Asian and European allies to deal responsibly with world problems,

and solid majorities favor maintaining or increasing the US military presence in the Asia-Paciﬁc (78%),

Europe (73%), and the Middle East (70%). A slightly larger majority now (69%) compared with a year ago

(65%) say NATO is essential to US security. And for the ﬁrst time, majorities of Americans are willing to use

US troops to defend South Korea if it is invaded by North Korea (62%) or if NATO allies like Latvia,

Lithuania, or Estonia are invaded by Russia (52%).

The most speciﬁc wish that President Trump has for NATO is for allied countries to contribute more to

collective defense; he and other administration ocials have advocated for withholding US commitment

to defend allies until they have paid more. But a majority of Americans think that NATO allies should

be convinced to do their part through persuasion and diplomatic channels (59%) rather than threatening

to withhold the US security guarantee to NATO allies to get them to pay more for defense (38%).

Given these views, it is clear that Americans appreciate the advantages that alliances bring. Majorities say

that alliances with Europe and East Asia (60% each) are either mutually beneﬁcial or mostly beneﬁt the

United States, and 48 percent say the same about alliances in the Middle East.

Core Trump supporters are the most skeptical of the beneﬁts regarding alliances for the United States.

Perhaps taking their lead from the president, a majority favor withholding US security guarantee

from NATO allies until they pay more (60%); 51 percent of overall Republicans agree. But even core Trump

supporters do not seem to believe the alliance is “obsolete,” given that a majority (54%) think NATO

is still essential to US security.

A Record Percentage of Americans Recognize Beneﬁts of Trade

Americans are feeling more optimistic about the positive impact of trade. Compared with a year ago,

record numbers of Americans now say that international trade is good for US consumers (78%), for

the US economy (72%), and for job creation (57%). (See Figure C.) Additionally, the perceived beneﬁts of

trade are up across all party aliations.

Creating jobs in the

United States

Consumers like youThe US economy

Figure C: International Trade

Overall, do you think international trade is good or bad for: (% good)

n = 2,020

2004 2006 2016 2017

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Executive Summary

A majority of Americans believe that trade deals between the United States and other countries beneﬁt

both countries (50%) or mostly beneﬁt the United States (7%). But a substantial percentage of Americans—

including a majority of core Trump supporters and a plurality of Republicans overall—think other countries

mostly beneﬁt (34%) or neither country beneﬁts (6%).

President Trump has blamed poor trade deals for the loss of American jobs, and on this point, Americans

agree. A majority say that manufacturing job losses are due to outsourcing (56%) rather than increased

automation (42%). Yet, more Americans say that the current administration’s policies will harm (41%) rather

than help (32%) US workers, and 24 percent say they will make no dierence.

There are clear partisan divides on expectations for the new administration. Solid majorities of core

Trump supporters (82%) and Republicans (64%) expect this administration’s policies will do more to protect

US workers, which may help explain why they are more optimistic about the overall beneﬁts of interna-

tional trade to the US economy, consumers, and job creation. For their part, Democrats may feel the need

to underscore their support for international trade as a reaction against the trade-bashing rhetoric from

both Republican and Democratic candidates in 2016.

Concern over Immigration at Lowest Point Yet

Immigration was a central issue during the 2016 presidential campaign, and it remains a key pillar in

Donald Trump’s America First platform. But the American public is less alarmed than last year by the

potential threat of large numbers of immigrants and refugees entering the United States. Just 37 percent

of Americans characterize immigration as a critical threat, down from 43 percent in 2016, marking a new

low in concern for this issue (Figure D). There are, however, still large dierences between Democrats (20%)

and Republicans (61%), with core Trump supporters the most likely of all to consider immigration a critical

threat (80%).

Republicans

Independents

Democrats

Figure D: Immigration as a Threat

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each

one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an

important threat at all: Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States

(% critical threat)

n = 2,020

46 47

1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015 2016 2017

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Overall

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

As the overall perceived threat from immigration has gone down, support for providing an opportunity

for illegal workers in the United States to become citizens has gone up. Among all Americans, two-thirds

(65%) support providing illegal immigrants a path to citizenship either immediately or with a waiting

period and a ﬁnancial penalty—an increase of 7 percentage points since last year. Conversely, fewer

Americans now say that illegal immigrants should be required to leave their jobs and the United States

(22%, down from 28% in 2016).

A clear majority of Democrats (77%, up from 71% in 2016) favor a pathway to citizenship either immediately

or with conditions. A smaller majority of Republicans now also favor the same solution as Democrats

(52%, up from 44%), although 36 percent of Republicans favor deportation (down from 42% in 2016). Even

core Trump supporters are divided in their views, with equal numbers supporting deportation (45%) and

a path to citizenship (45%) for illegal immigrants.

Majority Continue to Support Paris Agreement

Conducted just weeks after President Trump kept his campaign promise to withdraw from the Paris

Agreement on climate change, the 2017 Chicago Council Survey reveals that 6 in 10 Americans (62%) con-

tinue to favor US participation in the agreement. However, overall public support of the Paris Agreement

has declined since 2016 (when 71% favored participation) largely because of a 20-point drop in Republican

support (37%, down from 57% in 2016), perhaps following the president’s lead on this issue. Just 24 percent

of core Trump supporters want the United States to participate in the agreement. In contrast, majorities of

Democrats (83%) and Independents (60%) continue to support the Paris Accord, though also at slightly lower

levels than in 2016 (when it was backed by 87% of Democrats and 68% of Independents).

Overall, 46 percent of Americans say that climate change is now a critical threat facing the United States;

while still not a majority, this view reﬂects the highest point of concern recorded by the Chicago Council

Survey. Yet, Republicans and Democrats markedly disagree on the gravity of this issue. Seven in 10

Democrats think that climate change is a critical threat, compared with just 16 percent of Republicans and

12 percent of core Trump supporters (Figure E).

Republicans

Independents

Democrats

Figure E: Climate Change as a Threat

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each

one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an

important threat at all: Climate change (% critical threat)

n = 2,020

2008 2010 2012 2014 2015 2016 2017

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Overall

Fractures within the Republican Party Base

Headlines over the past year have proclaimed an internal battle within the Republican Party between

President Trump’s supporters and those who oppose his policies.

The 2017 Chicago Council Survey

data illustrate these ﬁssures between self-described Republicans who have a very favorable view of

President Trump (“Trump Republicans”) and those who do not (“non-Trump Republicans”).

Non-Trump Republicans align more with average US public opinion than they do with Trump Republicans.

Non-Trump Republicans are closer to the overall public than to Trump Republicans in their views on NAFTA

(53% overall public, 49% non-Trump Republicans, 20% Trump Republicans believe the agreement is good

for the US economy). Non-Trump Republicans are also closer to the overall public when asked the best

way to get US allies to pay more for their defense (61% Trump Republicans, 40% non-Trump Republicans,

and 38% overall favor withholding the US security guarantee). And on immigration, the overall public

(65%) and non-Trump Republicans (62%) are more aligned in supporting a path to citizenship for illegal

immigrants than Trump Republicans (43%). Speciﬁc examples of other dierences among Republicans

are included in each chapter of this report (see the sidebars on pages 16, 23, and 29).

Conclusion

Despite the politically charged environment over the past year, Americans express remarkably enduring

support for an active US role in world aairs, for security alliances, and for trade relationships. They

also favor oering illegal immigrants an opportunity to earn citizenship, either immediately or with

conditions—a fact often overlooked by political leaders. Even though a portion of Americans have some

questions about how much the United States gets out of security alliances and trade agreements, the

American public as a whole seems to recognize clear value in maintaining them.

President Trump appears to have noticed, and he has begun to adjust some of his campaign positions

since moving into the Oval Oce. He has declared that NATO is no longer obsolete and has taken some

steps to reassure allies that the United States will honor its defense commitments. Ocials in Trump’s

administration, including the vice president and the secretaries of state and defense, hold more main-

stream views on defense issues, and they have repeatedly traveled to allied nations to smooth rued

feathers. President Trump has also moderated some of his anti-trade rhetoric, backing away from

accusations of Chinese currency manipulation and seeking to renegotiate rather than abandon NAFTA.

These moderated positions are closer to mainstream American views; they are also closer to the views

of those Republicans who are not core supporters of Donald Trump.

Executive Summary

REPUBLICANS REPRESENT 26 PERCENT OF THE OVERALL SAMPLE, AND

THEY ARE DIVIDED BETWEEN TRUMP REPUBLICANS (14% OF OVERALL

SAMPLE) AND NON-TRUMP REPUBLICANS (12%). TRUMP REPUBLICANS ARE

THOSE WHO SAY THEY HAVE A “VERY FAVORABLE” VIEW OF PRESIDENT

TRUMP; NON-TRUMP REPUBLICANS ARE THOSE WHO HAVE A “SOMEWHAT

FAVORABLE,” “SOMEWHAT UNFAVORABLE,” OR “VERY UNFAVORABLE”

VIEW OF PRESIDENT TRUMP.

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

INTRODUCTION

To many observers, the “America First” plank in Donald Trump’s campaign described a policy vision that

would overturn decades of bipartisan US foreign policy. President Trump outlined his vision for America

First in his inaugural address: “Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign aairs, will be

made to beneﬁt American workers and American families.” This position has been interpreted by some

as a return to isolationism that could radically reorient America’s foreign policy and by others as a rejection

of America’s traditional security alliances, long-standing commitment to trade, and major international

agreements.

Whatever the particular perspective, the American public does not embrace a retreat or withdrawal of

the United States from the world. A majority of the American public (63%) continue to support an active role

for the United States in world aairs (Figure 1).

While Donald Trump’s rallying cry is to “Make America Great Again,” a majority of Americans believe it

already is. Americans continue to say that the United States is the most inﬂuential country in the world;

the public rates its inﬂuence as an average of 8.3 on a scale from 0 to 10, with 10 being the greatest

RepublicansIndependentsDemocrats

Figure 1: US Role in World Aairs

Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world aairs or if

we stay out of world aairs? (% active part)

n = 2,020

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1998

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2015

2016

2017

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Overall

Introduction

possible amount of inﬂuence. (See Appendix Figure 1 for full results.) Overall, a majority also say that

because of its unique character, the United States is the greatest country in the world (63%).

Core Trump

supporters are, in fact, the most likely to say the United States is the greatest country (91%).

When it comes to the best way to project American inﬂuence abroad, an overall majority of Americans

(61%) want the United States to play a shared leadership role, and majorities of Democrats (68%) and

Independents (62%) agree. Republicans are divided: while 49 percent of Republicans prefer a shared

leadership role, 47 percent want the United States to be the dominant world leader. And a majority

of core Trump supporters (53%) say the United States should play a dominant leadership role in the world

(Figure 2).

Figure 2: US Leadership Role in the World

2017 Chicago Council Survey

What kind of leadership role should the United States play in the world? Should it be the dominant

world leader, or should it play a shared leadership role, or should it not play any leadership role? (%)

n = 2,020

Overall

Republicans

Independents

Democrats

Core Trump supporters

Dominant world

leader

Overall

Play a shared

leadership role

Overall

Not play any

leadership role

In the president’s view—as stated in his inaugural address—the United States has “made other countries

rich while the wealth, strength, and conﬁdence of our country has disappeared over the horizon.” While

President Trump’s core supporters agree with this view, the 2017 Chicago Council Survey data discussed

in the following pages demonstrate that a majority of Americans reject the idea that we should question

our security alliances, abandon trade agreements, or walk away from international agreements. Overall,

Americans remain committed to engaging the world along the lines pursued by past administrations,

Republican and Democrat alike.

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

AMERICANS AND ALLIANCES

During the 2016 presidential campaign and into his presidency, Donald Trump repeatedly accused

allies of free-riding on America’s security guarantee and argued that US alliances were not serving

American interests. Standing alongside NATO leaders last May, Trump bluntly told the assembled heads

of state that they owed “massive amounts of money” to the United States and NATO.

But the 2017 Chicago Council Survey shows that the American public continues to support many

aspects of the traditional US alliance system in Europe and Asia, including US commitments to their

defense. Views are more mixed on alliances with Middle Eastern countries. Still, only the core supporters

of President Trump seem to share his views on alliances.

Eectiveness of Maintaining Alliances

When it comes to the most eective ways to achieve US foreign policy goals, maintaining existing alliances

tops the list, with 49 percent of the American public saying this approach is very eective. Americans

also believe maintaining US military superiority (47%) and building new alliances with other countries (36%)

are eective approaches (See Appendix Figure 2).

In fact, Americans are more convinced now than they were in previous surveys that alliances are very ef-

fective. Democrats and Independents are responsible for much of this increase. A majority of Democrats

(55%) now say that maintaining existing alliances is a very eective way to achieve US foreign policy goals,

up from 45 percent in 2016. Independents have also become more convinced, increasing from 34 percent

in 2016 to 47 percent in 2017. Meanwhile, Republicans have been relatively steady (Figure 3).

RepublicansIndependentsDemocrats

Figure 3: Maintaining Existing Alliances

How eective do you think each of the following approaches is to achieving the foreign policy goals of the

United States: Maintaining existing alliances (% very eective)

n = 2,020

2014 2015 2016 2017

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Overall

Americans and Alliances

Mixed Views of Alliances among Republicans

President Trump sees US alliances as one-sided ﬁnancial transactions, with allies largely free-riding

on American commitments, draining US resources with no resulting beneﬁt. But the US public is not buying

this argument. While President Trump has derided traditional alliances in Europe and East Asia, the

American public strongly supports these partnerships. And while the president has embraced several

alliances in the Middle East, even choosing Saudi Arabia as his ﬁrst overseas visit, the public is more

divided on alliances in this region.

Combined, 6 in 10 Americans say that either both the United States and allies beneﬁt from alliances in

Europe and East Asia or that the United States beneﬁts more. Americans are less enthusiastic about US

alliances in the Middle East: while a plurality say both sides beneﬁt (42%) or the United States mostly

beneﬁts (7%), signiﬁcant portions of the public believe that US alliances there mostly beneﬁt allies (25%)

or that neither country beneﬁts (23%). (See Figure 4.)

President Trump’s core supporters are the most pessimistic about the beneﬁts of alliances across all three

regions. These attitudes ﬁt well with the Trump narrative that NATO is too costly and unfair to the United

States.

Republicans (including some but not all core Trump supporters) tend to say that the beneﬁts of

alliances are mutual—although 4 in 10 say they mostly beneﬁt allies or neither country. Whether this doubt

about the beneﬁts of alliances was created by Donald Trump or whether he merely picked up on an

existing sentiment is unclear.

To be sure, the complaint about allies getting a free ride is not new. In 2016, President Obama griped

to The Atlantic about how “free riders aggravate[d]” him;

in 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

voiced concern about future political leaders who had not lived through the Cold War, saying they “may

not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost” without increased allied spend-

ing;

and Secretary Madeleine Albright made sure to insist on fair burden sharing in her 1997 speech to

Congress advocating for NATO expansion.

Indeed, complaints about burden sharing are as old as the

NATO alliance itself.

THE 2017 CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEY SHOWS THAT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC

CONTINUES TO SUPPORT MANY ASPECTS OF THE TRADITIONAL US

ALLIANCE SYSTEM IN EUROPE AND ASIA, INCLUDING US COMMITMENTS TO

THEIR DEFENSE.

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

Mostly beneﬁt

the United States

Mostly beneﬁt

our allies

Beneﬁt both the

United States and

our allies

Beneﬁt neither

Mostly beneﬁt

the United States

Mostly beneﬁt

our allies

Beneﬁt both the

United States and

our allies

Beneﬁt neither

Figure 4: Who Beneﬁts from US Security Alliances?

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Which of the following comes closest to your view on US security alliances in East Asia? (%) n = 694

RepublicansDemocrats Independents

Core Trump

supporters

Mostly beneﬁt

the United States

Mostly beneﬁt

our allies

Overall

Beneﬁt both the

United States and

our allies

Beneﬁt neither

Which of the following comes closest to your view on US security alliances in Europe? (%) n = 670

Which of the following comes closest to your view on US security alliances in the Middle East? (%) n = 656

Support for NATO

During the 2016 presidential campaign, NATO was a favorite target of criticism for Donald Trump, and

that targeting carried over to the early part of his administration. His distaste for NATO is not shared by

many other prominent Republicans; members of his own administration repeatedly sought to reassure

NATO allies that the US commitment to their defense remained inviolable. After the president visited

NATO headquarters and failed to explicitly endorse the collective defense provisions in Article 5, Senator

Lindsay Graham proposed a resolution that aimed to “reassure our allies and give notice to our enemies

that America stands ﬁrmly in support of NATO and our Article 5 commitment.”

The resolution passed

unanimously in the Senate. Eventually, President Trump himself indicated his support for Article 5 and

stated that NATO is “no longer obsolete.”

Throughout this debate, the American public has been consistently supportive of NATO. In the 2017

Chicago Council Survey, 69 percent of Americans say NATO is still essential to US security, up slightly

from 2016 (65%) and up signiﬁcantly from 2002 (56%), when the question was ﬁrst asked. Public support

is also bipartisan, with majorities of Democrats (82%), Independents (64%), and Republicans (60%)

describing NATO as essential, views largely unchanged from 2016. Even a majority of core Trump

supporters (54%) agree that NATO is still essential to US security (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Commitment to NATO

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say it is no longer

essential. Which of these views is closer to your own? (%)

n = 2,020

Overall

Republicans

Independents

Democrats

Core Trump supporters

Still essential

Overall

No longer essential

The biggest complaint Trump has about NATO is that the allies do not spend enough on defense. President

Trump threatened that he would withhold US contributions—or even withdraw from NATO—if other

NATO countries did not meet their commitments.

Even Defense Secretary Mattis suggested the United

States could reduce its commitments if NATO countries did not spend more on defense.

The overall

US public thinks that to encourage NATO allies to actually follow through on defense-spending increases,

the United States should use persuasion and diplomacy (59%) rather than withholding its security

commitment to NATO allies (38%).

Americans and Alliances

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

But there is a clear partisan divide on the best way to pressure allies on their spending commitments.

Democrats (72%) and Independents (56%) think the United States should use persuasion and diplomacy.

By a slim margin, Republicans prefer withholding the US security guarantee (51%) to using persuasion

and diplomacy (46%). An even greater percentage of core Trump supporters (60%) says the United States

should withhold the security commitment until allies actually increase defense spending (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Options if NATO Allies Don't Spend More on Defense

2017 Chicago Council Survey

As you may know, the United States has long urged its NATO allies to spend more on defense. They

have recently agreed to increase defense spending but have not yet done so. Which of the following

options comes closer to your view? (%)

n = 2,020

Overall

Republicans

Independents

Democrats

Core Trump supporters

The United States should

encourage greater allied

defense spending through

persuasion and diplomatic

means while maintaining

a ﬁrm commitment to defend

NATO members

Overall

The United States should

withhold its commitment to

defend NATO members until

NATO allies actually spend

more on defense

Overall

The United States should

encourage greater allied defense

spending through persuasion

and diplomatic means while

maintaining a ﬁrm commitment

to defend NATO members

America’s NATO commitment until its allies spend

more on defense, although 55 percent believe

that NATO is still essential. Non-Trump Republicans,

like the overall US public, are more consistently

pro-NATO. They support using persuasion and

diplomacy to get allies to pay more for defense, and

two in three say NATO is essential to US security.

SIDEBAR

Making Existing Alliances Work

Underpinning this broad support for alliances is a view that the United States derives clear advantages

from them. Analysis of the 2017 Chicago Council Survey data shows that even the minority of Americans

who think that US security alliances mostly beneﬁt our allies or neither country still support American

military partnerships. They favor maintaining or increasing the US military presence abroad, express

conﬁdence in key allies, and believe that NATO is essential to US security. In short, Americans are more

interested in making the existing relationships work than ﬁling for divorce.

Americans and Alliances

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

AMERICANS AND TRADE

Donald Trump placed American workers at the center of his domestic and foreign policy platforms. As

a candidate and as president, he has criticized trade agreements for beneﬁting other countries at the

direct expense of the US economy and American workers. The 2017 Survey ﬁnds that this message has

clearly resonated with his base and with a portion of the broader public. But in general, Americans

have begun to see the eects of trade on the overall US economy, consumers, and job creation more

positively. Republicans are now more optimistic about the impact of trade, potentially because a

Republican who promises to deliver better trade deals is now in the White House. At the same time,

Democrats continue to express favorable attitudes toward trade, in some instances at even higher levels

of support than in previous years—perhaps as a forceful rejection of the anti-trade message from a

president they deeply dislike.

Positive Assessments of Trade Beneﬁts Have Increased

across Party Lines

In a speech before signing the “Buy American and Hire American” executive order on trade, Trump said

that “jobs and wealth have been stripped from our country. Year after year, decade after decade, trade

deﬁcit upon trade deﬁcit . . . and lots of jobs.”

Despite this rhetoric, American perceptions of the beneﬁts

of international trade are more positive now than they were a year ago. In fact, record numbers of

Americans now say international trade is good for US consumers (78%) and the US economy (72%).

Moreover, the 2017 results mark the ﬁrst time since this question was asked that a majority of respondents

claim international trade is beneﬁcial to creating US jobs (57%). (See Figure 8.)

Creating jobs in the

United States

Consumers like youThe US economy

Figure 8: International Trade

Overall, do you think international trade is good or bad for: (% good)

n = 2,020

2004 2006 2016 2017

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Americans and Trade

Previous surveys suggest that Democratic and Republican views on the eects of international trade on

the US economy and consumers change based on the party occupying the White House. In 2004 and

2006—during the George W. Bush administration—Republicans were more likely than Democrats to

say that international trade was good for the US economy. In the latter survey, Republicans were also

more likely to say that trade is beneﬁcial to consumers. In 2016, with Barack Obama in the White

House, Democrats were more positive about international trade’s impact on the US economy, American

consumers, and job creation.

The 2017 Chicago Council Survey results go against the grain of that pattern, ﬁnding that, even

with a Republican now president, Democrats remain the most likely to see the beneﬁts of international

trade for US consumers (83%), the US economy (80%), and creating jobs in the United States (69%).

Democrats also remain the most favorable toward globalization, with 77 percent saying it is good for the

United States, up from 55 percent when the question was ﬁrst asked in 1998.

Still, favorable Republican attitudes on international trade have increased with a GOP White House. In

2017, a greater percentage of Republicans say that trade is good for consumers (77%), the US economy

(68%), and job creation (48%) than ever before. Core Trump supporters are similar to Republicans in citing

the beneﬁts to consumers (69%), the US economy (62%), and job creation (48%).

But Republican views have not become more favorable toward globalization over the years, with 55 per-

cent saying globalization is good in 2017—essentially unchanged from the 57 percent who said the

same in 1998 (Figure 9). The following sections will also demonstrate that Republicans overall are not

nearly as positive about existing trade agreements.

Republicans

Independents

Democrats

Figure 9: Globalization

Do you believe that globalization, especially the increasing connections of our economy with others around

the world, is mostly good or mostly bad for the United States? (% mostly good)

n = 2,020

1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2017

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Overall

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

It’s All about the Jobs

Jobs, as always, are at the heart of American concerns and priorities. Since the Council’s ﬁrst survey in 1974,

Americans have consistently prioritized the protection of American jobs as one of the most important

foreign policy goals, and that remains true in 2017. Three-quarters of Americans (73%) name it a very

important goal, the same as in 2016. This assessment crosses partisan lines, with at least 7 in 10 respon-

dents in agreement, and is the number-one priority of core Trump supporters (87%).

Donald Trump has attracted much support from his base due to his attention to the American working

class. From 2000 to 2010, the United States lost more than 5 million manufacturing jobs. President

Trump (and other presidential candidates) often linked the loss of these jobs to international trade and

outsourcing. In contrast, economic experts attribute the loss of US manufacturing jobs to increased

automation more than to outsourcing.

Regardless, the American public broadly agrees with the president on this point. Nearly 6 in 10 say that

international trade and moving jobs overseas is responsible for the decline in American manufacturing

jobs, while only 4 in 10 blame automation. This view is particularly strong among core Trump supporters

(74%) and Republicans (68%). A bare majority of Democrats (53%) say that automation is to blame for

job losses, with 46 percent blaming trade (Figure 10).

Figure 10: Trade vs. Automation

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Overall, which do you think is more responsible for the decline in American manufacturing

employment? (%)

n = 2,020

Overall

Republicans

Independents

Democrats

Core Trump supporters

International trade,

moving jobs overseas

Overall

Automation, replacing

workers with machines

Even though President Trump pledged to make protecting American jobs a priority in his administration

—

and in trade negotiations in particular—the US public overall is deeply divided over the Trump adminis-

tration’s policies on workers. Those divisions fall neatly along partisan lines. Core Trump supporters (82%)

and Republicans (64%) are largely convinced that the current administration’s approach will do more to

protect workers, while a majority of Democrats (60%) and a plurality of Independents (41%) say they will do

more to harm US workers (Figure 11).

Americans and Trade

More Say Trade Deals Beneﬁt All Partners Rather than

Just One Side

Both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton criticized trade agreements during their 2016 campaigns, and the

president has continued to attack trade deals from the Oval Oce. Americans overall tend to view

trade agreements as being mostly beneﬁcial to all countries involved (50%) or to the United States (7%).

But 4 in 10 believe they mostly beneﬁt other countries (34%) or beneﬁt neither country (6%).

Democrats are especially pro-trade in their outlook, with 62 percent saying trade agreements are

mutually beneﬁcial. In sharp contrast, a majority of core Trump supporters (58%) say that trade deals

mostly beneﬁt other countries, and a plurality of Republicans (47%) agree (Figure 12).

Donald Trump has particularly targeted the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as an example

of a poorly negotiated accord, calling it “the worst trade deal ever made by any country.”

But Americans

overall lean slightly positive on the deal—53 percent say it is good for the economy. Democrats are

especially supportive, with 7 in 10 saying it is good for the United States.

However, Trump’s criticism of NAFTA has found fertile ground among his base and a majority of

Republicans. Core Trump supporters hold the most negative views of the 25-year-old trade deal, with

72 percent saying it is bad for the economy. Six in 10 Republicans agree. Independents, however,

are divided, with half saying NAFTA is good for the economy.

Figure 11: Protecting or Harming American Workers?

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Do you think the current administration's approach to international aairs will: (%)

n = 2,020

Overall

Republicans

Independents

Democrats

Core Trump supporters

Do more to protect

American workers

Overall

Do more to harm

American workers

Overall

Make no dierence

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

Who Practices Fair Trade with the United States?

President Trump has often targeted the unfair trading practices of other countries as a reason the United

States is not performing up to its economic potential. He has singled out China as the most egregious

unfair trader among the trading partners of the United States, arguing in the ﬁrst presidential debate that

China is “using our country as a piggy bank to rebuild China . . . we’ve become a third-world country.”

On China, the American public agrees with the president. Unique among all countries included in the

survey, China alone is identiﬁed by a majority of Americans (68%) as practicing unfair trade with the

United States. Majorities of core Trump supporters (82%), Republicans (76%), Independents (71%), and

Democrats (61%) agree.

Mexico is also a frequent target of criticism by President Trump, but American attitudes about its trade

practices are more divided. The public at large is nearly evenly split, with 47 percent saying Mexico

practices fair trade and 46 percent identifying it as an unfair trader. Here, partisan divides are stark. Core

Trump supporters (76%) and Republicans (65%) say Mexico practices unfair trade. A majority of Democrats

(60%) and half of Independents (50%) disagree.

Other trading partners, however, fare better in public estimations. Majorities believe that Canada (79%),

the European Union (66%), Japan (60%), and South Korea (52%), trade fairly with the United States.

Still, Republicans are less likely than Democrats to describe each country as a fair trader, and core Trump

supporters are the least likely of all. (See Appendix Figure 5 for full results.)

Figure 12: Trade Deals between the United States and Other Countries

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Which of the following comes closest to your view on trade deals between the United States and other

countries? Do they: (%)

n = 2,020

Overall

Republicans

Independents

Democrats

Core Trump supporters

Mostly beneﬁt the

United States

Overall

Mostly beneﬁt other

countries

Overall

Beneﬁt both the

United States and

other countries

Overall

Beneﬁt neither

Americans and Trade

There are some striking contrasts between Trump

Republicans and non-Trump Republicans on

trade—although neither group is as pro-trade as

Democrats. Six in 10 Trump Republicans view the

United States as being on the losing side of trade

agreements (60% say that trade agreements mostly

beneﬁt other countries) compared with one-third

of non-Trump Republicans (34%). Half of non-Trump

Republicans believe NAFTA is good for the US

NOT ALL REPUBLICANS THINK ALIKE ON TRADE

Figure 1: NAFTA

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Overall, do you think the North American Free Trade Agreement, also known as NAFTA, is good or

bad for the US economy? (%)

n = 725

Overall

Non-Trump Republicans

Trump Republicans

Core Trump supporters

Good

Overall

Bad

economy (49%), closer to the views of the overall

US public (53%) than to Trump Republicans (20%).

(See Figure 1.) Non-Trump Republicans are also less

optimistic about the new administration’s policy

impact on American workers. While a plurality,

only 41 percent of non-Trump Republicans say the

current administration’s approach will do more to

help American workers, compared with 88 percent

of Trump Republicans (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Administration’s Eect on American Workers

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Do you think the current administration's approach to international aairs will: (%)

n = 725

Overall

Non-Trump Republicans

Trump Republicans

Core Trump supporters

Do more to

harm American

workers

Overall

Make no

dierence

Overall

Do more to

protect American

workers

SIDEBAR

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

Bipartisan Optimism on Trade

The 2017 survey results ﬁnd Americans underscoring their optimism for the positive eects of trade on

the US economy, for US consumers, and for job creation. Continuing recent trends, Democrats are the

most pro-trade among the public. Republicans have become more positive over the past year, perhaps

reﬂecting hope that a Republican administration will negotiate better terms for the United States. But this

recent uptick in GOP optimism should not overshadow the fact that Republicans are consistently less

likely to see trade and trade agreements as beneﬁcial for all countries, and their critical views of NAFTA

reﬂect that. Donald Trump’s messages on trade, however, most clearly resonate with his base: it is core

Trump supporters that invariably take the most negative views on trade.

AMERICANS ON IMMIGRATION AND

CLIMATE CHANGE

Immigration and climate change are two major issues that have been put to the test in the ﬁrst six months

of America First policies. Under the Trump administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement

ocers have greater leeway when it comes to detaining and deporting unauthorized immigrants.

Environmental Protection Agency ocials have tried to eliminate or minimize references to climate

change in policy documents, and they openly scorned the science behind climate change research.

The

2017 Chicago Council Survey results ﬁnd that while the president’s approach on these issues has appealed

to core Trump supporters and many Republicans, Americans overall are moving in the opposite direction.

Public Threat Perceptions from Immigration at Lowest Level Yet

Immigration was a central issue during the 2016 presidential campaign and remains a key pillar in Donald

Trump’s America First platform. President Trump has continued to pledge to build a wall between the

United States and Mexico, and he has made several attempts to ban travelers from six predominantly

Muslim countries from entering the United States.

The anti-immigrant overtones of America First have struck a particular chord with core Trump supporters.

Among this group, 80 percent perceive immigration as a critical threat to the United States, 19 per-

centage points higher than Republicans (61%) and 60 percentage points higher than Democrats (20%).

But those anti-immigrant overtones are not resonating with most Americans. Overall, only 37 percent

of the US public now says that immigration is a critical threat, down from 43 percent in 2016 and marking

an all-time low since this question was ﬁrst asked in 1998 (Figure 13). And although Republican concern

about the threat of immigration has been steady over the past two decades—roughly 6 in 10 have

consistently said that large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States represent

a critical threat—concern among Democrats and Independents has steadily declined. In fact, both

groups reached historic lows on this question in 2017.

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ON IMMIGRATION HAS BECOME MORE

POLARIZED OVER THE PAST 15 YEARS. THIS FACT SERVES AS A

STARK REMINDER THAT SHARPLY DIVIDED OPINION ON IMMIGRATION

WAS NOT CREATED BY DONALD TRUMP—HE SIMPLY EXPLOITED IT.

Americans on Immigration and Climate Change

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

American public opinion on immigration has become more polarized over the past 15 years. This

fact serves as a stark reminder that sharply divided opinion on immigration was not created by Donald

Trump—he simply exploited it.

Increasing Percentages Agree on Path to Citizenship for

Illegal Immigrants

Along with these overall declining concerns about immigrants and refugees coming into the country, there

is a sizeable and growing consensus about the best way to deal with illegal immigrants currently working

in the United States. Among all Americans, two-thirds (65%) support a path to citizenship with or with-

out conditions, up from 58 percent in 2016. Conversely, fewer Americans now say that illegal immigrants

should be required to leave their jobs and the United States (22% compared with 31% in 2013).

But that consensus still features deep partisan divides. A clear majority of Democrats (77%) and Indepen-

dents (63%) favor a pathway to citizenship either immediately or after a waiting period and paying a

penalty. A bare majority of Republicans (52%) also favor a pathway to citizenship with or without conditions

while 36 percent of Republicans favor deportation.

Core Trump supporters are the most inclined to support deportation, but even they are divided in their

views, with equal numbers supporting deportation (45%) and a path to citizenship (45%) for illegal

immigrants (Figure 14). This places them largely in-line with Republicans overall but sets both Republicans

and core Trump supporters far apart from overall American opinion.

Republicans

Independents

Democrats

Figure 13: Immigration as a Threat

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each

one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an

important threat at all: Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States.

(% critical threat)

n = 2,020

46 47

1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015 2016 2017

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Overall

Majority Continue to Favor US Participation in Paris Agreement

The Trump administration has also pushed back against addressing climate issues. In June 2017,

President Trump convened a press conference in the White House Rose Garden to announce the United

States would “cease all implementation of the non-binding Paris Accord and the draconian ﬁnancial and

economic burdens the agreement imposes on our country” and instead “pursue a new deal.”

Conducted just weeks after President Trump kept his campaign promise to withdraw from the Paris

Agreement on climate change, the 2017 survey results show that 6 in 10 Americans (62%) favor US par-

ticipation in the agreement. Yet overall support has declined since 2016 when 71 percent favored partic-

ipation, largely due to a marked decrease in support from Republicans. Just 37 percent of this group

(down from 57% in 2016) and 24 percent of core Trump supporters want the United States to participate.

Majorities of Democrats (83%) and Independents (60%), meanwhile, continue to support the agreement,

although at slightly lower levels than in 2016 (87% and 68%, respectively).

Republicans and Democrats also view the threat posed by climate change very dierently. Overall,

46 percent of Americans say that climate change is now a critical threat facing the United States. While

not a majority, it marks an all-time high for the measure and is mostly driven by increased concern

Figure 14: Illegal Immigration

2017 Chicago Council Survey

When it comes to immigration, which comes closest to your view about illegal immigrants who are

currently working in the United States? (%)

n = 2,020

Overall

Republicans

Independents

Democrats

Core Trump supporters

They should be allowed

to stay in their jobs and to

apply for US citizenship

Overall

They should be allowed

to stay in their jobs and

eventually to apply for

US citizenship only if they

pay a penalty and wait

a number of years

Overall

They should be allowed

to stay in their jobs with

work permits but not to

apply for US citizenship

Overall

They should be required

to leave their jobs and

leave the United States

Americans on Immigration and Climate Change

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

among Democrats. This year’s survey results reveal the largest partisan divide yet on the threat from

climate change—in fact, there is a dramatic 53 percentage point dierence between Democrats and

Republicans. Seven in 10 Democrats think that climate change is a critical threat, compared with just 16

percent of Republicans and just 12 percent of core Trump supporters (Figure 15).

Republicans

Independents

Democrats

Figure 15: Climate Change as a Threat

Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each

one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an

important threat at all: Climate change (% critical threat)

n = 2,020

2008 2010 2012 2014 2015 2016 2017

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Overall

America First at Odds with Public on Climate Change and

Immigration

Immigration and climate change are two areas in which the Trump administration has pursued radically

dierent paths from the Obama administration. Those decisions have elicited very dierent reactions

across party lines. While Republicans and core Trump supporters back the president’s decision to with-

draw from the Paris Agreement, Americans overall disagree—and overall concern about climate change

is on the rise. In addition, the views among Republicans are not unanimous: a slight majority of Republicans

who are not core Trump supporters back the Paris Agreement.

Similarly, although Republicans and core Trump supporters remain concerned about the possibility of

large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States, American concern overall

continues to decline. At the same time, a growing number of Americans support providing unauthorized

immigrants a path to citizenship. On both climate change and immigration, Trump’s America First

policies are giving his base and many in his party what they want. These policies, however, run counter to

the views of the overall American public.

On the controversial and very partisan issues of

immigration and climate change, there are notable

dierences in opinion between Trump Republi-

cans and non-Trump Republicans. While Trump

Republicans are equally likely to favor deporta-

tion and oppose a path to citizenship for illegal

immigrants in the United States, non-Trump

NOT ALL REPUBLICANS THINK ALIKE ON IMMIGRATION

AND CLIMATE CHANGE

Figure 2: Paris Agreement on Climate Change

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Based on what you know, do you think the United States should or should not participate in the

following international agreements: the Paris Agreement that calls for countries to collectively reduce

their emissions of greenhouse gases (% should participate)

n = 725

Non-Trump Republicans

Trump Republicans

Core Trump supporters

Overall

Republicans are decisively more likely to favor a

path to citizenship (Figure 1). And while only

23 percent of Trump Republicans favor US par-

ticipation in the Paris Agreement on climate

change, a slight majority (53%) of non-Trump

Republicans support it (Figure 2).

Figure 1: Illegal Immigrants Working in the United States

2017 Chicago Council Survey

When it comes to immigration, which comes closest to your view about illegal immigrants who are

currently working in the United States? (%)

n = 725

Overall

Non-Trump Republicans

Trump Republicans

Core Trump supporters

They should be allowed

to apply for citizenship

(with or without penalty)

Overall

They should be required

to leave their jobs and

leave the United States

SIDEBAR

Americans on Immigration and Climate Change

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

Since President Trump moved into the White House, he and his advisers have sometimes oered

contrasting views on foreign policy. In a recent example, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis openly diered

with the president on the best way to deal with North Korea’s nuclear program. Speaking with reporters,

Secretary Mattis emphasized a diplomacy-ﬁrst approach with Pyongyang, countering President Trump’s

tweet in which he proclaimed that “talking is not the answer!”

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson

reportedly favored the United States remaining in the Paris Agreement, and similar dierences between

the president and Congressional leaders toward NATO allies were described previously in this report.

The 2017 Chicago Council Survey data show that American public opinion similarly diers between core

Trump supporters and others. While core Trump supporters seem to embrace the ideas behind America

First, most Americans (including non-Trump Republicans) lean toward more mainstream foreign policy

approaches. They express remarkably enduring support for an active US role in world aairs, for main-

taining and guaranteeing US security alliances, and for America’s international trade relationships. They

also favor oering undocumented immigrants an opportunity to earn citizenship and support continued

participation in the Paris Agreement. Even though a portion of Americans have some questions about

how much the United States gets out of security alliances and existing trade agreements, the American

public as a whole seems to recognize clear value in sustaining them.

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

Appendix Figure 1: Global Inﬂuence

2017 Chicago Council Survey

I would like to know how much inﬂuence you think each of the following countries has in the world.

Please answer on a 0 to 10 scale, with 0 meaning they are not at all inﬂuential and 10 meaning they are

extremely inﬂuential. (mean score)

n = 2,020

Republicans

Independents

Democrats

Core Trump supporters

United States

Overall

8.3

8.0

8.7

8.9

8.3

China

Overall

6.8

6.7

6.9

6.8

6.9

Russia

Overall

6.5

6.2

6.8

7.0

6.6

European Union

Overall

6.3

6.6

6.1

5.8

6.1

United Kingdom

Overall

6.2

6.3

6.1

Germany

Overall

5.8

5.9

5.5

5.3

5.8

South Korea

Overall

4.4

4.6

4.4

4.2

4.3

India

Overall

4.2

4.4

4.0

3.8

4.1

Appendix

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

Appendix Figure 2: Achieving US Foreign Policy Goals

2017 Chicago Council Survey

How eective do you think each of the following approaches is to achieving the foreign policy goals of the

United States? (% very eective)

n = 2,020

RepublicansDemocrats Independents

Core Trump

supporters Overall

Maintaining US military

superiority

44 66 47

Signing free trade

agreements with

other countries

21 15 21

Placing sanctions on

other countries

30 20

17 22

Maintaining existing

alliances

47 43 49

Building new alliances

with other countries

34 28 36

Economic aid to

other countries

15 9 18

Military aid to other

countries

11 9 13

Military

intervention

15 24 18

Participating

in international

organizations

26 12 27

International

agreements

23 32

30 20

Appendix

Appendix Figure 3: US Military Presence

2017 Chicago Council Survey

Do you think that the US military presence in the following regions should be increased, maintained at

its present level, or decreased? (%)

n = 2,020

Republicans

Independents

Democrats

Core Trump supporters Overall

Increased

Europe

Asia-Paciﬁc

The Middle East

Maintained at its

present level

Decreased

276

65 2113

49 2920

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

Appendix Figure 4: The Use of US Troops Abroad

2017 Chicago Council Survey

There has been some discussion about circumstances that might justify using US troops in other parts of

the world. Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops in the following situations? (% favor)

n = 2,020

RepublicansDemocrats Independents

Core Trump

supporters Overall

If North Korea invaded

South Korea

61 70 62

To deal with

humanitarian crises

63 60 67

To stop or prevent

a government from

using chemical or

biological weapons

against its own people

80 73

72 78

If Russia invades a

NATO ally like Latvia,

Lithuania, or Estonia

If China initiates

a military conﬂict

with Japan over

disputed islands

41 46

If Russia invades the

rest of Ukraine

38 41 39

To ﬁght against

violent Islamic

extremist groups in

Iraq and Syria

58 76 63

51 54

Appendix

Appendix Figure 5: Trade with the United States

2017 Chicago Council Survey

In general, do you think that the following countries practice fair or unfair trade with the United States?

(% fair)

n = 2,020

Republicans

Independents

Democrats

Core Trump supporters Overall

Canada

Mexico European Union

China South Korea Japan

6679

52 6025

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

This report is based on the results of a survey commissioned by the Chicago Council on Global Aairs.

The 2017 edition of the survey is the latest eort in a series of wide-ranging surveys on American attitudes

toward US foreign policy. The 2017 Chicago Council Survey was made possible by the generous support

of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Charles Koch Institute, the Korea Foundation,

the Robert R. McCormick Foundation, and the personal support of Lester Crown and the Crown family.

The survey was conducted from June 27 to July 19, 2017, among a representative national sample of

2,020 adults. The margin of sampling error for the full sample is ±2.4, including a design eect of 1.1758.

The margin of error is higher for partisan subgroups.

Partisan identiﬁcation is based on respondents’ answer to a standard partisan self-identiﬁcation question:

“Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent,

or what?”

“Core Trump supporters” are deﬁned as those respondents who answered “very favorable” to the question:

“Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable view

of the following world leaders: US President Donald Trump?” This group, 21 percent of the overall sample,

self-identify primarily as Republicans (62%), but it also includes one-third that identify as Independents

(31%) and a handful of Democrats (5%).

“Trump Republicans,” 14 percent of the overall sample, are deﬁned as those Republicans who answered

“very favorable” to the question: “Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable,

or very unfavorable view of the following world leaders: US President Donald Trump?” “Non-Trump

Republicans,” 13 percent of the overall sample, are deﬁned as those Republicans who answered “some-

what favorable,” “somewhat unfavorable,” or “very unfavorable” to that same question. Among self-

identiﬁed Republicans, 51 percent are Trump Republicans and 47 percent are non-Trump Republicans.

A full listing of questions asked in the 2017 Chicago Council Survey, including details on which questions

were administered to split samples, is available online at www.thechicagocouncil.org.

The survey was conducted by GfK Custom Research, a polling, social science, and market research ﬁrm

in Palo Alto, California, using a randomly selected sample of GfK’s large-scale nationwide research

panel, KnowledgePanel® (KP). The survey was ﬁelded to a total of 3,618 panel members yielding a total of

2,181 completed surveys (a completion rate of 60.3%). The median survey length was 22 minutes. Of the

2,181 total completed surveys, 161 cases were excluded for quality-control reasons, leaving a ﬁnal sample

size of 2,020 respondents.

METHODOLOGY

Methodology

Respondents were excluded if they failed at least one of three key checks:

• Respondents who completed the survey in eight minutes or less.

• Respondents who refused to answer half or more of the items in the survey.

• Respondents who failed two or three of the following checks:

— Refused or skipped the question that was speciﬁcally designed to make sure respondents were

paying attention. (“In order to make sure that your browser is working correctly, please select

number 4 from the list below.”)

— Refused one or more full lists that included ﬁve items or more (of which there were 13 such lists).

— Gave exactly the same answer for (“straight-lined”) every item on one of the four longest lists in

the survey (Q5, Q7, Q8, or Q12).

The GfK Knowledge Panel (KP) was originally based exclusively on a national Random Digit Dialing

(RDD) sampling methodology. To improve the representation of the panel, GfK migrated to using an

Address Based Sampling (ABS) methodology via the Delivery Sequence File (DSF) of the USPS for

recruiting panel members in 2009. This probability-based sampling methodology improves population

coverage and provides a more eective sampling infrastructure for recruitment of hard-to-reach

individuals, such as young adults and those from various minority groups. It should be noted that under

the ABS recruitment, individuals in households without an internet connection are provided with a

web-enabled device and free internet service. Thus, the sample is not limited to those in the population

who already have internet access.

Generally, the speciﬁc survey samples represent an equal probability selection method (EPSEM) sample

from the panel for general population surveys. The raw distribution of KP mirrors that of US adults fairly

closely, barring occasional disparities that may emerge for certain subgroups due to dierential attrition.

To ensure selection of general population samples from KP behave as EPSEM, additional measures

are undertaken, starting by weighting the pool of active members to the geodemographic benchmarks

secured from the latest March supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) along several

dimensions. Using the resulting weights as measure of size, in the next step a probability proportional to

size (PPS) procedure is used to select study speciﬁc samples. It is the application of this PPS methodology

with the imposed size measures that produces fully self-weighing samples from KP, for which each

sample member can carry a design weight of unity. Moreover, in instances where a study design requires

any form of oversampling of certain subgroups, such departures from an EPSEM design are accounted

for by adjusting the design weights in reference to the CPS benchmarks for the population of interest.

The geodemographic benchmarks used to weight the active panel members for computation of size mea-

sures include:

• Gender (male, female)

• Age (18–29, 30–44, 45–59, 60 or older)

• Race/Hispanic ethnicity (white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, other non-Hispanic, two-plus

races non-Hispanic, Hispanic)

• Education (less than high school, high school, some college, bachelor’s degree or higher)

• Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West)

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

• Household income (less than $10,000, $10,000–$24,999, $25,000–$49,999, $50,000–$74,999,

$75,000–$99,999, $100,000–$149,999, $150,000 or more)

• Home ownership status (own, rent/other)

• Metropolitan area (yes, no)

Once the study sample has been selected and the survey administered, and all the survey data are edited

and made ﬁnal, design weights are adjusted to account for any dierential nonresponse that may have

resulted during the ﬁeld period. Depending on the speciﬁc target population for a given study, geodemo-

graphic distributions for the corresponding population are obtained from the CPS, the American

Community Survey (ACS), or in certain instances from the weighted KP proﬁle data. For this purpose, an

iterative proportional ﬁtting (raking) procedure is used to produce the ﬁnal weights. In the ﬁnal step,

calculated weights are examined to identify and, if necessary, trim outliers at the extreme upper and

lower tails of the weight distribution. The resulting weights are then scaled to aggregate to the total sample

size of all eligible respondents.

For this study, the following benchmark distributions of the US adult general population (age 18 or older)

from the most recent data (March 2015 Supplement) from the Current Population Survey (CPS) were used

for the raking adjustment of weights:

• Gender (male, female) by age (18–29, 30–44, 45–59, 60 or older)

• Race/Hispanic ethnicity (white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, other non-Hispanic, two or more

races non-Hispanic, Hispanic)

• Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West) by metropolitan status (metro, nonmetro)

• Education (high school or less, some college, bachelor’s degree or higher)

• Household income (less than $25,000, $25,000–$49,999; $50,000–$74,999, $75,000–$99,999,

$100,000–$149,999, $150,000 or more)

For more information about the sample and survey methodology, please visit the GfK website at

http://www.g.com/us/Solutions/consumer-panels/Pages/GfK-KnowledgePanel.aspx.

For more information about the Chicago Council Survey, please contact Craig Kafura, research associate,

at ckafura@thechicagocouncil.org.

About the Survey Sample

ABOUT THE SURVEY SAMPLE

2017 Chicago Council Survey

% of 2017

sample

n = 2,020

Average

age

White,

non-Hispanic

Black,

non-Hispanic

Hispanic

Other,

non-Hispanic

Racial composition (%)

18–29

30–44

45–59

60+

Age (%)

High school or

less

Some college/

associate's

degree

College

graduates

Education (%)

Female

Male

Gender (%)

Democrat Independent Republican

Conservative

Moderate

Liberal

Ideology (%)

Core Trump

supporters

About the Survey Sample

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

2017 Chicago Council Survey

% of 2017

sample

n = 2,020

Average

age

White,

non-Hispanic

Black,

non-Hispanic

Hispanic

Other,

non-Hispanic

Racial composition (%)

18–29

30–44

45–59

60+

Age (%)

High school or

less

Some college/

associate's

degree

College

graduates

Education (%)

Female

Male

Gender (%)

Democrat Independent Republican

Conservative

Moderate

Liberal

Ideology (%)

Core Trump

supporters

About the Survey Sample

ABOUT THE CHICAGO COUNCIL

SURVEY

The Chicago Council Survey, conducted every four years since 1974, biennially

since 2002, and annually since 2014, is a trusted and widely cited source

of longitudinal data on American public opinion about a broad range of US

foreign policy and international issues. With its combination of time series

and comprehensive coverage, the Chicago Council Survey is a valuable

resource to policymakers, academics, media, and the general public because

of its unique ability to capture the sense of particular eras—post-Vietnam,

post-Cold War, post-9/11—and to deﬁne critical shifts in American public

thinking. The Chicago Council Surveys are highly respected and widely used

in policy circles and academic research both in the United States and abroad.

Several scholarly works have drawn on Chicago Council survey data,

including The Foreign Policy Disconnect (Page, Bouton), Public Opinion and

American Foreign Policy (Holsti), Faces of Internationalism (Wittkopf), The

Rational Public (Page, Shapiro), and The Domestic Sources of American

Foreign Policy (ed. McCormick). All of the Chicago Council Survey data sets

are available to the public via the Roper Center and ICPSR, and the 2017

data will be available soon on www.thechicagocouncil.org.

In addition to the annual Chicago Council Survey of American public opinion

and US foreign policy, the Council’s polling has often expanded to inter-

national polling in Asia, Europe, Mexico, and Russia. Recently, the Council has

reintroduced a leaders’ survey as an important component of the 2014 and

2016 Chicago Council Surveys. Besides these comprehensive reports,

the Chicago Council Survey team publishes and disseminates short opinion

briefs on topical issues such as international trade, immigration, North

Korea’s nuclear program, and terrorism. These short reports can be found

on the Council’s website and on the Chicago Council Survey blog

www.thechicagocouncil.org/RunningNumbers.

About the Chicago Council Survey

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

Executive Summary

For example, see Aaron Blake, “The Peril of Opposing Trump

Is Very Real,” Washington Post, September 1, 2017, www.washing-

tonpost.com/news/the-ﬁx/wp/2017/09/01/the-peril-of-opposing-

trump-is-very-real-and-its-coming-into-focus-for-the-gop/?utm_ter-

m=.37f732991eb4.

The dierent ideological compositions of these Trump Republicans

and non-Trump Republicans may have some bearing on these inter-

nal Republican opinion dierences. Non-Trump Republicans (about

half of Republicans in this sample) are more likely to identify them-

selves as ideological moderates (31%) than are Trump Republicans

(16%). But both groups tend to identify more as conservatives (85%

among Trump Republicans and 64% among non-Trump Republicans).

Introduction

By contrast, 36 percent of Americans say that the United States

is no greater than other nations.

Americans and Alliances

Robin Emmott and Steve Holland, “Trump Directly Scolds NATO

Allies, Says They Owe ‘Massive’ Sums,” Reuters, May 24, 2017, http://

www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-europe-idUSKBN18K34D.

Shayna Freisleben, “A Guide to Trump’s Past Comments about

NATO,” CBS News, April 12, 2017, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/

trump-nato-past-comments/.

Jerey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April

2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-

obama-doctrine/471525/.

Robert M. Gates, “The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of

NATO),” speech delivered as Secretary of Defense in Brussels,

Belgium, June 10, 2011, http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.

aspx?speechid=1581.

Alison Mitchell, “Albright Seeks Early Vote In Senate on Larger

NATO,” New York Times, October 8, 1997, http://www.nytimes.

com/1997/10/08/world/albright-seeks-early-vote-in-senate-on-

larger-nato.html?mcubz=0.

Associated Press, “The Latest: Senate Jabs Trump in Unanimous

Vote on NATO,” US News, June 15, 2017, https://www.usnews.com/

news/politics/articles/2017-06-15/the-latest-senate-jabs-trump-in-

unanimous-vote-on-nato.

Lauren Carroll, “Donald Trump Changes NATO Position: ‘It’s No

Longer Obsolete,’” Politifact, April 12, 2017, http://www.politifact.

com/truth-o-meter/statements/2017/apr/12/donald-trump/donald-

trump-nato-i-said-it-was-obsolete-its-no-lo/.

“White House Again Threatens To Quit NATO If Allies’ Spending

Does Not Rise,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 18, 2017,

https://www.rferl.org/a/white-house-again-threatens-quit-nato-al-

lies-dont-raise-spending-as-pledged/28494735.html.

ENDNOTES

Dan Lamothe and Michael Birnbaum, “Defense Secretary Mattis

Issues New Ultimatum to NATO Allies on Defense Spending,”

Washington Post, February 15, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.

com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/02/15/mattis-trumps-defense-sec-

retary-issues-ultimatum-to-nato-allies-on-defense-spending/?utm_

term=.7a868bc4b3.

H.R. McMaster and Gary Cohn, “America First Doesn’t Mean

America Alone,” Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2017,

https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-ﬁrst-doesnt-mean-america-

alone-1496187426.

The Council ﬁrst asked about defending Baltic NATO allies in 2014,

and about defending South Korea from North Korea in 1990.

For example, see Chicago Council on Global Aairs, “Asia in the Age

of Uncertainty,” January 2017, www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/

default/ﬁles/asia-age-of-uncertainty-report_20170201.pdf.

Americans and Trade

Donald Trump, “Remarks by President Trump et al. at Signing

of Trade Executive Orders,” speech, Washington, DC, March 31,

2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-oce/2017/03/31/re-

marks-president-trump-et-al-signing-trade-executive-orders.

For more, see Dina Smeltz and Karen Whisler, “Pro-Trade Views on

the Rise, Partisan Divisions on NAFTA Widen,” Chicago Council on

Global Aairs, August 2017, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/

publication/pro-trade-views-rise-partisan-divisions-nafta-widen.

Federica Cocco, “Most US Manufacturing Jobs Lost to Technology,

Not Trade,” Financial Times, December 2, 2016, https://www.ft.com/

content/dec677c0-b7e6-11e6-ba85-95d1533d9a62.

“President Trump Delivers on Jobs for the American People,” White

House Oce of the Press Secretary, March 24, 2017, https://www.

whitehouse.gov/the-press-oce/2017/03/24/president-trump-deliv-

ers-jobs-american-people.

Donald Trump speech in Louisville, KY, Fox Business, March 31, 2017,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s5hIBNw0qj0.

This continues an upward trend for Democrats. In 2008, just 41 per-

cent held favorable views of the trade deal, and that number was

63 percent in 2013.

Hannah Beech, “Donald Trump Talked a Lot About China at the

Debate. Here’s What China Thought About That,” Time, September

26, 2016, http://time.com/4509121/china-presidential-debate-hil-

lary-clinton-donald-trump/.

Americans on Immigration and Climate Change

Marcelo Rochabrun, “ICE Ocers Told to Take Action Against

All Undocumented Immigrants Encountered While on Duty,”

ProPublica, July 7, 2017, https://www.propublica.org/article/ice-

ocers-told-to-take-action-against-all-undocumented-immigrants.

Lenny Bernstein, “NIH Unit Deletes References to Climate ‘Change,’”

Washington Post, August 23, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.

com/news/to-your-health/wp/2017/08/23/nih-unit-deletes-referenc-

es-to-climate-change/; Timothy Cama, “EPA Head Casts Doubt on

Supposed Threat from Climate Change,” The Hill, August 9, 2017,

http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/345937-epa-head-

casts-doubt-on-supposed-threat-from-climate-change.

These ﬁndings are matched by other polls. For example, a Quin-

nipiac University poll conducted August 9–15, 2017, found that 63

percent of Americans say that illegal immigrants who are currently

living in the United States should be allowed to stay in the United

States and to eventually apply for US citizenship, while 22 percent

said they should be required to leave (and 10% said they should be

allowed to remain but not apply for citizenship).

“Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord,” Oce

of the White House Press Secretary, June 1, 2017, https://www.

whitehouse.gov/the-press-oce/2017/06/01/statement-presi-

dent-trump-paris-climate-accord.

Conclusion

Alexandra Wilts, “James Mattis Contradicts Trump Over North Korea

Comments: ‘We’re Never Out of Diplomatic Solutions,’” Independent,

August 30, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/amer-

icas/us-politics/north-korea-trump-mattis-talking-over-diplomacy-

response-a7921121.html.

Endnotes

What Americans Think about America First 2017 Chicago Council Survey

Additional reports based on the 2017 Chicago Council Survey are

available at www.thechicagocouncil.org:

“Two in Three Americans Support

Increased Federal Healthcare

Spending,” Craig Kafura and Dina

Smeltz, September 7, 2017.

“US Public Not Convinced that

Trump’s Policies Will Make America

Safer,” Dina Smeltz and Karl

Friedho, September 11, 2017.

“American Opinion on US-Russia

Relations: From Bad to Worse,”

Dina Smeltz and Lily Wojtowicz,

August 2, 2017.

“North Korea Now Seen as a Top

Threat Facing the United States,”

Karl Friedho and Dina Smeltz,

August 7, 2017.

“Pro-Trade Views on the Rise,

Partisan Divisions on NAFTA

Widen,” Dina Smeltz and

Karen Whisler, August 14, 2017.

Chicago Council on Global Aairs

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The Chicago Council on Global Aairs is an

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